That, in short, is the story of Manohar Parrikar’s tenure as the defence minister. Parrikar was hand-picked by Prime Minister Modi. A great deal was expected from him. Most disappointingly, his tenure of 28 months will be remembered more for a plethora of unfulfilled promises rather than for any radical reforms. He had excelled as a state CM but could not deliver at the Centre. Why?
His failure can be attributed to two reasons. First, he inherited a non-functional ministry. For eight long years under A K Antony (October 2006 to May 2014), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had acquired a reputation for lethargy and corruption. Decision-making became an alien attribute. There was a policy paralysis. Only those proposals that guaranteed windfall illegal gains for the mighty progressed. After Modi came to power, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley was given additional charge of MoD. It was a monumental blunder. Jaitley possibly
could not have done justice to so many portfolios. As a result, the MoD remained comatose for six months.
Responsibility for India’s defence is discharged through the MoD, which provides the policy framework and wherewithal to the armed forces. It is entirely manned by bureaucrats who are clueless about defence matters. The service headquarters are mere attached offices. They do not form part of the decision-making apparatus.
The degree of gross ineptitude afflicting the MoD can be gauged from the fact that $3 billion of India’s money was lying forgotten with the US government for years, without earning any interest. Worse, India continued to make fresh payments to the US for new weaponry. Parrikar’s revelation in March 2016 shocked the nation.
The MoD has a vast domain of 39 ordnance factories and nine defence public sector undertakings. Yet, the indigenous defence industry has been in an appalling state. India has earned the most disgraceful tag of being the largest importer of conventional defence equipment in the world with 14 per cent of the global share. Despite having 52 defence R&D laboratories in multiple disciplines, no equipment conforming to the parameters has ever been developed in the promised time frame. It has been a chronicle of false claims, tall promises, inexplicable delays and suboptimal products.
The second cause of Parrikar’s failure was his inability to tame the obdurate bureaucracy. He was new to Delhi and had to contend with the status quo culture of the bureaucrats, uniformed and civil, who were contentedly ensconced in their comfort zones. In addition, during the tenures of ‘play safe’ Antony and overworked Jaitley, the MoD had become a bureaucratic citadel. Parrikar’s arrival threatened their unbridled dominance and they resented it. To undermine his authority, they often misled him into making untenable promises.
When Parrikar took over, the modernisation of our armed forces was lagging behind by over 10 years. Nearly 50 per cent of major defence systems were close to getting obsolete. The inventory of critical ammunition was alarmingly low; some were insufficient for even 10 days of intense fighting. Stocks of artillery and tank ammunition needed urgent replenishment. The armed forces had become ‘hollow’.
Restoring operational prowess of the services was by far the most urgent and critical challenge Parrikar faced and he took it up in right earnest. He sought to simplify the convoluted defence procurement procedure and initiate measures to boost indigenous defence production. He mandated that the first priority in all defence procurements should be accorded to the products designed, developed and manufactured indigenously. To expedite procurements, he freed a large number of proposals from offset encumbrances by raising the offset threshold. He liberalised norms for foreign investment and accorded preference to MSMEs for low cost projects. He appreciated that India could develop as a defence manufacturing power only if the prowess of the private sector was fully harnessed. Therefore, he approved adoption of three types of well-defined partnership models with the private sector—strategic, development and
competitive. Strategic needs, quality criticality and cost competitiveness were the key criteria. Such a capacity was to be over and above the capacity and infrastructure that existed in the public sector.
As the bureaucrats wanted the public sector’s monopoly to continue, they resorted tothe time-tested stratagem of constituting expert committees to study issues, thereby deferring decision-making and buying time till Parrikar moved out. This is exactly how the script played out. Parrikar has left. Committee reports are gathering dust and the status quo continues. The MoD carries on nonchalantly. Parrikar’s inability to exert enough pressure in the corridors of power emboldened the bureaucrats to defy and delay his orders. Every progressive step was impeded with crafty dexterity.
It is to Parrikar’s credit that despite the above constraints, he took major decisions to modernise the forces. Atotal of 124 new procurement proposals worth Rs. 2,09,751 crore were accorded approval. Urgently required ordnance worth Rs. 20,000 crore was acquired on fast-track basis. As regards initiating reforms in the higher defence management of the country, his tenure has little to show. Whereas Parrikar enjoyed a cordial personal relationship with the services, he could not get them their due status and recognition. Leaving
aside the grant of distorted OROP, little has been done to assuage the feeling of neglect afflicting the soldiers.
Parrikar had the potential to achieve much more than what the results show. He had his heart in the right place but lacked necessary standing and experience to handle the hostile environment of Delhi. However, due to his empathetic demeanour and sincerity of purpose, he earned the confidence of the services in ample measure—no mean achievement. Hopefully, posterity will not judge him too harshly.
The author is a decorated veteran and an expert in defence procurement procedures.
Email: mrinalsuman@gmail.com