Weeks after the Barcelona truck terror that killed 13 people in August this year, a top Intelligence Officer, during a high-level meeting of intelligence and security officials in Delhi, had asked whether Indian jiahadis, radicalised by Islamic State (IS) propaganda machinery, were capable of using such weapon of choice in India. “There is always a high chance,” was the answer as they flipped through the pages of interrogation report of IS suspects, who were inspired by Younes Abouyaaqoub, the man behind the vehicle-ramming attack in La Rambla, Barcelona. The meeting also discussed security mechanism required to thwart any attempt of vehicle-ramming in public area.
What can be done to prevent Barcelona, Nice, Berlin-style attacks? There was no definite answer except suggestions to erect various layers of security barricades at sensitive places. The security establishment was shocked again earlier this week following the IS-inspired jihadi struck in the heart of New York. Significantly, the lone wolf attack was carried out just days after the terrorist outfit lost control of so-called capital of caliphate in Raqqa. Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, the 29-year-old self-radicalised terrorist, who plowed the truck into a crowd, had never made a pilgrimage to Syria and Iraq. Neither was he trained in the battlefield of Afghanistan. The man, who used a pickup truck as the mowing machine, had migrated to the US in 2010 from Uzbekistan and suspected to had been indoctrinated in the virtual world by IS handlers.
The New York incident is a grim reminder that terrorism cannot be tackled by regaining the territories. The IS lost Mosul and Raqqa, but the shrinking space has triggered the fear of New York-style attacks abroad. At least two aspects—re-migration of foreign terrorists and activities of sleeper cells like Saipov—could prove to be nightmare for the security agencies with serious implications for South Asia and the West.
The unusualness of terrorists’ modus operandi in Nice, Berlin, Barcelona and New York have been borrowed from IS’s parent organisation al-Qaeda, which in 2010 called for using pickup truck as perfect weapon to kill ‘kafirs’. For a more effective and lethal attack, the outfit had asked the lone wolves to select the most-crowded locations with narrower spots and less escape rou
es. The ideal location, it preached, is a place where there are maximum pedestrians and least vehicles.
The monitoring of suspects may not resolve the vulnerabilities in truck terror attacks. Usual standard operating procedures and typical security doctrines are certainly not going to help against the global terror machines. The only way is to knock on as many doors as possible for twin programmes— De-radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation.
Both the US and India contained IS dangers in 2015-16 and security agencies felt proud in stopping the export of human resources to Raqqa to fight the religious war. But, since the dream of caliphate is over, the misguided but motivated terrorists in search of a safe haven may turn to sanctuaries based in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Nangarhar province, certain pockets in Kunduz, Ghazni, Farah and Lashkargah could turn into another base for the returnees, who could become arsenal for proxy wars in the region.
While the open war against terror would continue for some time, the intelligence agencies and anti-terror forces need to strengthen the surveillance on the radicalised youth fishing on the internet. The jihadi videos streaming on masked websites can be more frightening than tackling terrorists in the battlefield. Moreover, the agencies need to be careful about the fundamentalist leader’s penetration in Kashmir Valley, where they are using every trick in the book to rekindle passions for Azadi. A multi-agency effort is required to identify and wean away youths charmed by IS’s influence.
To prevent a Barcelona and New York, the counter-terror strategists need to delete the power point presentations, and deal with the issue of radicalisation by involving the communities. Growing radicalisation cannot be tackled purely as a security problem. A radicalised person exists in deep slumber, he is simply hypnotised. Even the wise lot can be exploited and forced to act like robots for jihad. The IS sleeper cells, after losing the dream of caliphate, is likely to assert themselves vigorously and all we need is proactive intervention to stop them in their tracks.
yatish@newindianexpress.com