Last month’s ASEAN meeting, for the first time, gave a categorical rebuke to the Myanmar junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing, by not inviting him for the summit. This sent a clear message, if somewhat late, to the military leadership that stymied the formation of the elected government in Myanmar in February by carrying out a coup d’etat.
Last month’s refusal to invite the military leader to participate is probably the very first time that ASEAN has taken this approach vis-a-vis the military government in Myanmar. For years when the Western world refused to engage with the Myanmar government, ASEAN’s policy of constructive and flexible engagement kept Myanmar within the grouping. ASEAN’s efforts to address the current political issue seems to be a bit late especially as nearly nine months have passed since the coup in Myanmar, which had severe repercussions on the civilian population, with several casualties and arrests of protestors. Assessing how the regional dynamics have played a role in the Myanmar context will illustrate the flip-flop approach that ASEAN has followed, particularly in the aftermath of the coup, until last month’s decision.
The initial efforts set in motion by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi’s diplomatic visits across the region were ineffective, sending uncertain signals. Ignoring the pleas of the protestors, the diplomatic efforts were more focused on getting the military to commit to holding elections within a stipulated period of time, rather than a clear message that supported the reinstatement of the elected government. While attempting to walk this tightrope, ASEAN remained a grouping that was both undecided and divided on how Myanmar was to be dealt with. Both these characteristics are not new to ASEAN, as its cohesion has always remained divided on critical matters. A decisive option would have been to place Myanmar under suspension until the military violence ended, but that would mean going against ASEAN’s sacrosanct principle of non-interference in internal affairs, a core pillar since its inception.
The grouping received tremendous criticism from the international community and the protestors within Myanmar when General Hlaing was invited to the ASEAN’s Jakarta summit in April 2021 that was seen as a de facto recognition of the coup and support for the military’s legitimacy. ASEAN however defended its position by requesting the military leadership to commit itself to the five-point consensus agenda that was set forth in the meeting. The agenda had two clear categories of measures to be implemented. The first was that it called for the following at ground level within Myanmar: 1. The immediate end to the violence. 2. All parties to the political conflict were to exercise restraint. 3. Constructive dialogue and a peaceful solution to the political stand-off between the military and the protestors. The second set of measures was particularly focused on the initiatives taken by ASEAN to help resolve the conflict. This had two main provisions: 1. The ASEAN chair would appoint a special envoy who would work in coordination with the Secretary-General to mitigate the political crisis. 2. Most critical with regard to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, coupling both the political stalemate and the Covid situation, was the extension of humanitarian assistance through the AHA or the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance.
While in principle General Hlaing agreed to these steps at the ASEAN summit, he then returned to Myanmar and stated that normalcy on the ground had to return first before these points could be considered and implemented, literally bringing the situation to naught and undermining the minimal influence the group had. For ASEAN, the appointment of the special envoy, Erywan Yusof, took about six months and the role for the AHA remained negligible. Much of the work of the AHA has been limited to assistance in the context of natural disasters and humanitarian relief. Its approach precludes the organisation from addressing situations of political conflict within the member countries. This is unlike the case of Western democracies where the question of humanitarian assistance is not just provided to areas where civilian populations are affected by natural disasters and calamities, but are also at risk as a result of political conflict. For ASEAN, its capacity to intervene is extremely limited given that the region is composed of states that are hybrid or quasi-democracies themselves.
On October 15, the decision of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting to withhold the invitation to the Myanmar military was a bold step that was pending for long. Much of the remarks by regional leaders following this development highlight the importance of improving the credibility of ASEAN in the face of criticisms levelled against it on its inaction on core regional matters. While this may seem a small step after months of uncertainty, and its effects to bring about real change may still be debated, it is nevertheless a welcome decision. May this be the first of many steps for ASEAN to reinvent itself in the context of events unfolding in the region.
Shankari Sundararaman
Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)