Ideology, UN and our Kashmir policy
Many Indians are dismayed at the latest turn of events in Kashmir—the collapse of the PDP-BJP alliance. The earlier peace initiative of declaring a ceasefire during Ramzan evoked a mixed response. The killing of a prominent journalist and a soldier, besides several grenade attacks were a message from the insurgents that they are not interested in peace. In the midst of all this came a one-sided UN Human Rights Commission report that blamed the Indian government for all the violence in Kashmir. Violence in the Kashmir Valley, not the whole of J&K, is a complicated issue and to understand the present and predict the future, one needs patience and an understanding of broad historical currents.
As someone involved with the issue for over three decades, the current events do not come as a surprise. Like all insurgencies, the one in Kashmir has also transformed from a socio-economic problem to a purely political issue. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s declaration of a 1000-year war with India over Kashmir or Hafiz Saeed’s dream of ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’ (conquest of India) as well as global issues like the rise of ISIS all impact the Kashmir problem. It seems Pakistan is determined to fight India to the last Kashmiri.
Insurgency is like an amoeba, it changes shape and size over time. So any kind of ‘template’ or standard operating procedure to tackle the issue is a non-starter. It is also a truism that the role of armed forces in counterinsurgency is that of an ‘enabler’; they cannot provide a solution by themselves. This needs reiteration, so that it is clearly understood. An insurgency may start as a protest movement against election rigging, turn to secession and finally into a religio-politico demand like establishment of a kingdom of God. The Kashmir insurgency has precisely gone through these phases.
Goaded by parachuted ‘experts’ and drawing-room-liberals, India’s policy towards Kashmir has been stuck in the rhetoric of ‘winning hearts and minds’. Economic packages and development are sought to be the answer to the violence in Kashmir. But the fact is that with around 6 per cent poverty, Kashmir is one of the better-off regions in India. Using economic goodies to wean away an ideological convert from violence is like treating a cancer patient with TB drugs! Is it any wonder that this has failed to achieve any results?
In the early 1990s, the main demand of the Kashmiris was for an independent Kashmir. The movement was headed by JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front). It was spontaneous and triggered by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many visitors to the Valley at that time, including this author, were often told by ordinary Kashmiris that if countries in the Soviet Union can become independent why can’t Kashmir? However by the mid-90s, the movement was taken over by pro-Pakistan groups with Benazir Bhutto chanting ‘Azadi of Kashmir’ while actually promoting a merger with Pakistan.
J&K in its present form is the only former princely state that has retained its British-era boundaries. All other states have been reorganised on linguistic basis and have found sufficient ‘azadi’ within India.
Indian attempts to address the political issue in J&K are severely constrained by the fact that under the umbrella of UN resolutions, Pakistan continues to intervene. India is guilty of lack of will to take action to deal with the historical folly of taking the issue to the UN on 1 January 1948. The original issue was our complaint over Pakistan’s invasion.
But to PM Nehru’s horror, the UN, dominated by the West, sidelined the issue and instead disputed India’s sovereignty. Nehru violated the basic principle that strong countries do not take their disputes to the UN but solve them on their own. No other secessionist issue has ever been on the UN agenda, be it Tibet, Balochistan, Mindanao island of Philippines, Northern Ireland or even our own Naga or Mizo problems! It is time India withdraws its complaint from the UN and ask the agency’s observers to go home. It must begin to deal with Kashmir as an internal issue. Trifurcation of Kashmir is one possible solution. But the first step for that is India withdrawing its complaint from the UN. This is likely to happen in the near future as that is the first step to deal with the Kashmir issue on a long-term basis. The year 1971 was the right moment for this step, but even the ‘bold’ Indira Gandhi demurred from taking this logical step. The present PM, hopefully, is made of sterner stuff.
Only after Kashmir is delinked from the UN and Pakistan, a peace process can begin. Peace process emphasises persuasion, negotiations, socio-economic measures and winning over the people. In case of counterinsurgency, the emphasis is on the use of force to create conditions to implement a peace agenda. Countering an ethno-religious revolt involves enforcing peace, a system of governance, values, ideals and a mode of behaviour. This differs from the peace approach; it is a wider concept and is preferred to the narrowly-defined one, counterinsurgency.
Counterinsurgency is often perceived to seek preservation of status quo or imposition of status quo ante. It is in an ideologically weak position while dealing with insurgency that promises change/revolution/utopia. Peace enforcement is concept that seeks ‘regime change’ in the thinking and behaviour of the target region, nation or group. Implicit in this is the rejection of the insurgent’s values, ideals, ideology and methods. It is a more positive concept compared to a mere counter to insurgency and includes peacemaking as an integral part. The million-dollar question is: Will India bite the bullet and free itself from the shackles of UN intervention and its fallout of Pakistani meddling?
col. Anil Athale (RETD)
Former Chhatrapati Shivaji fellow, USI. Has studied insurgencies in Kashmir, Northeast, Sri Lanka,
Northern Ireland and Chhattisgarh
Email: anil.athale@gmail.com