The Sino-Indian military stand-off in Eastern Ladakh following the audacious 19 km incursion into designated Indian space around Daulat Beg Oldi by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made the ongoing diplomatic concourse between the two countries increasingly irrelevant. Admittedly, any such incident can neither be trivialised nor overstated for its impact on India’s relations with China. But whether there is any manifest need to call for a Special Representative (SR)-level intervention at the present juncture to prevent ties from falling into an abyss of sorts remains to be seen.
The incursion comes in the wake of the recent expressions of a desire towards normalisation of ties with India during the BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013 and earlier in Beijing when China’s ‘fifth generation’ leaders, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang, took over the reins of power. The recent developments do not match up commensurately to the expression of intent for sustainable normalcy. They have left New Delhi to configure whether the new ‘Communist power duo’ in Beijing can be expected to be any different from their predecessors in utilising tactical manouevres to outwit India by playing the oft-repeated waiting game on the border issue. As the Line of Actual Control progressively degenerates into a debilitating controversy, it is bound to its shadows on the strategic thinking of the Indian leaders who have demonstrated an internalised zeal for peace with China.
New Delhi must realise that no significant military activity along China’s international border can take place without the manifest sanction of the Chinese Military Commission spearheaded by President Xi. It must take off that voluntarily self-adorned ‘garb of helplessness’ it puts on each time there brews a fresh Sino-Indian dispute linked to border developments.
It is not coincidental that the ongoing crisis emanated after the soothing words of positive hope spelt out by President Xi in Durban during his tête-à-tête with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Durban, where it was ‘magnanimously’ announced that Chinese Premier Li had chosen New Delhi as his ‘first foreign foray destination’ after taking over. Then came the rider that Islamabad, China’s closest strategic ally, would be the next halt in the same tour, which also includes outlying Germany in the itinerary. Soon thereafter, well planned military manouevres in the Ladakh segment, integrally located in the Jammu and Kashmir territory, ensued with a destabilising thrust.
One attribute that defines Chinese foreign policy is that all vital organs of the State—including the powerful Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission—are almost in absolute sync with a given policy variant. In contrast, the organs of the Indian State are dysfunctional, self-questioning and flawed versions in veritable ‘self-destruct mode’.
China now is working to alter the line of actual control bit-by-bit by employing novel methods—without having to fire a single shot. With India a mute spectator, the PLA has brought pastoralists to Uttarakhand’s Barahoti sector and given them cover to range across the line. Using pastoralists in the vanguard and troops in the rear has also been tried elsewhere to drive Indian herdsmen out of their traditional pasture lands and assert Chinese control over those places.
In this way, China is encroaching, little by little, on Indian land in the Chip Chap and Skakjung regions of Ladakh. Chumar in Ladakh was raided last September by helicopter-borne PLA troops, who destroyed Indian bunkers before returning. Officials in Arunachal Pradesh are tired of complaining about the Union government’s nonchalant attitude to PLA’s aggressive activities along their state’s border.
Under these circumstances, our China policy and constructs need imperative recasting to convey a strong message to Beijing that any further build up on LAC would be seriously viewed in New Delhi, and invite proportionate responses in bilateral ties.
Unfortunately, India has unconditionally opened its markets and coffers to Chinese goods. This has strengthened Chinese perceptions about India’s vulnerability and weakness. Had New Delhi shown the sagacity to systemically link proliferation of economic ties with China to a permanent resolution of the border tangle, India’s bargaining capacity in bilateral relations would have manifested itself more resoundingly. Regardless of who the interlocutors are—the Japanese, the Vietnamese, the Philippine or the Indians—Beijing’s classic positioning in negotiations is strategically premised on Claim Area Propositions (CAP). Each CAP variant is extensively backed up by a lot of institutional memory, map material, historical texts of agreements, and assertive and lengthy argumentations.
India’s leadership must distinguish between caution and pusillanimity. The former helps to avert problems, but the latter conveys weakness and invites more aggression.
A Chinese fable tells of how a frog in a pot of lukewarm water feels quite comfortable and safe. He does not notice as the water temperature slowly rises until, at last, the frog dies and is thoroughly cooked. The fable describes China’s strategy for growing its influence in South Asia in the face of a deeply suspicious India. India today risks becoming the proverbial frog in the slowly warming pot.
emmdiem@hotmail.com
