Diplomatic outreach to small states in Indian ocean 

The recent visits by Jaishankar to Seychelles and Doval to Lanka for a trilateral with Maldives are expected to further India’s ties with these nations. But deft handling is crucial
Diplomatic outreach to small states in Indian ocean 

India’s focus on maritime security cooperation took a turn last week even as it increased its diplomatic outreach to the Indian Ocean island countries. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have made an outreach to Seychelles and Sri Lanka, which hosted the trilateral with India and Maldives, respectively. Both these visits are expected to further India’s ties, especially with the small nations that are critical in the Indian Ocean. 

Small islands nations are gaining prominence in the context of the ongoing focus on matters that are maritime in nature. Increasingly, the presence of major powers in the waters around India has been worrying, pushing the country to expand its naval diplomacy and focus on maritime cooperation. China’s presence is one of the pivotal issues pushing India’s outreach. Beijing has already asserted its presence in the Western Pacific, particularly the South China Sea; the pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promotes a maritime component in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route, which essentially looks at enhancing Chinese infrastructural capabilities across a range of states in the Indo-Pacific region. This has brought small states into the greater security perceptions of major powers, vying for both economic and security-driven controls, in the widening gap between the US and China that is currently underway. 

Furthermore, small island developing states (SIDS) are extremely vulnerable to the pressures of non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, transnational crimes, natural calamities and economic challenges that are pushing them closer to the brink of collapse. Progressively, the context of major power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is impacting these states as they are already strapped for cash and infrastructural needs, which are being met by other states that vie for both control and exploitation of natural resources. The United Nations Security Council has called for a collective approach to the issue of ensuring international stability and responsibility in the preservation and sustainability of these small island nations. With increasing geopolitical tensions, the stresses faced by these states are bound to increase in a highly contested space. 

The recent visit of NSA Ajit Doval to Sri Lanka was for the fourth trilateral meeting between the three countries on maritime security cooperation and took place after a gap of six years. The trilateral formulation convened with both Sri Lanka and Maldives began in 2011 and the last meeting was held in 2014. This framework was to build maritime cooperation addressing areas of common concern and promoting existing defence and security ties with the two countries too. India’s efforts to promote this hinges on its primary focus on the Indian Ocean as the theatre of its security priorities in the maritime domain. While the increasing presence of China’s footprint has altered the stability of the South Asian sub-region and that of these island states, India too has to tread softly in its outreach. 

Delicate balance and sensitivity to the needs of the smaller states will remain crucial. In all these three countries, there are factors that will require a deft handling by India. Most importantly the fault lines between domestic politics in these nations and their foreign policies with India will require a nuanced approach. 

First, in the case of Seychelles, there has been a change of government last month. The newly elected government of President Ramkalawan belongs to the Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS) party. While in opposition, the LDS was vociferously opposed to the close ties that the former government of President Danny Faure had with India, in particular objecting to the building of a joint military facility on Assumption Island. This plan that has been agreed to in 2015 during the visit of PM Modi and subsequently revised in 2018 is certainly under the scanner. India’s move will be credible in this context. 

Second, the case of Maldives has also been very sensitive in recent years. Since 2018, there has been an improvement in India’s bilateral ties with the Maldives under President Solih, even as the earlier government under President Yameen had moved closer to China. In recent months, there were anti-India protests in the Maldives, splitting the domestic political space in the Maldives into pro- and anti-India groups. 

Third, ties with Sri Lanka have also see-sawed between two extremes. The return of the Rajapaksa family to the centre stage of politics is not going to be easy, given the close ties Sri Lanka under them had with China earlier. While President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has expressed concerns over Chinese investments, this is difficult to translate into action. The trilateral dialogue seeks to broaden the security consensus in the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre. In October, Sri Lanka expressed concerns over the rise of the Quad even as the grouping concluded its second foreign ministers meeting in Tokyo. These concerns related to the increasing securitisation of the Indian Ocean region. 

While India’s efforts to balance the domestic compulsions in these countries will be critical, it will also be imperative for the small island states to assess where their strategic autonomy is more likely to remain secure. 

Shankari Sundararaman

Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi 

(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)

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