Once dismissed as a ‘junkyard army’ and characterised by some of its officers as an army severely constrained by its ‘short arms and slow legs’, the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) is rapidly transforming itself into an increasingly professional fighting force.
Until 1993, the modernisation of the PLA was always on the back burner. Mao Tse Tung, driven by concerns over a potential challenge to party authority and the risk of divergent ideological interpretations, sought to maintain a firm grip on the military apparatus. After Mao, subtle yet discernible shifts began to take shape. Deng Xiaoping exhibited a lesser degree of suspicion towards military professionalism. However, party control over the PLA remained an overriding imperative.
Only after the first Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Taiwan Straits crisis (1995–96) did a catalyst develop for reevaluating military professionalism. The combination of highly increased weapons effectiveness and the far more complex nature of modern, high-tech warfare led the PLA to conclude that its preparations for conflicts like the Gulf War—‘local wars under modern conditions,’ as they termed it—were insufficient.
This marked the beginning of a concerted effort to enhance their strength and adaptability. The Chinese defence budget embarked on an extraordinary trajectory from 1997 onwards with a run of unbroken double-digit real annual growth until 2011 (except for one year). This underwrote the process of military modernisation that was to follow.
The approach of the PLA towards military affairs finds its embodiment in a rather interesting construct known as the ‘military strategic guideline’. To grasp China’s military strategy, this is the proverbial North Star as it encapsulates the very essence of China’s military strategy. The PLA itself describes it as a repository of principles and plans; as the then Chief of the General Staff Zhang Wannian succinctly pointed out when devising the PLA’s 1993 guideline, any strategy should answer the following questions: ‘With whom will we fight? Where will we fight? What is the character of the war that we will fight? How will we fight?’
According to the Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China by the US Department of Defence (DoD), the critical ‘operational component’ and ‘highest-level strategic guidance for all PLA activities’ is ‘active defence’.
The key elements of the PLA’s active defence doctrine are -
(1) a defensive military strategy (permitting attacks only after having first been attacked, although what constitutes an attack is left purposely vague, and could include pre-emptive or even preventive strikes)
(2) a ‘forward defence’ posture
(3) an operational doctrine that focuses on the opposing force’s weaknesses, initiated only when ‘time and conditions favour the PLA’
Since the late 1990s, China has moved from having a military budget smaller than Taiwan’s to being the second-largest defence spender in the world, outstripping Japan, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Only the United States spends more than China on defence. Today China’s military receives higher funding than the next 17 Indo-Pacific militaries combined.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced an annual defence budget of about $224.79 billion for fiscal year 2023. This is a 7.2% increase from last year and is the eighth consecutive single-digit uptick in China’s defence spending, with the last double-digit jump of 10.1% recorded in 2015. The US Department of Defence, for example, has highlighted in the past that China’s actual military expenditures are at least twice the officially stated figure. India by comparison has a defence budget of $72.6 billion in fiscal 2023–24. There is a very strong case therefore for upping India’s defence spending.
The PLA has experienced qualitative advancements and the acquisition of previously absent capabilities. These include integrating stealth technology, precision-strike capabilities from a safe distance, long-range capabilities for airborne and undersea attacks, and the ability to engage in expeditionary warfare. Investments in satellite systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and sophisticated computer networks have greatly augmented their ability to gather intelligence, coordinate operations, and enhance situational awareness on the battlefield. A recent example of their imitation of independent design is the development of aircraft carriers. In 1999, China refurbished an old Soviet Union carrier after purchasing it second-hand, making it the first aircraft carrier—The Liaoning. In 2017 it launched the first domestically built aircraft carrier—The Shandong. By 2022 China launched its third aircraft carrier—The Fujian. This was also locally built, and the vessel was designed to be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult enabling aircraft dispatches in rapid succession. The carrier takes its name from Fujian, the Chinese province located directly opposite Taiwan.
Although PLA modernisation seems likely to proceed roughly along these lines over the next decade, several internal or external events could alter its direction.
First, resolving the Taiwan issue would significantly impact China’s military outlook. While immediate prospects for resolution seem unlikely, Chinese control of Taiwan through peaceful agreement or armed conflict would necessitate a shift in military strategy.
The second factor involves a heightened focus on major conflicts beyond the Taiwan Straits. The concept of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ theatres aids in prioritising resource allocation among theatre commands, with an increasing focus on the Indian border even more than the Korean peninsula. This aligns with President Xi Jinping’s promotion of a ‘holistic national security concept’ that emphasises addressing threats to the party’s survival and interests from multiple directions, akin to the Soviet strategy in the 1980s, which required Soviet forces to plan and conduct wars on three fronts independently.
Finally, new perspectives on the nature of warfare could shape future strategy updates. The 2019 strategic guideline maintained a focus on winning ‘information’ wars. However, indications suggest that in the coming years, the PLA could shift its attention towards the next stage of modernisation, known as ‘intelligentisation’. This concept involves leveraging disruptive technologies in military applications, often pursued through collaborations with China’s civilian science and technology sector. Areas of focus may include artificial intelligence, robotics, unmanned systems, hypersonics, nanotechnology, and biotechnology.
Manish Tewari
Lawyer, MP, and former I&B Minister
(manishtewari01@gmail.com)
(Views are personal)