On October 14, the US Senate and the House of Representatives issued a joint explanatory statement to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, stating that ‘there is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any US role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military’. The explanatory note also dilutes the requirement that needed Pakistan to interrogate any Pakistani national involved in nuclear proliferation and to allow US officials access to such a person; and simply goes on to state that it is ‘our understanding that cooperative effort currently being undertaken by the governments of Pakistan and the US to combat proliferation will continue’.
The bill, sponsored by John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Lugar — passed by the US Senate on September 24, and the House of Representatives on October 1 — has triggered an anti-American debate in Pakistan, and both houses of Parliament are debating it. The much-criticised conditionalities are more of a South Asian concern than American.
The Kerry-Lugar bill, legally titled ‘The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009’, tripling non-military aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion per annum, will become law, once signed by President Obama. The announcement was made by Obama during his address to a meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan in New York.
The Pakistani government, and President Zardari, initially rejoiced. They never bothered to tell the nation that Section 203 of the Act says that for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the US Secretary of State makes a certification, to the appropriate congressional committees that:
* The government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the US in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
* The government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance, including taking into account the extent to which the government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as:
* Ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries;
* Preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and
* Strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and
n The security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
The first presumption is that Pakistan is involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons-related material. It has never been proven in a court of law, but the presumption is part of the US law.
The second presumption is that Pakistan is somehow involved in sponsoring terrorism, and thus needs prompting from the US to put a stop to it. There is an implication that Pakistan’s military and intelligence agency is involved aiding the terrorist groups, including those that are conducting attacks against the US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, and against the territory or people of neighbouring countries, which obviously means India.
LeT and Jaish are mentioned specifically by name, and Pakistan is prohibited from letting them operate in its territory, including carrying out attacks into India. The law further requires the closure of terrorist camps in the FATA, and dismantling terrorist bases in Quetta and Muridke. This clearly implies that bases in these places exist, and they should be removed.
The message for the security forces of Pakistan is loud and clear. They must not ‘materially’ and substantially subvert the political or judicial processes. Who can certify as to whether these forces are ‘materially’ subverting the political or judicial process?
Many of the clauses in the bill appear to be the handiwork of the Indian embassy in Washington and Indian lobbyists. These include the ones dealing with dismantling terrorist bases of operations in Pakistan, including in Quetta and Muridke; preventing terrorist groups, such as LeT and Jaish, from operating in the territory of Pakistan. What would Kerry or Lugar know about LeT and Jaish, or their headquarters in Muridke?
There are provisions in the bill that apparently have been instigated by the Pakistan embassy and maybe even the present rulers. Americans would not be interested in the security forces of Pakistan not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan. The same legislators were supporting the security forces, led by Musharraf, until August last year. Why the sudden change of mind?
Pakistan’s rulers in their innumerable meetings with the American Congressmen during the past 18 months have repeatedly blamed the military and the intelligence agencies for the present mess. They asked for help in the form of assurances from the Americans that they would be able to complete their tenure. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009 is the maximum the Americans can do. Many may believe otherwise but they are being naïve. CIA director, or the American joint chief of staff, or a US secretary, will not be calling our chief of army staff to desist from interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs. This would be considered highly undiplomatic and impolite. And the military establishment in its October 7 top commanders meeting has made its opinion known. The corp commanders have expressed their ‘serious concerns’ on some of the clauses of the bill. This is a golden chance for the opposition to corner the government; and to create a rift between the military and the present set-up.
About the author:
Anees Jillani is a prominent Pakistan Supreme Court lawyer