NEW DELHI: A month into the US-Israel campaign against Iran, the battlefield is already yielding hard lessons. Drone swarms, precision strikes and networked air defence are no longer emerging concepts, they are being stress-tested in real time. In a wide-ranging interview, The New Indian Express speaks to former Director General of Army Air Defence Lt Gen (Dr.) VK Saxena (Retd) on the rise of unmanned systems, the stress points in Iran’s air defence architecture and the capability gaps India must urgently address.
Q. There is a view that Iran’s air defence has crumbled under US and Israeli strikes. How do you assess its performance?
I would not characterise it as a collapse. It was a case of sub-optimal performance under saturation. Any Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) rests on three core components: sensors, shooters and command and control.
Sensors include surveillance radars, early warning systems and electro-optical devices that detect and track aerial threats. Shooters comprise surface-to-air missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery that engage them. The critical layer is the battlefield management command and control system which fuses inputs, generates a recognised air picture, prioritises threats and assigns weapons in real time.
In Iran’s case, the sensor and shooter layers are relatively capable but uneven in quality, with a mix of legacy Soviet-origin, indigenous and reportedly Chinese-origin systems. The limitation lies in the command and control architecture.
Their Integrated Air Defence Command and Control System appears to have come under strain. It supports both the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, creating a dual command structure. This leads to delays in decision-making, interoperability challenges and inefficient resource allocation, particularly during high-density, multi-axis attacks.
Q. How much did intelligence asymmetry contribute to Iran’s difficulties?
That is the second factor. Iranian capabilities are widely known due to the strong intelligence networks of the United States and Israel. When your adversary has deep visibility into your deployments, capabilities and vulnerabilities, it creates a significant operational disadvantage.
We must also recognise the asymmetry. Iran is dealing with military powers that possess advanced surveillance, precision strike and electronic warfare capabilities. This is not a like-for-like contest and that context is important when assessing performance.
Q. Iran’s drone and missile inventory has expanded despite sanctions. How do you assess its operational significance?
Sanctions have compelled Iran to indigenise. It has developed industrial-scale production capacity for unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles, supported by hardened and underground infrastructure.
The Shahed series, especially the Shahed-136 with a range of around 2,000 km, reflects the shift to low-cost, high-volume strike capability. These loitering munitions enable saturation attacks, exploiting gaps in air defence and forcing defenders to expend far more expensive interceptors.
Alongside, Iran fields cruise missiles such as Soumar and Hoveyzeh and ballistic missiles including Fateh-110, Zolfaghar and Shahab-3. It also fields the Khorramshahr series which allows multiple warheads from a single missile to hit separate targets and complicate interception.
The significance lies in scale and cost asymmetry, generating mass at low cost while stretching and depleting advanced air defence systems.
Q. What does this conflict reveal about the evolving economics of air defence and the role of unmanned systems?
The conflict brings out a clear cost asymmetry. Defenders are using high-value interceptors, often several times more expensive, against low-cost UAVs and loitering munitions. This imposes a sustained economic burden. There is also the issue of magazine depth. Interceptor inventories are finite, and in a prolonged engagement, depletion becomes a serious operational constraint.
Unmanned systems are reshaping the character of warfare. In Ukraine, unmanned surface vessels have successfully targeted high-value Russian naval assets despite the absence of a conventional navy. Similarly, counter unmanned aerial systems, including soft-kill measures such as jamming and spoofing and hard-kill kinetic solutions, are becoming integral to air defence networks.
The trend is clear. Scalable autonomous systems are delivering effects that were earlier dependent on expensive, crewed platforms.
Q. Where does India stand in this context and what capability gaps need urgent attention?
India has been responsive in adapting to these trends. Indigenous unmanned aerial and counter unmanned systems have been tested operationally, including during Operation Sindoor.
In the conventional air defence domain, we are relatively well-positioned. The Army’s Akashteer and the Air Force’s Integrated Air Command and Control System provide a credible, network-centric framework for airspace management and engagement.
However, in the unmanned domain, three gaps need immediate attention.
First, supply chain sovereignty. Our unmanned ecosystem must eliminate dependence on imported critical components.
Second, production scalability. We need to move from prototype-driven development to mass manufacturing. Industrial capacity and throughput must increase significantly to sustain high-intensity operations.
Third, regulatory alignment. The Drone Rules, 2021 must be revisited to reflect operational realities, including airspace integration, counter-drone authorisations and faster procurement pathways.
Additionally, survivability measures such as hardened shelters, dispersed production nodes and potentially silo-based missile infrastructure should be examined.
The overarching lesson is clear. Future air defence will be defined by integration, automation and scale. Systems that can fuse data, respond in real time and sustain high operational tempo will have the advantage.