Delivering the keynote address at the Galle Dialogue, national security adviser Ajit Doval evoked the UN General Assembly Resolution of October 1971 and declared the Indian Ocean should become a Zone of Peace. The genesis of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) could be traced to the Conference of the Heads of States of non-aligned countries in Cairo in 1964, when then Sri Lankan prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike spoke out against increasing superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. The Cairo conference adopted two resolutions: the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons covering the oceans of the world, especially those which had been hitherto free of nuclear weapons; opposition to big power efforts to establish and maintain bases, in the context of the Cold War rivalry, in the Indian Ocean region.
Forty-three years have elapsed since the UN General Assembly passed the resolution. The security architecture in the Indian Ocean region has undergone fundamental transformation. The US, which was perceived to be the hegemonist power in the 1970s, is viewed by many countries, including India, to be a positive force for peace and stability. Most countries would like the US to maintain a credible naval presence in the region. The Soviet Union has disintegrated and Russia does not have the resources to compete with the US. China, which in the 1970s did not have much of a presence in the Indian Ocean region, has emerged as a rising power and is increasing its influence in a big way among the littoral states of the ocean.
According to many commentators, Doval’s statement was intended to persuade the littoral states to come together and keep China out of the Indian Ocean region.
Of equal relevance is the transformation which has taken place in the policies and programmes of the Sri Lankan government, which was in the forefront championing the goal of IOPZ. It should be pointed out that the IOPZ declaration was adopted by the UN in the backdrop of much bickering and controversy. No country dared to oppose the resolution and vote against it, because it would have meant advocacy of the Cold War and big power rivalry. Except People’s Republic of China, all the major powers—France, UK, USSR and US—abstained from voting. The resolution was adopted by 61 votes to 0 with 55 abstentions. An ad hoc committee on Indian Ocean to study the implications of the resolution was constituted to suggest practical measures to implement the resolution. On December 11, 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which called for convening of a conference on Indian Ocean in Colombo in 1981. But, by that time, Sri Lanka had become lukewarm to the proposal it had mooted.
Perceptive observers of the South Asian scene can discern subtle changes in the Sri Lankan position when India exploded the nuclear device in 1974. Shirley Amarasinghe, the Sri Lankan diplomat, declared that Colombo did not want the superpowers to be replaced by a hegemonist littoral power. To add to New Delhi’s dismay Sri Lanka began to support Pakistan’s proposal for declaring South Asia as a nuclear weapons-free zone. When the United National Party was voted to power in 1977, Colombo’s foreign policy began to show a marked preference towards the West. On Afghanistan and Cambodia, Colombo began to toe the American line. What is more, though Colombo paid lip service to IOPZ, it never made any attempt to get the resolution implemented. In this context, swearing by IOPZ every year in the UN General Assembly, one is reminded of the famous lines of W H Auden, “Let mortals beware of words, for with words we lie, can say peace when we mean war.”
Efforts to build up an anti-China alliance in the Indian Ocean region are unlikely to succeed. China has, during recent years, successfully adopted a policy of winning friends and influencing people. Beijing has strengthened its links with most of India’s neighbours—Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Speaking about India’s relations with neighbouring countries Doval rightly said, a few weeks ago, that except for Bhutan, New Delhi’s ties with other countries are beset with problems. It must be pointed out that every country has the sovereign right to diversify its foreign relations, but when these links adversely affect India’s vital security interests, India has to be vigilant and take appropriate action. The growing links between Colombo and Beijing, including the visit of submarines to the Sri Lankan ports, are clear pointers to disturbing trends in India’s southern neighbourhood.
A close scrutiny of Sri Lanka-India relations clearly reveals that India had always stood by the unity and territorial integrity of the island. During the Fourth Eelam War, India was the principal guarantor of the unity of Sri Lanka.
Significant intelligence inputs made by India enabled the Sri Lankan armed forces to destroy the vital supply lines assiduously built by the Tigers over the years. Without adequate supply of weapons, Tigers became fish out of water. What is more, except for China and Pakistan, most major countries were guided by India’s position on the conflict.
It is against this background that one must analyse the more specific issues relating to Indian security and India-Sri Lanka relations. As far as India is concerned, Sri Lanka is strategically placed and given the geographical location and ethnic linkages the political developments in the island will have profound consequences for Indian security. India and Sri Lanka are so close that there is not enough sea between them for both to have their full share of territorial waters in accordance with international law.
How did Colombo respond when vital Indian security interests were at stake? During the first Indochina War, in May 1954, when New Delhi was using diplomatic pressure to speed up the independence of Indochinese countries, Sir John Kotelawala permitted American Globemasters carrying French troops to make use of the airports in the island. In February 1971, when New Delhi withdrew landing and overflying facilities to Pakistani airplanes, Sri Lanka granted these rights to Pakistani aircraft. These flights involved Pakistani soldiers and war materials and were an illustration of complicity between Pakistan and Sri Lanka against India. In the present situation, if Colombo’s growing friendship with China and Pakistan is intended to “cut India to size”, New Delhi cannot remain unconcerned about these developments.
The writer is former senior professor, the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras.
Email: suryageeth@gmail.com