NEW DELHI: The tiny archipelago of the Maldives is fast turning into a proxy battleground for India and China. Ever since Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom took over as President of the Maldives in the 2013 presidential election, defeating the opposition led by Mohamed Nasheed by a slender margin amidst allegations of rigging and fraud, New Delhi has watched with growing dismay as the nation, which officially has a ‘India First’ policy, started making overt overtures to Beijing and Riyadh.
China, which sees the tiny group of islands as a key part of its ‘String of Pearls’ policy, was more than happy to respond with huge sums of money in return for political, economic and military influence.
New Delhi views the String of Pearls, or row of Chinese-built/financed ports which dot the Indian Ocean and stretch all the way to Africa, as an attempt strategically encircle India by getting docking rights for PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) vessels and establishing electronic eavesdropping posts, thus limiting India’s maritime sphere of influence.
China, however, insists that these are meant only to protect its key trade and oil routes along the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) or the main maritime routes running between ports used for trade, logistics and naval forces. According to former President Nasheed, who lives in exile in the UK after a court in the Maldives convicted him on terrorism charges, they “want to have a base in the Maldives that would safeguard trade routes — their oil routes — to their new markets; to have strategic installations, infrastructure”.
This accusation was bolstered when Yameen became an enthusiastic supporter of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to connect mainland China with Europe and Central Asia through a massive network of road, rail and sea routes.
The road in this Belt and Road Initiative refers to the maritime routes, and overlaps with ports in which Beijing already has considerable influence, in Myamnar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti on the eastern African coast at the mouth of the Red Sea, where it now not only has a naval base, but a full-fledged PLA Expeditionary Force.
New Delhi watched helplessly as Yameen withdrew the Maldives from the Commonwealth of nations in 2016, after the grouping of former British colonies threatened to suspend it for eroding democratic institutions. Earlier, in 2013, soon after assuming power, he also stopped negotiations with the United States for a Status of Forces Agreement, which would have given the US Navy greater access to the archipelago. To add insult to injury, three Chinese naval ships docked in Male in August 2017.
Despite several promises from the Yameen government that it would not allow China to set up military bases on its territory, New Delhi remains skeptical given the massive Chinese investments pouring into the country, and Chinese firms getting contracts to build state-of-the-art tunnels connecting key islands and even a brand new airport.
In August 2015, India’s foreign secretary, S Jaishankar, visited Maldives to voice Indian concerns over a new law promulgated by Yameen that allows foreigners to own land in the country if they invest $1 billion and reclaim 70 per cent of land from the sea.
In January this year, days before the crisis erupted in Male after the Supreme Court freed jailed opposition leaders and allowed them to contest the elections tentatively slated for October, Nasheed accused China of “land-grabbing” at a press conference in Colombo, arguing that Chinese interests had led to the leasing out of about 16 islets among the 1,192 scattered coral islands, and Chinese companies were building ports and other infrastructure there. “...There is land grab going on, that threatens not just the Maldives, but the peace and stability of the entire region. A large emerging power is busy buying up... our islands, buying up our key infrastructure, and effectively, buying up our sovereignty,” he alleged.
With China warning India against turning the Maldives into another “flashpoint” in Sino-India relations, New Delhi faces a geo-strategic dilemma with no clear end or options in sight at the moment.
Route to emergency
January 29
The Maldives Supreme Court accepts a petition filed by leaders of a four-party opposition alliance demanding the temporary removal of President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom for corruption and misrule. Two former presidents, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who is Yameen’s half-brother, and Mohamed Nasheed, in exile after he was charged with terrorism, are among the signatories.
February 2
The Supreme Court rules that the trials of Nasheed and other jailed opposition leaders were unconstitutional, and restores their political and civil rights. Indian says that in the “spirit of democracy and rule of law, it is imperative for all organs of the Government of Maldives to respect and abide by the order of the apex court.”
February 3-4
A defiant Yameen locks down Parliament for “security reasons”; heavily armed soldiers prevent opposition MPs from entering. His offer to hold elections scheduled for later this year rejected by opposition. Nasheed appeals for military intervention by India, and asks the US to freeze all financial transactions of Maldives regime leaders going through US banks.
February 5-6
President Abdulla Yameen declares a 15-day state of emergency in the country, and troops storm and seal off the Supreme Court. Former president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the half-brother of the current President, and two judges arrested.
February 8-10
Chief Justice arrested. Supreme Court rescinds earlier order freeing opposition MPs. New Delhi says it is “disturbed” by the Emergency and the arrests. A Chinese daily warns against any interference by India in the Maldives. Yameen sends special envoys to China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan but India says dates for his visit not suitable to its leaders. Indian journalist arrested and deported.
