Fiery Agnipath stir: Right idea, grim realities

The need for a plan to modernise the armed forces has been haunting India since the eighties when General K Sundarji authored the controversial ‘perspective plan’.
Image used for representational purpose only. (Photo | PTI)
Image used for representational purpose only. (Photo | PTI)

Déja vu must be experiencing déja vu. The fiery protests over Agnipath, the new avatar of the armed forces recruitment programme, projected by its authors as ‘transformational’, are reminiscent of protests from a not so distant past. The images of marauding mobs, of trains set afire, of travellers left terrified, are a scary testimony of angst and seething anger coiled deep in the political economy. The BJP-led NDA government finds itself yet again in a perfect storm, caught between intent and poorly planned, ill-conceived execution. Perceptions are worsened by the geography of rioting — in states where the BJP is in power or in alliance — for instance Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Agnipath is the right idea caught in poor optics and trapped in grim realities.

Context is critical for the construct of public policy. The nation faces threats on multiple fronts on its borders. Does India need to urgently modernise its armed forces? The answer is an unequivocal yes. Does India need to rebalance boots and bytes, recast the scale and shape its military maximum effect? Of course it does. Is there a need to review and repair the skew of average age across the forces?
The answer — given the average age profile of 33 years for Indian soldiers — is indisputably yes. Does the country need to optimise the cost to efficiency ratio of its defence spending? Clearly the answer again is yes.

The need for a plan to modernise the armed forces has been haunting India since the eighties when General K Sundarji authored the controversial ‘perspective plan’. The 1991 economic crisis followed by political instability left the ideas stranded. In 2002, post the Kargil war during the Vajpayee era, a major attempt was made under Lt Gen Pankaj Joshi, a double amputee war hero who rose to be Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS), to recast the strategic template for the country’s armed forces. The fact that in 2022, the criticality of modernising the armed forces continues to be debated, and is the epicentre of a political controversy, illustrates the stagnation of strategic policy thought.

Change is rarely smooth, never elegant and inevitably triggers confusion and chaos. Timing is of essence in the acceptance of any paradigm change. The question is whether the unveiling of the new Agnipath programme could have been timed better, especially given the distress in the rural economy and the failure of governments to fill over 2 million vacant posts.

It is true that change is vulnerable to pushback. It is also true that operational tactics matter for success of strategy. It is arguable that the launch of Agnipath scheme could have been distanced from job creation announcement by the Central government — particularly in a landscape where politicos deploy enlistment in the armed forces to camouflage their patchy record in job creation.

Criticism is focussed on the shorter tenure of four years recruits would sign on when the expectation is of life-long service and benefits. The crux of the critique is located in India’s demography with a bulging workforce and fuelled by the inadequacies of the political economy to generate jobs. That said, the idea of short service tenure is not new. It is an accepted template across many nations, and indeed has been used in the past even in India.

The moot point is the expectations of the aspirants. Acceptance depends on guarantees provided to secure their future. The protests have triggered a parade of promises by chief ministers offering priority once they re-enter civil life. Political promises are not exactly enforceable. Barely a third of veterans secure placements post retirement. And the record of states is manifest in data – over five lakh police posts have been vacant for over five years.

A new policy per se demands deliberative processes. It must allow for tweaks to enable adoption and public acceptance. This calls for creation of room for debate and negotiation. Should the tenure be four years or longer as some veterans have suggested? What will be the defining characteristics to establish quality retention? What is the logic of the cut-off for retention at 25 per cent and is there merit in the argument for review and expansion?

The success of public policy is defined by the approach. Yes, branding is useful for political messaging but branding is not sufficient to propel confidence and acceptance. Frequently policy makers and politicos confuse political propagation with persuasive processes and policies. It is not enough to blame the opposition for misinformation — social media posts are not a substitute for active on the ground counter-mobilisation.

The lessons learnt from recent policy debacles need to be inducted — this demands active engagement with the stakeholders. Promises need to be enshrined in law and BJP-ruled states could take the lead by creating the framework. The districts which host the largest number of armed force personnel are known. MPs, ministers and CMs need to focus on creating the necessary confidence in the new policy — aspirants want to be heard not talked down to. It is instructive to remember at all times that the social contract between those willing to serve in uniform and the nation rests on a precious sentiment called trust.

Shankkar Aiyar
Author of The Gated Republic, Aadhaar: A Biometric History of India’s 12 Digit Revolution, and Accidental India
shankkar.aiyar@gmail.com

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