The one thing unique in the Constitution was the right for all adults, regardless of qualification, to vote. Since then, the process of democratisation of electoral procedures has steadily advanced. But this advance has not been uniform or without trouble.Since 1952, having obtained legislative mandate from the mass electorate, the ruling Congress proceeded systematically to demolish the old order in the name of socialism and egalitarianism.
The “old rich” consisting of princes, zamindars, landlords, and the urban and rural rich was levelled through expropriation, nationalisation, punitive taxation and land ceilings. From 1956, we saw the creation of linguistically homogeneous states. Fortunately, the danger of linguistic nationalism has passed and a national identity emerged.
Socialist policy, vigorously imposed by the political elite, placed great emphasis on the public sector. This slowed down after the traumatic Emergency and the loss of power of the Congress in 1977. Between 1977 and 1991, socialist policymakers struggled to find a solution to slow growth and continued backwardness. The liberalisation of 1991 finally ushered in market capitalism.
A “new rich” class emerged and inequalities worsened due to rapid economic growth. But since liberalisation, most Indians have prospered and have done better materially than their parents. This brought the issue of identity based on individual achievement to the forefront in contrast to group identity.
Elections were fought largely to elect members of dominant castes in the 70 per cent of general seats while reserving the rest for SCs and STs. Electoral politics was seen in terms of mobilisation of the four varnas. The North and West of India had a Brahmin- and Kshatriya-dominated polity but in the South, the polity was dominated largely by different jatis or sub-castes of the Sudra varna.
Electoral politics led to the rise of jati-based political parties in the South agitating for the fruits of political power, preferential employment and distribution of free and subsidised goods. This was repeated in the North and West ending the domination of varna-based politics and ushering in jati-based alignments. This also disrupted the attraction of national parties based on ideology. Yet there was a need for a political formation at the national level which could hold the country together as social and economic changes accelerated and created both dynamism and chaos.
As India became increasingly urbanised, the 40 per cent of population in urban areas became detached from their age-old village disciplines, preferences and prejudices. Released from social control, urbanites began to assert their individual impulses. With the loosening of social responsibilities, urban areas experienced civic chaos which has been increasing over time.
This rejection of the old social and moral order in urban areas soon extended back to villages through increased physical mobility. The access to cinema, television and mobiles introduced new ways of behaviour. The idea that individual rights were more important than social obligations began to take hold among those who aspired to “modernity”. This was a recipe for social chaos, resultant violence and confusion of moral values.
Soon religion became redefined as an ideology rather than as a way of life practiced by ancestors and validated by the passage of centuries and accepted by all. This phenomenon of religious ideology has begun to affect the political sphere as the most convenient way of mobilising the masses and organising the electoral process. The ban on appeals to religion to solicit votes was submerged in specific issues which questioned or defended specific religious and cultural practices.
The major conflict in the polity revolves around the idea of a common civil code to follow the common criminal code already instituted under British rule. The common civil code will eliminate established ancestral practices legitimised by time or by religious texts. The need for a common civil code is derived from a political notion that all citizens should behave in the same manner and be treated equally in all respects. This notion of equality comes in the way of differential behavioural patterns of populations with different religious and cultural traditions.
When people are unlike each other in terms of religion, caste, gender and individual endowments, imposing equality on them is tantamount to levelling everyone to a common minimum standard. Making everyone equal in economic, cultural and religious terms can only be attempted under religious and atheistic totalitarian regimes. Religious levelling has led to massacres and oppression of vast populations. Many nations were built on this type of levelling—Pakistan is an example. Even as recently as the last century, the equalising policies of the Nazi, Communist and Maoist regimes resulted in the massacre of nearly 100 million people. This cannot be repeated.
In order to be stable and peaceful, a polity should respect and protect the cultural and religious beliefs of the people. Real change will come only when individuals feel the need to do so and not when legislators, judges and bureaucrats force them. It may be better to let people be what they want to be and allow change gradually to come on its own. Anything else is likely to be resisted, ineffective and counterproductive.
Policy in India was driven by a legislative, judicial and bureaucratic elite motivated by the concept of “modernity” as defined by the West and enshrined in the Constitution. Despite slowing our national growth, this interventionist policy did not succeed in the sphere of economic equality; it is unlikely to work with regard to ancestral religious and cultural traditions.
This whole idea of “modernity” is now challenged by the majority of electors who have reached the limits of their patience and tolerance. The electorate has been expressing their religious and cultural preferences and prejudices. Whether this is a triumph of democracy or collapse of “modernity” depends on the reader’s point of view but this reality must be acknowledged.