For me the greatest strategic achievements of 2017 was the eventual defeat of the ISIS both at Mosul and Raqqa and its eviction from the Levant. The coming of the ISIS in 2014 heralded an era of sustained turbulence and conflict. The regret I carry into 2018 is that ISIS may live to fight another day. It still exists in virtual and networked state awaiting opportunity to re-emerge. It will be a tragedy if the world does not get its act together.
The Middle East is in ferment. Dormant conflicts such as the Palestinian Israeli one are being fanned in the hopes of creating an uncertain peace. While the events in Saudi Arabia are actually encouraging in terms of the setting of the stage for a revamp of one strain of Islam, the pace of change seems unnerving. If 2018 is spent in consolidation, cultivation of goodwill and withdrawal from Yemen by the young Saudi Crown Prince it could augur well for the strategic environment of the Middle East. The Crown Prince has also to realise that too much too soon is likely to open up spaces for entities such as ISIS.
However, the Iran-Saudi divide is set to only worsen as the hold of Iran over the Levant strengthens and Russia too steps in to prevent the dilution of Iran’s strength in Lebanon. I do anticipate President Trump eventually pulling out from the Iran Nuclear Treaty of July 2015 much in the style of disruptive leadership that has become his trademark as exemplified by the decision on Jerusalem.
When it comes to India’s strategic security in the external domain, unlike earlier years it has now to start with China and then swing to Pakistan; or perhaps look at collusion between the two. It is known that China’s backing down from Doklam was much to do with India’s sensitive handling and also China’s pragmatism due to the then upcoming BRICS summit and the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. With information available that the PLA with enhanced strength of regulars has decided to stick it out opposite Doklam for the current winter with some improved and new infrastructure, it is likely that we have not seen the end to the issue.
It appears almost a guarantee that 2018 is likely to witness Doklam 2 with a difference in approach. China is likely to give coercion some importance but perhaps even more will be the focus on the issue with which it failed in 2017—information war. India will have to secure its information and cyber domains besides sharpening its diplomacy to retain Bhutan without any compromise. In fact, Bhutan will probably be the focus of attention in 2018.
It is well known that Pakistan deeply studied Doklam and was actually surprised at India’s professional handling of the standoff. The potential of this being studied jointly by China and Pakistan is obvious. This brings about the chances of higher levels of collusion between the two countries. 2018 will be yet too early for the negatives of the CPEC starting to take shape but Pakistan’s economic confidence is unlikely to sustain beyond that year, especially once the loans start to be returned.
2017 has been a significant year in terms of China’s increasing strategic footprint in South Asia. Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Maldives have all received Chinese attention. Towards the end of the year, Nepal has left India in a tizzy. However, there is a counter-offensive on the cards; its effectiveness will depend on the speed with which India acts.
With Pakistan in election mode in 2018, the turbulence within that country will be more marked. With India’s elections due in 2019 nothing in terms of peace initiatives should be expected. A possible new round of some parleys, if any at all, may take place with Pakistan towards end of 2019. Yet, with Hafiz Saeed seeking a political future and Pervez Musharraf backing him while looking for his own return, the potential for unpredictable acts against India is rife. That is where the real danger for India lies in 2018.
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