Like most others, I was astonished to see arson, tear gas and police firing in Leh on September 24. That this most peaceful of Indian regions should be pushed to violence, even if only for the most fleeting of moments, was baffling. The response of the Ladakh administration and mainstream media was even more baffling. Over 70 protesters arrested, noted environmentalist Sonam Wangchuk charged with threatening national security, curfew—what was going on?
How or why a peaceful demonstration turned violent will be probed by a judicial enquiry. However, a cursory view of the footage suggests a handful of young men broke away from the demonstration to set fire to the Leh BJP office and a police vehicle, and the police fired upon demonstrators, killing four, including a retired trooper, and injuring 80. Ladakh’s director-general of police justified the police firing, saying that if they had not, the entire city of Leh would have “burned to the ground”. Since when did setting an office and a vehicle on fire become burning an entire city? Why were 70-plus people arrested when the footage showed only four or five arsonists? How can the non-violent Wangchuk, who was on hunger strike, be accused of endangering national security on the farcical ground of attending a UN conference in Pakistan at which he praised Prime Minister Narendra Modi?
Indications are that the Union Home Ministry recognises the disproportionate nature of the administration’s response, though it has not yet released Wangchuk or the 30 others who remain in custody. Calm prevails in Ladakh, the curfew has been lifted, and a fresh round of talks between the Union Home Ministry, the Leh Apex Body of the People’s Movement for the Sixth Schedule (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) took place on October 22.
Much now depends on how the talks progress. Ladakhis originally welcomed the grant of Union Territory status in 2019, but their jubilation was soon tempered by experience. In August 2020, Leh’s elected councillors complained that the Lieutenant-Governor’s office was taking unilateral decisions on matters that had been the prerogative of the hill councils, such as fund allocation. In September, the Leh council passed a resolution demanding self-administration either under Article 371 of the Constitution, which grants varied autonomies to ten states, including Nagaland, or under the Sixth Schedule, which grants autonomous councils the rights to legislate on land, agriculture, forests, education, public health, judicial and executive powers, and allows funding from the consolidated fund of India. Ladakh’s hill councils, by contrast, lacked legislative powers.
Between 2020 and 2022, two remarkable alliances coalesced around these demands—among political parties and civil society, and amongst Buddhistmajority Leh, Shia-majority Kargil, and a sizable Sunni minority. Leh and Kargil had not agreed on joint demands until this point. In August 2021, the LAB and the KDA agreed on four demands: statehood for Ladakh, constitutional safeguards, under either Article 371 or the Sixth Schedule, four Lok and Rajya Sabha seats (two Leh, two Kargil), along with filling vacant administrative posts, pending since 2019.
Talks began with the Union Home Ministry in 2022. Though some progress was made—Ladakhis were granted protection of their land and domicile rights along with reservation in government jobs—implementation was slow. In 2023- 2024, graduate unemployment was 26.8 percent; government plans for infrastructure development threatened Ladakh’s fragile ecology. The two core demands remained deadlocked. It was in this context that Wangchuk went on hunger strike in 2023 to demand inclusion in the Sixth Schedule; his hunger strike sparked a non-violent movement that gathered steam when the Union Home Ministry stonewalled over five rounds of talks, leading to renewed hunger strikes.
Six rounds of talks have now taken place between the LAB, KDA, and the Union Home Ministry. Perhaps the seventh will finally address the core Ladakhi demands. The options for consensus include (a) statehood with protections; (b) autonomous hill councils with legislative powers provided by the Sixth Schedule; and (c) continuation as a Union Territory but with a legislature, which is what Jammu and Kashmir currently has.
Of the three, the first is the most desirable, given Ladakh’s territorial size, linguistic distinctiveness, ecological culture, and status as a frontline defender against both Pakistan and China. Ladakhis in both Leh and Kargil have repeatedly provided early warning of Pakistani and/or Chinese incursions; public support for security will only increase with Ladakhi self-administration. Ladakhi environmentalists such as Sonam Wangchuk have shown how Ladakh’s ecology can be protected—vital to stem the shrinking of the Himalayas—and, at the same time, harnessed to security needs through, for example, solar-powered tents for soldiers.
The second option is eminently feasible. In September 2019, the tribal affairs ministry recommended that Ladakh be brought under the Sixth Schedule, which would have empowered the existing hill councils. No action was taken, and no explanation appears to have been offered for inaction, though Sixth Schedule provisions can be adapted within the Union Territory framework. Empowered hill councils would serve as an alternative to a legislature; indeed, the legislative rights offered by the Sixth Schedule might be better protected than those in a Union Territory.
The third option is the easiest, as several Union Territories with elected legislatures already exist. However, in most cases, from Puducherry to Jammu and Kashmir, their powers are severely limited, with executive power concentrated in the Lieutenant-Governor’s (L-G) office. Ladakhis are well aware of the National Conference administration’s disempowerment by the L-G’s office in Jammu and Kashmir; indeed, the current protest movement began as a reaction to the disempowerment of Ladakh’s hill councils by the L-G’s office in Leh. To make the third option acceptable, the Union Home Ministry might need to incorporate protections under the Sixth Schedule.
Will the Union administration consider any of the three options, or will it continue to stonewall? As September 24 showed, to test Ladakhi patience any longer would be unwise. While there is little risk that China or Pakistan will benefit from Ladakhi discontent with Union policies, there is a high risk that denying constitutional rights to an elected administration will further weaken a democracy already plagued by domineering.
Radha Kumar | Former member, Government of India’s Group of Interlocutors for J&K, author of The Republic Relearnt: Renewing Indian Democracy, 1947-2024
(Views are personal)
