In a keynote address at a seminar jointly hosted by King’s College and India’s Centre for Policy Research in September, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (Retd) of Centre for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University, said, “It is only a matter of time before a Chinese carrier strike group appears in the Indian Ocean.” He reminded us that China wasn’t new to the Indian Ocean and that India must get used to China’s South Asian presence.
Strategists in India, too, think the same way. The Chinese warship-building spree leaves no doubts that PLAN (PLA Navy) will be armed to the teeth, first to push the US out of the first island chain and then probably the second island chain. The priority will be Taiwan and supremacy in the South China Sea, and then break out to threaten Guam in the Pacific. After that, since the accelerated warship-building would have afforded China the opportunity of fielding more than two carrier battle groups, it would turn its attention to the Indian Ocean. The preliminary preparations are staring at us—Hambantota on a 99-year lease, Gwadar, a satellite port on the Makran Coast, and an operational base in Djibouti.
By creating naval bases far away from its homeland, China has a distant vision of overcoming its vulnerability to the long logistics chain that the Chinese warships will be exposed to in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The advantage the Indian Navy has in the IOR, i.e., unhindered freedom of movement, not subject to adversary surveillance and mounting capabilities of interdiction in hot war situations, may get mitigated in the event of frequent PLAN and Pakistan Navy combined operations in the IOR. The task of the Indian Navy will grow to maintain surveillance on adversarial activities in SLOCs and sea space of our national interest. This will be a serious handicap. What options does India have in today’s rapidly changing geopolitical contours?
The US-led free world order is coming under threat repeatedly. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) circus around Taiwan, its open encroachment in the Pacific, and the Russian annexation of four southeastern and southern areas of Ukraine with tacit Chinese support are there for all to see. Except for making politically correct statements, the US hasn’t been able to either slow down China’s autocratic belligerence or free the areas/countries from their zone of influence. Either the US has lost its stomach to combat these autocracies, or its domestic politics prevents proactive action. The credibility of the US as a dependable military power has been declining since its hasty retreat from Afghanistan.
Indo-Pacific strategies have thrown up several cooperative mechanisms. Some are pointing towards economic security, such as Quad, whereas some have maritime combat confrontation potential, such as the Malabar exercise and AUKUS.
However, one cannot rule out the possibility of these three amalgamating into one to achieve the common defining objective of preventing the world from sliding into an autocratic framework.
India, apart from its collective security commitment, has regional responsibilities towards IOR littorals who do not have enough assets to retain their autonomy and sovereignty, which are already under threat. Economic coercion by China in India’s neighbourhood, leading to them surrendering their sovereign assets despite India being the preferred security partner to all of them, is a serious concern.
The proactive foreign policy by Prime Minister Narendra Modi over the past eight years has begun to show some results towards mitigating Chinese chequers, but there is much distance to cover. It is probably time for India to adopt all of the government’s oceanic strategies. India must utilise its geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean.
Geographically, trade and combatants’ entry and exit are predictable through choke points. India also has Andaman & Nicobar Islands standing as a fortress at the mouth of Malacca Straits. A formidable presence in the islands would not only act as deterrence but also provide the ability to maintain surveillance, leading to possible harassment of adversaries’ ships engaged either in the transportation of important cargo, which is required to sustain its ability of waging war or worse, an interdiction in an all-out conflict.
Western Indian Ocean surveillance and offensive capabilities must continuously be enhanced with high-tech weapon platforms and systems to retain an edge over the combined adversaries. The capabilities of maritime neighbours must continually be enhanced in the true spirit of SAGAR and the neighbourhood-first policies of Prime Minister Modi. India’s actions should not leave any doubts in neighbours’ minds that their well-being can be ensured by integrating into the Indian economy and security architecture.
Lord Curzon, the 24th Viceroy of India, observed the importance of oceans for the prosperity of India. He said that India must offer its neighbours assistance which should be the envy of outside powers, and it can achieve that by integrating their economies and security into India’s architecture. India’s power projected in IOR could also prevent the risk of war on land borders. He had gone to the extent of saying that losing her power in the IOR may prompt the land neighbours in the north to push India southwards. He probably meant that sea power could act as deterrence for adversaries since they would have much more to lose in the Indian Ocean.
India’s ability to fortify the A&N islands has now become necessary, given the likelihood of the emergence of a PLAN fleet in the Indian Ocean, as articulated by Sr Col Zhou recently. It is very much in the realm of possibilities that China could have an Indian Ocean Fleet permanently based in Gwadar or some East Coast African country. Our diplomatic policies should focus more towards African countries that are looking up to India for upping their economy and security. This is quite possible within the SAGAR framework.
Dual-purpose airports, ports and basing of surveillance equipment in A&N islands will go a long way toward ensuring maritime security in the IOR. Similarly, our cooperation with Indonesia must receive priority attention. Port development of Sabang, joint patrolling, and surveillance of Lombok, Sunda and Ombai-Wetar straits would provide insurance to both defensive and offensive capabilities. Sound Operated Surveillance System is one such mechanism which can improve Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA). These mechanisms need to be supplemented with Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) to reduce the stretching of Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms such as fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and ASW ships.
Southern Indian Ocean island states are key to overall maritime security. A joint surveillance mechanism from bases in those island countries for future networks needs to be given serious consideration.
Vice-Admiral (Retd) Shekhar Sinha
Former Commander-in-Chief, Western Naval Command & CISC Member, Trustee Board, India Foundation