Earlier this year, amendments proposed to the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act met with opposition from political parties, civil society and minority religious groups. Over the last decade, changes in rules have made compliance with the Act—through which NGOs and charitable organisations receive foreign funds—more onerous. Many organisations have lost their FCRA licences, while even genuine NGOs and charities have found it increasingly difficult to access foreign funding for work that fills gaps in government services.
In this context, a recent order of the Madras High Court merits scrutiny. The case concerns denial of an FCRA licence to an organisation run by a Christian priest who practises Zen Buddhism. The order could reasonably uphold the denial on the ground that the organisation did not disclose its religious antecedents in its application. However, it also gives Executive authorities “considerable leeway and unfettered discretion” in deciding such cases. Such discretion calls for appropriate safeguards. The order does add that courts may intervene if that discretion is misused.
The order goes further, however, in discussing the “inclusivity” of Hinduism vis-à-vis the “inherent exclusivity” of Abrahamic religions. It also refers to arguments that attempts at inculturation (“appropriation”) by Christian and Muslim organisations were aimed at preparing the ground “for eventual takeover”, while leaving the broader debate to be “waged” elsewhere. It subsequently raises concerns that the social balance could be affected if a religious group gains ascendancy, citing tensions between minority groups in Kerala, in the context of conversion activities allegedly supported by foreign funds. It also invokes the court’s Arsha Vidya Parampara Trust case of 2025, which upheld the right to teach moral philosophy using certain religious texts.
The 14-page order, read as a whole, goes considerably beyond the principal question before the court to engage with a contested religious issue in broad terms. In a society already sharply polarised along communal lines, observations from a constitutional court on such matters call for particular care and nuance. Courts are entitled to examine the wider context of cases before them. But on matters of faith and identity, a measured articulation can help preserve the distinction between judicial adjudication and wider debates that properly belong in the public sphere.
