Democracy, for many, is dead or just about to be. The outgoing US president has reflected on the fragility of this fabric to hold the weight of the mass. No doubt, democracy was one of the best ideas of the 20th century which took it for granted that people will speak their minds and shape their future. But it turned out quite on the contrary not only in the postcolonial democracies but also in developed ones as well. As a public enterprise model of politics, 120 countries and 63 per cent of the world population is currently living under the democratic shield. If the 20th century could hold the democratic fabric intact, the 21st century witnesses its setbacks as nominal establishments with autocratic and kleptocratic elements largely ruining the institutions and systems.
The founders of modern democracy (say like John Stuart Mill and James Madison) regarded it as a powerful, but imperfect tool for governance. The imperfect element proved powerful for its way forward in many of the under-developed, newly independent and post colonial nations. Michel Kalecki used the term ‘intermediate regimes’ to the governing establishments in these countries, where the lower middle class and the rich peasantry were identified to perform the role of the ruling class.
Accordingly, whenever social upheavals brought the representatives of the lower middle class to power, they invariably served the interests of the big business often aligned with the remnants of the feudal system. By virtue of their numerical size, the lower middle class (in a democratic frame of elections) succeeded in coming to power. The state under these regimes was expected to play the role of dynamic enterprises and undertake investments to maintain and improve economic growth and ensure development and distribution. They tried to deliver to the interests of the lower middle class (stake holders) with state capitalism as a special purpose vehicle.
Kaleckian theory found that to fulfil these requirements, the ruling regimes had to gain a measure of independence from the foreign capital and carry out land reforms to ensure social equity and establish upward growth of the economy. The regimes however, faced severe resistance from the imperial capitalists and the feudal landlords to achieve these essential and enabling requisites. This recognised them of the imperative to compromise with the upper middle class and international capital. The compromise levels reached the extent of reckoning them as forces capable of threatening the existence of the regime itself. To remain in power, obviously the regimes had to identify other routes—kleptocratic and collaborative. Incompatible partners in this route added to the imperfection of governing tool.
The relevance of this pattern in the Indian context has been debated in the 70s. In 1973, K N Raj by relating the sequence of political events and administrative patterns, established its relevance. However, it was rejected by E M S Nampoothirppad through a different logic: Comparing the nature of power transmission from the imperialistic hands to their local loyalists. He argued further that the very description of the alignment of class forces makes it clear that the concept does not apply to India. This gave birth to new appreciative theoretical debates. One inference from these debates is: If the power is acquired by the recipient regime in a dominating position, then the political power can be consolidated systematically in collaboration with the interest groups.
It is not meant here to argue that democracy has deteriorated only in the post-colonial countries. Rather, there is an aversion to this governance tool across the spectrum by virtue of the imperfection it inherited en-route. This prompted to pin point the elements that were (probably) instrumental in deteriorating the democracy. The two prominent causes identified in this context are the financial crisis (recession of 2007-08) and (2) the rise of China as a global power. The Chinese communist party is said to have broken the democratic world’s claim of establishing economic well being. For instance, if the US was doubling living standards every 30 years, China could do it in 10 years (The Economist, 2014)
Further, the democracies in the global space have reoriented its approach and outlook. It has become a rewarding operation for the loyalists making the democratic political establishments become self-serving. Plato’s worry about democracy turned out for right—“citizens would live from day to day, indulging in the pleasure of the moment”. Democratic governments got into the habit of borrowing to meet the short term needs of the people while evading the long run investments required for improving living standards. For sure, they are uncertain of their long term power position. This got into a vicious cycle and resulted in the decline of visible political loyalists, thus increasing occurrences of concentration of power and wealth with few.
It is interesting to note that the share of political party memberships are on the decline across developed democracies. For instance, only one per cent of the British population are members of political parties in 2014 as compared to 20 per cent in 1950 (The Economist, 2014). If one observed, the big debate in the 2015 British elections had been on the inequalities and the economic biases facing the people—the growing inequalities and the failures of the capitalist system to hold democracy straight. It is estimated that the collective wealth of Britain’s richest has more than doubled in ten years. Worldwide studies further confirm that more than half of the voters do not have trust in their governments. If kleptocracy potentially can deliver and replace democracy, should we let it fade away?
C S SUNDARESAN
President of Alliance for Advanced Research and Development Initiatives, an independent think tank
Email: cs.sundaresan@hotmail.com