There is a famous and oft-cited quotation from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar that might be relevant to our times: “There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.” India, by picking up the gauntlet, has done exactly that. It has significantly raised the price of terrorism for Pakistan, thus raising the level of our deterrence. Even more significantly, India may, without boasting, have fundamentally altered the balance of power in the region.
Not being a warmonger, I certainly welcome the so-called ceasefire. Whether brokered by the ‘big brother’—US President Donald J Trump—or not is less important. Neither Pakistan nor India can afford a long-drawn war. The cost, to India alone, is reportedly over $80 billion for just four days of what was not even a full-blown war. But we have proved that we are a fighting force that simply cannot be ignored or overlooked. We have shown the world that we can be an important part of the new world order, capable of putting boots on the ground if needed. Not just boots on the ground, but missiles, drones, and much else in the air, beside conventional air, navy, and ground forces.
Which brings us to the crucial question—what next? I am sure that the Indian Prime Minister’s Office and strategic teams must have already war-gamed the post Operation Sindoor options. I am tempted, almost, to say ‘post Pakistan’ instead of ‘post Operation Sindoor’. Pakistan, on the verge of bankruptcy, would arguably have been on the brink of collapse had we pushed on for a few more days.
To game an India-positive and terror-negative scenario, let us play scrabble with the letters in our adversary’s name. The common belief is that P is for Punjab, A for Afghania (the northwestern province), K for Kashmir, I for Indus, and S for Sindh. We will notice that B is entirely absent. For us, on the other side of the border, it should be obvious that if Bangladesh did not belong with Pakistan at partition, neither did Balochistan.
Let’s dive into history a bit. What is now Balochistan is one of British India’s minor provinces by that name merged with what used to be the larger entity called the Balochistan Agency. A conglomeration of semi-autonomous princely states, the accession of the latter and its subsequent integration into Pakistan were neither smooth nor seamless. As in the erstwhile East Pakistan, there is a widespread perception that the Baloch have received a raw deal from the Pakistan state and have never been happy with their subordinate position.
Unrest in Balochistan has been endemic. The the spectacular hijacking of the Jaffar Express on March 11, with some 380 passengers on board, is only a recent example. Credit for which was claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army and blame assigned to India by the Pakistan military establishment. Indeed, the Pahalgam terrorist attack was widely perceived as Pakistan’s revenge for the Jaffar Express incident.
The liberation of Balochistan, at first, may not seem as a practical or achievable goal for India. For one, Balochistan does not share a boundary with India. Yet, Baloch independence may not require the scale or cost of operations required in the creation of Bangladesh 54 years ago. In this regard, the authority I shall invoke here is the real hero of this great campaign. No, it is not Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw or even Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora.
Instead, I refer to Lt Gen Jack Farj Rafael Jacob, who, as Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command, led the assault on Dhaka. His record of how India won the 1971 Indo-Pak war and helped liberate Bangladesh can be found in Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (1977) and An Odyssey in War and Peace (2011), his autobiography. In a short piece such as this, it is impossible to summarise the many insights and teachings contained in these two books.
Suffice it to say that there are two kinds of generals—politicos and soldiers. The former curry favour with their civilian masters, the latter do the difficult and dirty work of fighting and winning wars. Unfortunately, the politicos often obtain promotions at the expense of the soldiers. To offer one famous reminder, Gen Brij Mohan Kaul, largely responsible for India’s debacle in the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, was promoted by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as the army chief against the recommendations of his predecessor, Gen K S Thimayya.
Manekshaw, who had seen little action, was also much more of a manager than a soldier. Luckily for India, he was not as bad as Gen Kaul. Jacob’s book shows how both he and Gen Aurora were wrong on many occasions. That we won the war was largely in spite of their errors and misdirections.
Generally speaking, public relation experts, credit-hoggers and sycophants rise in our system at the expense of truly competent and upright soldiers or bureaucrats. This must not be repeated in the current fight with Pakistan. India’s national or strategic interests, we must recognise, may not be identical to those of political leaders or parties.
In the present case, however, if Prime Minister Narendra Modi succeeds in breaking off another part of Pakistan—something never seriously contemplated, let alone attempted, in the last 50 years—he would change the course of both history and geography of the subcontinent. And those who understand Modi would have us believe that he cares for little more at this stage of his illustrious career than permanently securing his legacy for posterity.
Is it time, to borrow a phrase from ‘Jihadi General’ Asim Munir’s playbook, to go for the enemy’s jugular? Certainly, India must carefully weigh such an option. We don’t need shrill war cries, but cold, calculated and calibrated actions that will produce lasting results. If A was linked to Operation Sindoor, B for Balochistan may well be on the scrabble board in the future.
Makarand R Paranjape
Right in the Middle
Author and commentator
(Views are personal)
(Tweets @MakrandParanspe)