Just a couple of months ago before the lockdown started, the dominant political buzz in Bihar was about second-guessing the viable alternative to Nitish Kumar. Three plausible scenarios were offered—a BJP-led coalition with local parties; a Prashant Kishor-managed third front roping in leaders like Asaduddin Owaisi, Kanhaiya Kumar and others; and an RJD-led existing alliance.
With Amit Shah effectively shooting down the idea of the BJP deserting the JD(U) and the Prashant Kishor initiative proving to be a non-starter, only the RJD-led alliance remains a relevant option. However, it is pertinent to ask whether the RJD is a viable opposition to take on the Nitish-led NDA in Bihar. The test of viability of any political party or alliance in Bihar since 1990 is contingent on it meeting two criteria: the necessary condition and the sufficient condition.
While the necessary condition requires a party/alliance to fully command the loyalty of its core support base, the sufficient condition requires it to win over a section of the opposition’s core support base. No party or alliance in Bihar has won state elections without meeting both the criteria. In other words, an electoral victory necessitates the winning of a section of caste/community who are perceived to be politically hostile to the party seeking their accommodation.
For instance, Lalu Yadav was able to sustain his 15-year hegemony from 1990-2005 not only by holding on to the larger segments of OBCs, Dalits and Muslims, but by effectively winning over a section of upper caste Rajputs who otherwise were dead opposed to the Mandal movement. Similarly, the Nitish-led NDA managed to trounce the RJD in 2005 and 2010 not only by commanding the loyalty of the new core-support base of upper castes, non-Yadav OBCs and Mahadalits, but also by garnering the support of a section of Muslims despite their opposition to the BJP.
The same was true for the 2015 state Assembly election wherein Nitish succeeded in fetching the support of upper castes despite being in an alliance with Lalu. Thus, in every case, the electoral victory fulfilled the twin criteria of commanding one’s core support base and splitting the same of the rival party/alliance. Let us measure the state of the RJD in terms of its ability to meet these yardsticks.
In post-Lalu RJD, the line of succession is unambiguously clear in favour of Tejashwi Yadav. Despite his lacklustre leadership and lack of political maturity, he is the supreme leader of not only the party but also his caste men.
Though he lacks the charisma of his father, no other Yadav leader in any party in Bihar can match his appeal among their caste electorate. Further, the flip-flop by Nitish on his alliance with the BJP and support to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, augur well for Tejashwi as an overwhelming majority of Muslims are left with no other option but to support him as he heads an opposition party with some electoral relevance. In this sense, the RJD meets the first condition of commanding its core support base of ‘MY’ (Muslims and Yadavs) that accounts for nearly 30% of the electorate. However, it is on the second condition of winning over a segment of the politically hostile support base—crucial for electoral victory—that the RJD fails the test miserably.
Three reasons are responsible for the same. First, the current RJD leadership has lost the battle of perception. It has successively failed in striking a chord with its erstwhile support base of non-Yadav OBCs in general and EBCs and Mahadalits in particular. The image of the RJD still remains that of a caste party whose reign signified a partnership between the criminal organisations and the government. Even the party’s recent agitation over the killing of RJD leader J P Yadav was perceived as a case of selective outrage due to caste association rather than a concern for law and order. His own allies, Hindustan Awam Morcha Secular (HAM (S)) president, Jitan Ram Manjhi, and RLSP leaders took exception over the inconsistencies in exhibiting outrage.
Thus, in popular parlance, the RJD is still caught in its old image of being a Yadav-centric party.
Second, the party tried to address this lacuna by aligning with other subaltern caste leaders like Mukesh Sahni, Upendra Kushwaha and Jitan Ram Manjhi. However, the communities that these leaders claim to command have successively demonstrated a distinct pattern since 2014. Overwhelmingly, they voted for the BJP in the Lok Sabha elections (2014 and 2019) and Nitish (2015) in the state election. In fact, these leaders themselves lost the election from their chosen constituencies. Hence, these alliances will not help the RJD in reaching out to the majority of the non-Yadav OBCs and Dalits.
Thirdly, in striking contrast to Lalu, who garnered the support of upper caste Rajputs despite intensifying the rhetoric of Mandal discourse, it’s a long shot for Tejashwi to retain even a fraction of them. Not only has the ageing Rajput leadership of the party already lost its appeal, there seems to be intense infighting among them. The resignation of senior RJD leader Raghuvansh Prasad Singh from the party post is a case in point. Thus, unlike Lalu and Nitish in the past, the current RJD doesn’t pass the second criterion of moving beyond its core support base and winning over the segments that appear to be otherwise opposed to it.
The core ‘MY’ support base would place it as the prime opposition, but the perception of its parochial association with the same will prevent the party from putting up a spirited fight. Hence, the ensuing election in Bihar is going to be a one-way affair.
Rajan Pandey Freelance journalist
Sajjan Kumar Political analyst associated with People’s Pulse
(sajjanjnu@gmail.com)