On May 12 and 13, American President Joe Biden will host a special US-ASEAN summit to commemorate 45 years of relations between his nation and the Southeast Asian grouping. The summit, which was earlier scheduled for March 28 and 29, was postponed due to the unavailability of several of the regional leaders, who could not confirm their participation as the Muslim-majority countries were observing the Ramzan fast. Though delayed, the summit promises incremental steps in furthering US-ASEAN ties. By bringing the focus on ASEAN and the significance of its multilateralism, the US seeks to address a gap in its regional outreach that still needs fine-tuning.
From 2021, when the Biden administration took office, the key approach to the ASEAN region was to refocus efforts to invigorate some sense of balance to relations with the group, especially in the aftermath of the disastrous efforts of the Trump administration that undermined regional multilateralism and exacerbated the rivalry with China. Even as the US-China rivalry has continued, further complications have evolved with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, leaving the American approach to Southeast Asia hinged on both these events. For the US, Southeast Asia remains critical in terms of how America will shape its Indo-Pacific policy, while ASEAN still needs to evolve its strategy for the larger Indo-Pacific region coherently. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) still falls short of embracing the region as a contiguous unit. For the Biden administration, the recognition of ASEAN’s significance to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy is a vital factor that drives the administration’s reinforced engagement, which has seen a flurry of high-level visits to the region.
From May to July 2021, both Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited six of the Southeast Asian countries, marking a significant effort at re-establishing the region’s relevance to the US administration. The high-level visit of Vice President Kamala Harris, following the US pullout of Afghanistan in August 2021, was seen as a clear indicator of the importance of the Indo-Pacific strategy, even as it happened immediately prior to the AUKUS agreement that brought the region sharply into focus. While the core agenda of that visit was to re-emphasise the US commitment to the region, there were critical areas where differences were apparent. The American efforts to address the ongoing US-China rivalry in binary terms—‘liberal’ versus ‘illiberal’—does not find resonance in Southeast Asia. Most of the regional countries are not adherents to the values of democracy unlike the Western nations and quasi-authoritarian control remains a part of the regional political landscape. Moreover, countries like Singapore have categorically rejected the notion of another Cold War in the region, which is economically integrated with both the US and China. This leaves ASEAN little choice but to remain neutral in the face of increasing tensions between the two powers. As the implications of major power rivalry on the region increases, it needs to be underscored that ASEAN should not be held ransom to these shifts. The region has been far more vulnerable to the shifts, while its institutional processes have remained inadequate to address the challenges.
In October 2021, an earlier US-ASEAN Summit was held in which American President Biden participated with a slew of new initiatives to endorse his nation’s commitment to the group. The assistance of $102 million towards funding issues of mutual concern such as recovery from the pandemic and climate change in the region were key areas on which convergences emerged in US-ASEAN ties. Additionally the region also received 40 million jabs from the US as part of its vaccine diplomacy to fight Covid and an additional $200 million in medical supplies for pandemic assistance. This approach to vaccine diplomacy was also reiterated during the Quad Summit of March 2021, which was disrupted by the devastating second wave that India faced. Addressing vaccine diplomacy is now seen as a vital component of sustaining ties with both Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, not just for the US, but for the Quad countries too.
Areas of economic integration with America remain a core issue that will drive the US-ASEAN interests further. The US withdrawal from the TPP and the Biden administration’s decision to stay out of the CPTPP have created a space where the ASEAN-driven RCEP has changed the economic calculus in the region to China’s advantage. While the drivers of the US security engagement are relatively high, for ASEAN, the economic angle also remains significant. In addressing this, the October 2021 summit saw the Biden administration unveil the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which was to be the US answer to building greater economic resilience among its partner countries across the Indo-Pacific, with Southeast Asia as a core in the pivot. The IPEF seeks to address areas such as fair and durable trade practices, supply chain resilience, and energy and environmental standards while addressing infrastructure needs and transparency. These factors were further reiterated by the visit of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, where the emphasis on the economic architecture for the region was once again referred to in the context of ASEAN as a critical cog in the wheel.
There are, however, challenges that persist even as the summit is taking shape. These relate to the bilateral ties that the US has with some of the ASEAN members. Myanmar will remain away from the summit and so this formula will be a 1+9 mechanism in adherence to the ASEAN principle of Myanmar being represented by a non-official. Moreover, the close relations of both Cambodia and Laos with China will make it essential to address the US ties with these two nations. Vietnam too has become critical especially in the context of the Russian war on Ukraine. Reports of joint Russia-Vietnam exercises scheduled for the same time as the summit are likely to embarrass both the US and ASEAN, complicating matters. This summit will need to fine-tune several notes, but balancing the regional and bilateral will be key.
Shankari Sundararaman
Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)