
As Bangladesh continues to confound us with its anti-India rhetoric, it’s time to understand the strategic basics of the situation.
First, it’s important for us not to imagine that Bangladesh has become a sworn adversary and everything is downhill in terms of the bilateral relationship. A serious and deliberate effort is going on by anti-India quarters to grab the opportunity and set up things to take a negative spiral. The prime mover is Pakistan’s ISI, for whom this is a god-sent opportunity.
It was good to hear the sane counsel of Bangladesh Army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, who recently characterised the India-Bangladesh relations as a “give-and-take”, emphasising that both countries have strategic interests in each other’s stability. He assured that Bangladesh won’t do anything to hurt India’s interests. However, with a situation in which we are uncertain about who is in control and how far the radical right has embedded itself, the worry may be natural.
At the same time, it’s extremely gratifying to see the Indian response. Our government has not said a word out of place. The quiet diplomacy being followed is a lesson for many nations who perceive an unfavourable change with a readiness to immediately respond.
India’s wait-and-watch policy is not without action. It’s fully seized of the strategic importance Bangladesh holds. It also realises there is anger on the neighbour’s streets, although much of it is instigated. Having put its weight behind Sheikh Hasina and now allowing her to temporarily reside here, India is bearing the brunt. However, a nation cannot be controlled from the streets, and relationships need to be based upon several other spheres of activity, the social and economic being among the most important.
For Pakistan, having suffered the ignominy of a military defeat to India and the surrender of 93,000 prisoners of war in December 1971, the sentiment of retribution has never parted. Many analysts are stating Pakistan has re-entered Bangladesh to find an opportunity for retribution. Actually, Pakistan never left Bangladesh; it remained embedded in its former territory in more ways than one.
The Jamaat-e-Islami party and some pro-Pakistan Islamist militias continued to operate in Bangladesh, contributing to the radicalisation of the political culture, which was already fairly strong. The Pakistan army, backed by Islamists, had created radical religious militias—the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams. These were dismantled to a point, but not completely. The Jamaat maintained its radical stance through a strong Bengali Muslim footprint; but it is believed Pakistani sleeper agents were also embedded through a strong ISI presence. China’s abiding interest in India’s Northeast is enough reason for its partnering activity with the ISI.
The threats to India’s security emanate from a mix of sources. A conventional military threat has been virtually nonexistent as is evident from the fact that the Indian armed forces have nicknames for most perceived adversaries for their wargames, but not for Bangladesh. Interestingly, the Bangladesh armed forces do have a nickname for India for its wargames, but for different reasons.
The main security threats to India from the direction of Bangladesh in the current environment are more hybrid in nature. The first and foremost, under the current circumstances, is minority targeting. Its impact cannot be adequately assessed. There are close to 13 million Hindus in Bangladesh—7.95 percent of its population—and their perceived insecurity can result in an exodus to safe havens, leading to a situation akin to 1971.
Its impact on sentiments in India can be intense and perhaps that is something viewed as being in Pakistan’s interest. Anyone in their senses in the Bangladesh leadership today should realise that religious sentiment is the most intense cause of conflict between nations. This is where the Bangladesh Army needs to step in, and it eventually will.
I have served with the Bangladesh Army in two UN missions and had many follow-up engagements over the years. The strategic orientation of its leadership is of a very high order and its capability to assess its national interest is highly professional. There is a mix of ideology that exists as in any other organisation, but national interest remains the supreme issue. There is allegedly a formidable Pakistani influence still deeply embedded within the uniformed forces of Bangladesh, which instigates them from time to time. This is the influence that has sought to play the Pakistani interest card in keeping India’s Northeast in perpetual ferment.
There is the perpetual challenge of border management, resulting from unsettled populations, borders and waters. With Hasina, these domains were largely quiet and would have eventually been cordially resolved in the long run; that cordiality appears busted and will take time to be regained. There is also the rising turmoil in western Myanmar, especially the turbulent state of Rakhine, from where a million Rohingya Muslims were displaced, mostly into Bangladesh. The constant state of instability there threatens to move into the adjoining Northeastern Indian states.
It may be unfair to perceive conventional threats to the vulnerable Siliguri corridor. The Bangladesh Army has rarely, if ever, given us scope to point fingers but when the situation is fraught with linkages not under
its control, one has to view this area from an Indian national security angle. It’s a strategic piece of territory that India can ill afford to ignore. Continuous Track 1 engagement is difficult under the circumstances.
Ideally, Track 2 engagement between well-reputed and veteran Bangladeshi and Indian diplomats, along with senior Indian and Bangladesh army veterans, could help dispel the inevitable suspicions that arise when a sudden downturn in relations between friendly neighbours takes place. It would probably give us a far better dividend than the Track 2 engagement we have with Pakistan.
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir