In a dramatic shift, hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a staunch advocate of tripartite dialogue between India, Pakistan and Kashmir (with some conditions) now wants to have a bilateral dialogue with New Delhi. The shift is remarkable as till now he has hardly missed a chance to ridicule the efforts of moderate separatist leaders to engage New Delhi as a ‘sellout’. The ongoing unrest in Kashmir has made Geelani the most influential separatist leader. His newly-acquired status signifies the failure of all previous peace processes; his scale-down and offer of dialogue is significant.
Kashmiri intellectuals sympathetic to Geelani are busy defending the shift as a departure from maximalist to realist: “the responsibility of spearheading the movement has tempered Geelani’s rhetoric and has made him see reason”. Is this the beginning of a genuine peace process? Moreover, will New Delhi facilitate a safe landing for Geelani when he gets into a tight spot?
After 86 days of strikes and curfews in the ‘Quit Kashmir’ campaign, 65 persons have been killed and many crippled for life. Cumulative economic losses are estimated in hundreds of crores. He is under tremendous public pressure to find a solution to the ‘Kashmir dispute’. Mounting the tiger of popular sentiment is easy; producing results assiduous. Geelani earned his place in the sun after nearly six decades of hard-fought political struggle and is at the risk of losing popularity in a matter of days.
Politics is a dirty game with strange bedfellows. After the brutal death of 17-year-old Tufail Mattoo at the hands of police on June 11, protests spontaneously broke out in the Valley. Seeing the situation spinning out of control, the state government detained Geelani on June 20, but it did not help the authorities contain the situation. On the contrary, the leadership of All Parties Hurriyat Conference(G) was taken over by more radical leaders led by Musarat Alam and Asiya Andrabi.
Taking advantage of the situation, the APHC(G) launched the ‘Quit Kashmir’ campaign, and from June 24, they began issuing weekly calendars of hartals and protests. Unabated killing of youth by security forces galvanised people in favour of the protest programmes; it took no time for the street protests to assume the proportions of a popular uprising.
The week of July 30 to August 6 has so far been the most volatile, during which 30 persons were killed out of the total 65 deaths. During this period frenzied mobs throughout the Valley attacked and burned police stations, railway stations, government offices and whatever else came their way. It was virtual anarchy, with the government unable to control the situation despite indiscriminate use of force.
In panic, the government decided to release Geelani. All these years, the security apparatus tried its best to undermine Geelani; eventually they had to seek his help to prevent the situation from going from bad to worse.
Initially Geelani was reluctant to come out of jail, as he was aware of the risks, for boys controlling the street might not heed his call for calm. But he had no choice. The government was determined to release him. He felt jittery while in jail as Musarat Alam was gaining popularity and calling the shots. Geelani perceived it as a threat to his newly-acquired leadership status.
Being a Jamaat-e-Islami firebrand, Geelani is adept in exploiting religious discourse to promote his political plan. Once out of jail, he tried to don the mantle of a statesman. Taking the moral high ground of non-violence, Geelani asked agitating boys not to burn public property and shun stone-pelting completely, though he has been a votary of armed struggle from the very beginning of militancy in Kashmir. Since then the situation has calmed to an extent, but stone-pelting has not stopped completely; the intermittent killing of youth also continues.
Geelani’s supporters give him credit for controlling the situation; his detractors say it is an effect of Ramzan, when people are more focused on spiritual affairs. Whatever the reason, Geelani’s claiming the high moral ground was undermined when he himself divulged that ‘the government had promised to provide him space if he keeps the agitation violence-free’.
Geelani’s five conditions for dialogue are not new. Separatists from time to time have asked for accepting Kashmir as an ‘international dispute’, for ‘demilitarisation’, and for the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and other extraordinary laws. The other conditions — that the prime minister commit publicly and ensure practically that henceforth no killings and no arrests shall take place, and punishing persons responsible for the death of 65 persons — both look like demands for winding up an agitation rather than confidence-building measures (CBMs) to be initiated before a dialogue.
For the government some of these conditions are not impossible to meet. It is believed that both the state and the Centre are busy preparing a package to be announced before Eid, and the release of prisoners and the revocation of AFSPA from some urban areas are on the cards. CBMs are not an issue, but what happens if the CBMs are fully or partially set into motion: will azadi then be on the table? Is the present dispensation in Delhi ready to discuss issues related to ‘sovereignty’? It looks as if Delhi is presently desperate to defuse the crisis, and will worry about the contours of dialogue, if any, later.
Irrespective of New Delhi’s compulsions, it is not difficult to anticipate the fate of Geelani if he settles on anything less than azadi. Kashmir being the graveyard of reputations, his own diehard supporters will condemn him as a traitor. It is easy for mainstream parties such as the NC and PDP to negotiate around ‘autonomy’ and ‘self rule’; they may be hailed for any such achievement. Geelani and his ilk cannot even think of discussing any arrangement within the four walls of the Indian constitution; they have aroused people’s expectations so high that tens of thousands have paid with their lives.
This has been the worst feature of the turmoil in Kashmir. Any popular leader, be it Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah or Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, lost credibility while dealing with New Delhi. Geelani is too losing his face; it will be cul-de-sac and only faceless chaos will be left on the streets. One thing goes to the credit of the present lot of separatist leaders: though they sought inspiration from religion their idiom was political. The choice is not between moderates and hardliners anymore; it is between hardliners and extremists; out of the frying pan, into the fire.
firdoussyed@yahoo.com