Imran Khan, sworn in as Prime Minister of Pakistan on Saturday, August 18, is widely regarded as a puppet of the Pakistan Army. That is only partly true for three reasons. First, Imran has a mind of his own. He opportunistically used the army’s clout to win the general election just as the army used him to coalesce the deadly triumvirate that rules Pakistan: the Islamic clergy, terrorist organisations and a pliant judiciary. Second, a closer study of Imran’s politics suggests he will clash with the army sooner rather than later. For example, Imran wants to open Pakistan’s 2,300-km border with Afghanistan.
The Pakistan Army wants to close it with a fence. Imran is vicariously anti-American at a time when the Pakistan Army is trying to repair relations with Washington. Imran wants to spend more money on education and healthcare. The Pakistan Army wants to spend every spare rupee (and there aren’t many) on the defence budget from which it siphons off large sums.
Imran entered politics tangentially through his interest in health care, building a cancer hospital in memory of his mother, who died of the disease. He is at some point likely to challenge the army’s constantly spiralling defence budget that is now nearly 4 per cent of GDP and has made Pakistan Army officers the country’s wealthiest land owners and businessmen.
There is a third reason, though, why Imran will remain a puppet of the powerful army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for at least a while. He knows what the army does to prime ministers who don’t toe its line. Nawaz Sharif defied the army and has been reduced to a cipher in prison. Benazir Bhutto defied General Pervez Musharraf and was assassinated.
Her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged by General Zia-ul-Haq. So Imran will tread cautiously. If he outlives his utility value, he will be sidelined like other Pakistan Army puppets or protectees, including, most infamously, Dawood Ibrahim. Imran’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), doesn’t have a majority in the National Assembly. Terror groups and religious extremists support him in parliament. Shackled by needing to run a minority government, Imran is vulnerable to being remote-controlled by the army.
What kind of prime minister will Imran make? The Economist minces no words: “Mr. Khan who has seldom attended parliamentary sessions and who has described the National Assembly as ‘the most boring place on earth’, must find a sense of dedication, detail and compromise that has evaded him till now. He must learn to work with a political class he has only slammed. And he must gently let down his most enthusiastic supports from the irresponsible highs he generated for them—for instance, by promising to end corruption within 90 days.”
For India, the key question is: will terrorism abate under Imran’s prime ministership? The short answer: no. The Pakistan Army controls terrorism against India and Afghanistan. The prime minister has no role in abating or increasing it. Two facts, however, may affect Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. One, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has already greylisted Pakistan over money laundering for terrorist activities. An Asia-Pacific Group delegation of the FATF visited Pakistan earlier this week to examine what steps Islamabad has taken to clean up its act. If the number of terrorists groups that continue to receive finance from Pakistani sources is any indication, then blacklisting Pakistan at next year’s FAFT meeting could be on the cards.
Blacklisting will be devastating for Pakistan’s economy. Its foreign exchange reserves have plunged below $9 billion (by way of comparison, that’s 2 per cent of India’s forex reserves). An International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout is inevitable. But the IMF loan will come with conditions of strict spending restrictions that Imran will find hard to swallow.
The fear of blacklisting, though, could moderate Pakistan Army-abetted terror attacks on India. Ceasefire violations across the Line of Control (LoC) have already reduced significantly. Since Governor’s rule was imposed on June 20, terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir too have declined, with Indian security forces using search-and-destroy tactics with greatly improved effectiveness.
The other key reason why Imran’s prime ministership may bring a relative lull to the Pakistan Army’s terror attacks is its deteriorating relationship with the US. For the first time in over 60 years, the US International Military and Education Training programme that conducts training for armed forces from around the world at US military facilities will bar Pakistan Army participation. China has, meanwhile, begun to pull back some of its investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing recently refused to provide a soft loan in lieu of the IMF bailout. Pakistan’s debt burden to China due to the CPEC is already causing Pakistani commentators to question the viability of the debt-laden infrastructure project.
In the short term, Imran will be a ventriloquist for the Pakistan Army, parroting its line on Kashmir. Rawalpindi wants a resumption of dialogue with India, but along with a continuation of terror. In the dialogue, it wants three issues to be discussed: Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek. For India, Siachen and Sir Creek are closed chapters. Kashmir is relevant only in the context of ending Pakistan-abetted terrorism in the Valley. The divergence between the two sides will ensure that no meaningful dialogue can take place till Pakistan ends its criminal use of terror as state policy.
The generals in Rawalpindi have ensured that Imran’s PTI, lacking a majority in the National Assembly, remains at the mercy of its extremist allies. It is a matter of time before Imran Khan Niazi (that’s his full name) revolts against the army’s authority. The inevitable clash can have only one winner and history tells us it won’t be Imran.