last week, one of the most graphic images of the military-led violence in Myanmar flashed across the globe digitally. On March 8, a day celebrated as International Women’s Day, came a photo of a Catholic nun on her knees in front of security forces pleading to ensure that the youth hiding within the Church were not killed. It was the most poignant image of the gruesome violence that has been ensuing for the past few weeks in Myanmar, even as the international community had rhetorically pushed its repeated line on the return to “normalcy” and “urging all conflicting parties to show restraint”. In one of the most brutal crackdowns since the military coup that brought the tatmadaw back into power on 1 February 2021, the attack on the youth hiding within the Myitkyina’s St Columban’s Cathedral in Kachin state was by far the most chilling reminder of where Myanmar may be headed if the world watches silently.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup d’etat, the United Nations Security Council met on 2 February 2021 but failed in its efforts to pass a joint statement on the crisis that had evolved in Myanmar, particularly as this was vetoed by China. Beijing’s position since the coup had been that any coercive action on Myanmar such as sanctions would only worsen the situation rather than making it better. Earlier Chinese statements were also misleading as they referred to the situation in Myanmar being akin to a ‘cabinet reshuffle’, minimising the impact of the political realities and reaffirming that it was a matter of domestic politics that remained out of the purview of the normative role of the UN.
In the earlier UNSC debates on Myanmar’s internal situation, both China and Russia had vetoed any action against that nation. This was specifically evident during the 2017 Rohingya crisis in which the current military leader General Min Aung Hliang has been implicated in an independent fact-finding mission under the UN Human Rights Council. In November 2019, Gambia filed a lawsuit against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice for the genocide of Rohingyas, leading to Aung San Suu Kyi’s fall from grace even as she defended the issue as an internal matter of the state. While Suu Kyi did not categorically give a clean chit to the military, the question of sovereignty and non-interference weighed heavily in the debate over human rights, which was seen as tacit support for the military’s actions against the Rohingyas. However, the more recent UNSC presidential statement on 10 March 2021 has been emphatic in its position, vocally condemning the military coup d’etat and calling for the restoration of democracy unanimously, even as the military has been told to exercise ‘utmost restraint’. While the statement falls short of a resolution, it is still the first unanimous effort by the UNSC to address the crisis.
This raises the question of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its implementation in the context of Myanmar. The R2P principle still remains nascent in its implementation. In Southeast Asia in particular, several countries are primarily driven by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes where the context of state security becomes aligned with the stability of the regime in power. This places the principles of sovereignty and human rights on opposite sides of the spectrum. The ASEAN’s approach to the issue of human rights has always been more limiting, as it justified restrictions on the universal principles for supporting authoritarian governments that delivered on economic development. Often categorised within the cloak of ‘Asian values’, it set the approach to human rights apart from the universal principles. This underwent a change in 2008 following the implementation of the ASEAN Charter and the move towards community building within the ASEAN region as a whole. The Charter emphasised the importance of democratisation and human rights, bringing these values into the ASEAN’s broader debates and approaches.
The R2P emerged as a norm in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), identifying the response of the international community when human lives are at risk of violence from within the state. In 2005, this was reformed by reaffirming intervention under specific cases of mass killings and crimes against humanity.
In the specific case of Myanmar, the UNSC invoked the R2P following Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 that led to huge losses of life and displaced millions. Two important factors emerged in the debate—first, whether the principle could be used to address humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of natural calamities; second, whether regional organisations such as the ASEAN could act as intermediaries in the move to deliver assistance. Applying the debate on R2P in the current context becomes far more critical as the junta is now waging a ruthless war against its own people. The picture of protestors carrying placards invoking the R2P is a clear reminder of the ground realities. While provisions for an arms ban are currently in place, these still do not address the crucial issue of reining in the violence by the state forces. While the UNSC statement falls short of a resolution, the R2P may be the need of the hour, even as the junta’s violence has gone unchecked through the last week.
Shankari Sundararaman
Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)