Chinese soldiers were already advancing towards Doka La when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping shook hands on June 9 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Astana. The standoff had reached its peak when the two met a month later on July 7 at the G20 summit at Hamburg. The standoff has since tapered off—though imperceptibly—and by most estimates it is likely to continue till late autumn, even early winter. Why the standoff happened, persisted and defied an early resolution has meanwhile triggered a whole range of prognosis.
Let’s answer the ‘what’ before exploring the ‘whys’: This standoff seems to be part of an evolving pattern. Chinese and Indian forces were likewise face-to-face at Chumar and Demchok during the September 2014 Xi-Modi summit and a similar standoff at Depsang had marked Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to New Delhi in May 2013 when Dr Manmohan Singh was the prime minister.
And now, as Indian ministers and officials begin hectic visits to China in the run-up to the September 2017 BRICS summit in Xiamen, this border standoff once again shows signs of a similar gradual climbdown. The current standoff’s trilateral nature however is what makes it complicated this time with perilous implications for the India-Bhutan special relationship.
Second, this also seems to be part of China’s growing assertiveness against all its neighbouring countries. The last four years of Xi’s presidency mark China’s coming out of its closet —biding one’s time. China pursued unilateral muscle flexing to reclaim territories that it always believed to be part of China. The standoff at Doka La is similar to China asserting claims against Russia, Japan, and other ASEAN members. China today has the will and wherewithal to retrieve its territories lost to unequal treaties.
China however is extremely selective: It is validating a few of these legal instruments while rejecting others. An apt example could be the judgement by the Court of Arbitration that last year debunked China’s historic claims to the South China Sea based on the Communist nation’s so-called nine-dash line.
Now we can explore the ‘why’ part beginning with President Xi’s domestic compulsions.
The sacking of Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai this Saturday reflects the Communist Party’s internal political turmoil around its impending leadership succession. Sun, a protege of former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, had emerged as contender for the top position in the post-Xi leadership that Xi is expected to outline at the coming National People Congress meet this autumn.
He will also present the NPC with a work report thereby justifying his second term till 2023. Incidentally, former party secretary of the same Chongqing municipality, Bo Xilai had become the scapegoat in the last power transition in 2012 where he had emerged as a strong contender against Xi.
Xilai, a protege of former President Jiang Zemin, has since been publicly disgraced and jailed since 2013. This pattern has become increasingly transparent as also vicious, generating new pressure points on China’s leaders. Xi has limited space to manoeuvre and cannot be seen making any concessions to India. The People’s Liberation Army is celebrating its 90th anniversary which also makes accommodation a difficult option.
Externally as well China feels unhappy. It has had 24 rounds of border negotiations with Bhutan over 33 years and has not been able to resolve its border issues with this tiny kingdom. China holds India responsible for Thimphu’s tenacity to withstand China. Politically, China abhors the Doka La episode as it has brought Bhutan closer to India. On June 16, Thimphu invited Indian soldiers to push back advancing PLA soldiers as they entered Doka La. Militarily, China feels insecure with its forces in Chumbi Valley being sandwiched by Indians forces in Sikkim and Bhutan. China wants to widen the Chumbi Valley, jetting towards India’s Siliguri corridor to gain military advantage of proximity and the height of Doka La.
Diplomatically, China seeks to delink Bhutan from India to unleash incentives and manipulate Bhutan’s ruling class. Strategically, the Chinese believe in killing the money to scare the tiger. So browbeating Bhutan, for them, has lessons for other neighbours. Conversely, losing face to India will bolster all its neighbours who may gang up against China’s aggressive posturing and land grabs.
However, the repeated visits of Indian officials in the run up to the BRICS summit may offer China a face saver. Ajit Doval’s visit to China next week to attend the BRICS national security advisors meet may confirm the thesis of tapering off in China’s rhetoric and strengthen atmospherics for future trilateral dialogue. China’s rather well-calibrated rhetoric has been tapering off indicating a prolonged standoff without raising the costs. India nonetheless must remain conscious to China’s efforts at injecting anxieties amongst the Bhutanese.
China for example has been projecting this standoff as if it is between China and India, fanning sentiments on how Bhutan remains vulnerable to such muscle flexing by two big neighbours. Or, how India may be using Bhutan to pursue its own security interests.
An unusual trip last week by Dr Jiang Yili, counsellor at China’s Embassy in New Delhi and wife of Ambassador Luo Zhaohu, who has a doctoral degree from and on India, to Bhutan and her meetings with all royals including the Queen Mother is symptomatic of India’s potential vulnerabilities. The couple has been extremely active in meeting India’s political personalities, visiting India’s Northeast which has gone mostly unreported.
There is also little official clarification available on whether this is happening in consultation with India or does it mark India’s inability to even keep a tab on these visits, meetings, their outcomes and implications for India-Bhutan ties?
Swaran Singh
Professor, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi
Email: ssingh@jnu.ac.in