Lack of clear policy leads to silence on the Baloch front

The reference to Balochistan in the PM’s 2016 Independence Day speech triggered speculation over possible Indian support for the Baloch cause.
Hinglaj Mata. | EPS
Hinglaj Mata. | EPS

The reference to Balochistan in the prime minister’s 2016 Independence Day speech triggered speculation over possible Indian support for the Baloch cause. But the debate on Balochistan did not last long as it was driven by a few cryptic statements of the prime minister and died a natural death without further inputs from the government.

Why did the government fail to sustain public interest? The Bangladeshi experience is instructive in this regard. East Pakistan bordered upon West Bengal, one of the most populous states of India that was well-represented in the Parliament, bureaucracy, media, and intelligentsia. Partition did not completely disrupt ties between East Pakistan and West Bengal. The elite among the partition refugees from East Pakistan were influential within India. And there was a significant Hindu population in East Pakistan that was among the Pakistani army’s primary targets. When Pakistan unleashed a genocide targeting Bengalis, West Bengal played an important role in raising the issue across the world and hosted the liberation movement as well as refugees.

Balochistan does not share a border with India. Both the pre-1947 Baloch Muslim settlers and post-1947 non-Muslim Baloch refugees are small in numbers and have assimilated with related groups in northern and western India. Unlike the Bengalis from East Pakistan, the people of Baloch origin do not enjoy any clout in India. Moreover, there is hardly any awareness about Balochistan in India except that it is occasionally associated with temples such as Lasbela’s Hinglaj Mata. Our history textbooks focus entirely on Sindh and (West) Punjab ignoring Balochistan, whose history goes back to Mehrgarh that predates the Indus Valley Civilisation. Also, the Indian intelligentsia and media are divided. One section is more concerned about human rights violations in distant countries than in nearby Balochistan. The other conflates the desirability and feasibility of Baloch independence and is, therefore, wildly enthusiastic about the Baloch cause. In contrast, the Bangladeshi liberation movement received widespread support cutting across ideological divides.

Given the lack of awareness about Balochistan, the divisions within the Indian intelligentsia and media, and the miniscule Baloch population in India, it is difficult to mobilise public opinion in favour of the Baloch cause. The difficulty is compounded by the absence of a clear government policy on Balochistan. In fact, the government has not even adopted a uniform spelling for Balochistan in its communications.

To facilitate public debate, the government has to first identify the parameters for evaluating the desirability of intervening in Balochistan. While we should not allow the short run calculus to be muddied by misplaced hopes of better ties with Pakistan (and China), we should not be over-optimistic about the long-term prospects either. We should not intervene under the illusion that an independent Balochistan will necessarily embrace secular democracy or provide India with preferential access to its mineral wealth and overland access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The Bangladeshi experience is sobering. The secular liberation movement lost ground to religious extremists and the army, who supported insurgencies and cross-border terrorism targeting India. Also, until recently, Bangladesh did not provide India with access to the North-east. (In the meantime, China, which supported Pakistan in 1971, emerged as a major trade partner and defence supplier to Bangladesh.)

India’s Balochistan policy should be governed by an assessment of the country’s long-term interests and its capability to intervene meaningfully in favour of the Baloch people, who are divided across three countries and are led by a fragmented leadership. The Baloch issue should not be used as a bargaining chip or quick-fix to India’s Pakistan problem because that will both harm the Baloch people and reduce India’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Vikas Kumar

Assistant Professor, School of Development, Azim Premji University, Bengaluru

vikasprithvipur@gmail.com

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