The saga of the Indian Army’s response to Pakistani intrusions in the Kargil sector in 1999 has now reached the status of folklore. The heroes of the battles of Tololing, Khalubar, Tiger Hill and many more deserve their place under the sun and so do their families. The 25th anniversary of the Kargil Vijay Diwas—observed on July 26—is an occasion on which more can be told. There was so much happening at that time in so many other sectors—some of these relatively unknown facts deserve airing, too.
Besides Kargil, the Pakistani deep state had launched active operations of an intense kind—employing terrorists and even regular forces—in the adjoining Valley and Jammu regions. On Kargil’s flank, in the Turtuk area near Siachen glacier was Point 5770, more foreboding than any. Today, it stands renamed Navdeep Top after a relatively unsung hero who had scaled the peak with a handful of Rajputs to kill and evict a Pakistani section.
It should be recalled that while carrying out operations in Kargil, General Parvez Musharraf’s strategy was twofold. First was the intent of cutting off the Srinagar-Leh highway to starve Ladakh, and in consequence, force the vacation of Siachen glacier by the Indian Army—a pipe dream. The secondary or alternative aim was to disturb the counter-terror grid in Kashmir from where India would need to find troops to respond to Kargil intrusions. In addition, it was to motivate the J&K people to rise against the Indian government and thus weaken India’s hold over the region. A potential public revolt was always a Pakistani obsession. It has been abortively tried several times with Operation Gulmarg in 1947-48 and Operation Gibraltar in 1965.
The 15 Corps, the Army’s formation that oversaw the security of Kashmir and Ladakh in 1999, had an onerous responsibility. It was accountable for the LoC in Kashmir and Ladakh, as also internal security related to countering terrorism . Simultaneously, it also had Kargil, Siachen glacier and Eastern Ladakh to look after—a very tall order to be responsible for so many active fronts.
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism was at its peak. The Valley was flush with troops, although the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), the Army’s counter-terrorism mainstay, had just 36 units, 27 less than the 63 that exist today. As many as five mechanised infantry units and one armoured regiment minus their main equipment were deployed in South Kashmir. They de-inducted immediately once the Kargil operations commenced. Infiltration was one of the major threats and despite all efforts to counter, there were regular leakages across the LoC helping swell the number of terrorists. More invariably came in than those who got killed in the operations within.
I held charge of the operations, intelligence and training domains of South Kashmir, which included the highly turbulent districts of Anantnag, Pulwama and Badgam. My headquarters was at Avantipur. We were fired upon every other day despite active patrolling along the periphery. On the very day I took charge, there were four areas where firefights were ongoing with terror groups. The remnants of the Afghan mercenaries still existed with some groups. Just four years before this, Al Firan had kidnapped five tourists and beheaded one of them in the Pahalgam area. The separatists were hugely emboldened because India treated them with kid gloves.
As the seriousness of the Pakistan intrusions dawned, a brigade from the Sindh Valley was detached to move to Kargil and an RR sector from Kulgam took its place. This was the beginning of the movement of troops in different directions, with the mechanised units moving out too. As it became clear that a full division size force would move to Kargil, the 8th Mountain Division from Sharifabad (North Kashmir) commenced preparations even as some of its units started to precede it in moving to Dras. However, in its wake, it left huge voids that took time to fill, almost like Jammu today. Before we could raise and deploy Kilo Force, it was my formation (Victor Force) that took over the Valley.
At this juncture, a major change occurred. A new headquarters called HQ Overall Force Commander was established to take away counter-terrorism responsibility from the overburdened HQ 15 Corps, which concentrated on the LoC in the Valley and Kargil.
In J&K, it’s a folly to think one can divide and demarcate such responsibility on a functional basis for perpetuity. Only one authority has to hold charge. My HQ at Avantipur looked after the Valley’s dangerously cascading terrorist environment with nine sectors of RR under command (recommended is three), forcing me to spend over two hours every evening to only take reports on the day’s events. In a day, I was controlling 11-12 simultaneous firefights.
To up the ante in Kashmir and keep our attention divided, Pakistan employed two strategies. First, it activated the areas vacated by the 8th Mountain Division that Victor Force was plugging with temporary deployments. In Handwara, Lolab and the Nutnas areas, it infiltrated its regular special service group officers with some experienced terrorists, who took no time in getting down to seeking contact with our troops and contesting them. It does sound familiar with what we are witnessing in Jammu.
The second was the commencement of a series of sneak intrusions into army and police camps by suicide attackers, by deception or perimeter entry, ready to fight unto death. An initial paralysis had to be overcome by the typical grit of the army and JK police. Camp and convoy security had to be ramped up, as also protection to minorities and migrant workers who worked on construction projects besides the long winding ammunition convoys that moved to Kargil through our area of responsibility. To its credit, the Victor Force did not witness the destruction of even a single ammunition truck despite 110 Hume pipe crossings in a road stretch.
I can recall situations almost similar to the ones being experienced in Jammu today that are causing so much concern. No doubt it is worrisome, but a recall of the worst times in the Valley will tell you that we have seen much of this and worse. Raking our memory will deliver lessons long forgotten. Nothing new happens in these areas—it's always a revisit of the past.
(Views are personal)
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps and Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir