Genetics of Love-Jihad and Love-Jauhar

The legend of Jauhar predates the advent of Islam by several hundred years; however, the vilifiers of Love-Jihad choose not to acknowledge this
Illustration for representation
Illustration for representation
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Twenty years ago, the phrase ‘Love-Jihad’ entered the Indian public sphere. The underlying idea was that Hindu women were being enchanted into marrying Muslim men. This was not perceived as genuine love but rather as a clandestine Islamic expansionist strategy, using marriage as a means to propagate the faith. The Hindu lobby that raised this issue never questioned why Hindu women might choose Muslim men over Hindu men; their sole focus was on how to prevent such unions.

Contrast this with another term: ‘Jauhar’. This refers to the self-immolation of women in a besieged fortress, choosing death by fire over capture. It is portrayed as an act of true love and fidelity, hence the term ‘Love-Jauhar’. This narrative appears in textbooks and on television, embedded in the legends of Rajasthan, where it is consistently presented as a sacrifice and never a tragedy. No one interprets it as a strategy, nor does anyone question whether it was a free choice or forced upon them by husbands or fathers who preferred death by fire to a life of disgrace and shame.

Both Love-Jihad and Love-Jauhar address the same underlying concern: a Hindu woman’s transgression of boundaries, specifically concerning the body of an upper-caste Hindu woman. This fear has nothing to do with religion. It has more to do with caste.

The concept of ‘religion’ as a term is a 19th-century European colonial invention, based on conversion, which is fundamental to Christianity and Islam. Hinduism, however, does not convert. Like Japanese Shinto and Chinese Han identity, being Hindu is an ethnic identity acquired by birth into a particular caste (jati). The British did not invent caste, as claimed by Sanatanis; rather, they invented the concept of religion as understood by historians.

Religions are inherently imperialistic in nature. They expand their reach through military might, conversion, and marriage. This characteristic is absent in China, Japan, and India. The Chinese choose to assimilate conquered territories, hence they regulate and dissuade Uighur Muslim or Tibetan Buddhist practices. Japan restricts the entry of foreigners into its nation, preferring tourists. Hindus protect boundaries by preventing inter-caste marriage. This practice solidified approximately 2,000 years ago and was documented in the Manusmriti, the most authoritative of all lawbooks on dharma, known as the dharma-shastra.

According to Manusmriti, if a Shudra man were to marry a Brahmin woman, their child would become a Chandala. Today, as Hinduism is projected as a casteless religion by Sanatanis, the Muslim man takes the place of the Shudra man. He is contamination to be shunned. Even the Muslim woman cannot be brought into the Hindu fold where purity of marriage is still determined by caste. Even today, across India, there are new reports of boys and girls who marry outside caste being killed.

The legend of Jauhar predates the advent of Islam by several hundred years; however, the vilifiers of Love-Jihad choose not to acknowledge this. Kalhana’s Rajatarangini contains accounts of the Hindu king Harsha during his invasions of Kashmir. The Mahabharata describes Krishna’s widows killing themselves by fire, and the Yadava caravan subsequently being raided by Abhira tribesmen, with no Muslim invaders present. Whatever the terminology—be it ‘sahagamana,’ ‘sati,’ or ‘jauhar’—the practice of burning women began in India 1,500 years ago, according to inscriptional evidence in Eran, Madhya Pradesh, a few centuries after the establishment of caste boundaries. This is not coincidental.

History shows that Mughal emperors married Rajput princesses without difficulty, while Rajputs almost never married Mughals, and Mughal princesses often remained unmarried. The flow of purity has always been unidirectional. In warrior communities, giving away a daughter was often an act of submission and shame. Many Sanatanis argue that the women sent to Mughal harems were not daughters of queens but rather daughters of concubines.

There is a more perplexing question that the establishment is unwilling or unable to address: Why did Hindu women want to marry Muslim men? Perhaps they imagined, or sometimes perceived, Muslim men to be more physically vital, while Brahmins and Baniyas prioritised the mind and neglected the body. This was formerly compensated for by gyms and gods with biceps and six-packs, now marketed as ancient Hindu virility. India once had the Anangaranga, which taught men to be expert and considerate lovers. Tradition offers no such schooling, and the neo-Hindu establishment is uncomfortable with it.

The Sanatani establishment has primarily been compelled to organise itself against Hindu reformers, rather than against Muslims. Nineteenth-century anti-sati campaigns, led by Rammohan Roy, provoked a Sanatani backlash that redefined itself as the protector of traditions. Here lies the deeper divide.

Currently, some people are promoting Hinduism as a religion suitable for everyone, irrespective of birth or caste, based solely on devotion to a guru. This approach is generous, popular, and growing rapidly. Sanatanis are effectively trying to turn Hinduism into a conversion-based religion. But caste proves the biggest obstacle. The idea of a meat-eating bride entering a pure vegetarian household continues to evoke disgust in Hinduism’s elite circles.

This structural difference—between Islam, which expands gene pools, and Hinduism, which protects gene pools—needs to be at the core of the Love-Jihad and Love-Jauhar debates.

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