It was November 2008 and Chhattisgarh was in the midst of election fever. Just ahead of polling day, then Indian Air Force (IAF) Squadron Leader T K Choudhary was readying his Mi-17 helicopter to fly over the Bastar forests carrying 25 persons, including two IAF crew members, some election officials and polling material as cargo. In the cockpit, Choudhary had Flight Engineer Sergeant Mustafa Ali for company.
Taking the IAF crew and election officials by surprise, the helicopter drew heavy small arms fire, even as Choudhary took off from a helipad in interior Bastar.
Maoist rebels, hiding in a hilly pocket overlooking the helipad, opened indiscriminate fire from their AK-47s, leaving Ali dead and the helicopter badly damaged.
The incident was the turning point in the IAF’s approach to the deployment of six of its Mi-17 helicopters in the battle against Maoist rebels. Soon after that attack, the IAF rushed a proposal to the government to amend the Rules of Engagement for its men and helicopters deployed in anti-Maoist operations.
Then IAF chief Air Chief Marshal P V Naik, in early 2009, wanted the Central government to let its men to “fire back in self-defence” when they come under attack from Maoists. That request was granted within months and now all IAF helicopters flying for logistics support and casualty evacuation of policemen have guns mounted on the flanks with Garud commandos manning the weapons.
But the arming of IAF helicopters and the presence of commandos has not scared away the rebels.
In the last three years, IAF helicopters have carried out 7,000-odd sorties in aid of the central police forces fighting Maoists, of which nearly 200 were rescue missions.
The IAF helicopters have come under Maoist fire 14 times in January and February 2013. On five occasions, the choppers were hit by bullets, on one occasion forcing an emergency landing.
It was the Mi-17’s sturdiness and the IAF air crew’s precautions such as doing steep dives to land and carrying out steep take-offs to avoid coming under fire that chiefly contributed to the air operation’s no-casualty report.
In January 2013, an IAF Mi-17 that was flying into south Bastar to carry out a rescue operation of some policemen stranded in the forests came under fire from Maoist rebels, leading to the injury of a Chattisgarh police radio operator. With their helicopter damaged, the six IAF personnel, including two Garud commandos, left the injured policeman behind to rush to the nearest police station to seek help.
Though the IAF crew came under severe criticism from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for leaving behind the policeman, IAF chief N A K Browne was livid and called the report of IAF crew abandoning the cop as “nonsense”.
Browne explained then that what the IAF crew did at was the best decision they could have taken in the circumstances.
In July 2012, IAF was asked to extend its air support operations—codenamed Op Triveni—to eight of the Maoist-infested states—Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh—instead of five states. The IAF refused, citing unacceptable risks its helicopters faced due to poor infrastructure.
The IAF reaction shows that the Indian armed forces are wary of getting into the fight against Maoists. This is not because they are not ready for a good fight, but because they fear their main focus of defending the nation from external aggression and threats will get diluted and this will only make India’s adversaries a happier lot.
That said, it is clear that the armed forces do not want a role in operations against the Maoists in the jungles of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha or Jharkhand, primarily because the rebels have not shown secessionist tendencies or made calls to the local population to break away from the Indian union.
There are other factors such as socio-economic issues involved in these regions being breeding grounds for Maoist movement and hence, keeping away the armed forces is seen as a better strategy.
“The fight against the Maoists is not a military problem. There are other socio-economic issues dovetailed to it,” pointed out former Army Adjutant General Lt Gen (Retired) Mukesh Sabharwal, an officer much experienced in C-I operations in both Jammu and Kashmir and the North East.
The Army, as an institution, too is not too keen on getting involved in internal security duties.
“It is not a great idea to deploy the Army in an offensive role in the anti-Maoist operation because the problem is not going to end too soon and the Army units will get drawn into the fight in large numbers. This will only be advantageous to our enemy at the borders,” Sabharwal noted.
According to a serving Major General, there are four main reasons for the Army not being ready to do this job.
One, the force, which has trained to fight the enemy’s army, will be wasted in such roles. Two, this job will only keen enlarging the already stretched Army units away from its primary role and will provide no relief to the troopers.
Three, the Maoists have not shown secessionist tendencies. Four, the Maoist menace will not end in a short period of time and it is going to be a long haul.
“We are already engaged in long haul fights in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East. This role will do for now,” he explained.
But that does not prevent the defence forces from coming to the aid of the central armed police and paramilitary forces such as the CRPF and BSF, apart from the state police forces.
“We are clear in what we want to do. We will play only advisory and capacity-building roles in anti-Maoist operations,” a Brigadier said.
The Army also provides attachment posting to officers from the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force in its battalions in insurgency-hit Jammu and Kashmir and the North East, he explained.
The Indian Army has offered to post advisers to Maoist violence-hit states, such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra and Jharkhand. But there has been no word from the MHA on this proposal made three-four months ago.
Help, but from a distance
Policemen trained by Army: 80,000
Central police battalions trained: 40
State police battalions trained: 40
Training given for: Bomb Disposal, Field Engineering
Army’s role: Advisory, Capacity-Building
Air Force’s Role: Logistics, Casualty Evacuation
Why the reluctance
* The armed forces, trained to fight the external enemy, will be wasted in internal security
* The Maoists show no seccessionist tendency, unlike the insurgents in J&K and North East.
* Fight against Maoists has socio-economic factors involved and is a long one
* Getting involved will stretch the Armed Forces, already engaged in fights elsewhere
