Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi recently made an observation which deserves attention beyond his country. He declared that Pakistan’s governance system had effectively “collapsed” and could no longer adequately address the country’s challenges. He subsequently clarified that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif would complete his five-year term, without withdrawing his diagnosis of the system itself.
Naqvi is no ordinary Cabinet minister. A former journalist and media entrepreneur, he became caretaker Chief Minister of Punjab before emerging as interior minister, chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board and president of the Asian Cricket Council. Even without a traditional electoral constituency or political dynasty behind him, his influence is considerable. Exceptionally close to Field Marshal Asim Munir, he is increasingly perceived as an important civilian face of Pakistan’s military establishment.
His rise therefore merits attention in India.
The parliamentary term of governments in Pakistan is five years. Yet no elected Prime Minister has completed a full tenure. Governments have fallen through military intervention, dismissal, judicial disqualification, assassination, resignation and parliamentary manoeuvre, many times when they are around three years old.
The third year, consequently, acquires an almost psychological significance, when economic dissatisfaction, political opposition and establishment calculations can begin converging. Shehbaz Sharif’s government is entering this zone, although there is no evidence that it is about to fall. More interesting is whether Pakistan’s familiar hybrid arrangement between civilian authority and military influence is evolving.
Naqvi could illustrate that evolution—a civilian without an independent political base, trusted by the establishment and operating across politics, security and diplomacy. Pakistan may not require another conventional military takeover; its hybrid system could simply acquire different civilian faces.
Naqvi’s importance extends beyond Islamabad. In June, he travelled to Tehran carrying a special communication from Munir for Iran’s Supreme Leader and a message from Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s PM subsequently publicly acknowledged Naqvi’s contribution to the diplomatic process involving Iran and the US.
Naqvi is also a Shia in a country where the community has historically faced considerable sectarian pressure. His identity should not be over-interpreted, but it adds an interesting dimension to his usefulness in engagement with Iran.
The larger point is that an interior minister has emerged as a strategic emissary on one of Pakistan’s most sensitive external relationships. He, therefore, sits unusually close to both Pakistan’s internal-security machinery and its external strategic establishment.
That makes his warning about governance particularly noteworthy.
Instead of predicting Pakistan’s next political crisis, it may be more useful to ask whether the country is accumulating some of the conditions historically associated with sudden political mobilisation.
The demographic evidence is striking. Pakistan is one of the world’s youngest large nations. UNDP has estimated that 64 percent of its population is below 30. More recent World Bank data shows that 28.5 percent of Pakistanis aged 15-24 were neither in employment, education nor training in 2025.
Numbers alone do not produce upheaval. Expectations matter. The Pakistani youth of 2026 is digitally connected to the world. He or she observes opportunity, prosperity, lifestyles and mobility elsewhere while confronting economic uncertainty, constrained employment, political confrontation and governance deficiencies at home. This creates an aspiration-governance gap.
Pakistan already faces formidable internal-security pressures; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan violence, Baloch militancy, Pashtun discontent and the unresolved confrontation surrounding Imran Khan. The former PM’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party continues to command substantial political loyalty and is planning another nationwide mobilisation in September.
A fifth source of turbulence could now emerge—not another insurgency, but wider generational frustration cutting across political, ethnic and provincial identities.
I have written about Gene Sharp before. His book, From Dictatorship to Democracy, acquires contemporary relevance. His influential catalogue of 198 methods demonstrated the extraordinary range available to populations seeking change without resorting to violence. His larger principle was simple; State power rests not only upon coercive capability but also upon cooperation and obedience. When sufficiently large sections of society withdraw these, apparently powerful systems can become vulnerable.
The digital revolution has amplified this beyond anything Sharp envisaged. The aggrieved no longer require elaborate political organisations before mobilising. Grievances connect rapidly, narratives acquire momentum and leadership can sometimes emerge after mobilisation rather than before it.
This does not suggest that Pakistan is inevitably heading towards an Arab Spring or a colour revolution. It means that conditions exist in which unexpected mobilisation could occur. For Pakistan’s security establishment, experienced in combating insurgency and terrorism, this would present a different challenge. Instruments designed against violent organisations may prove unsuitable against broad, initially peaceful mobilisation. Excessive coercion could widen protest and create space for radical elements to exploit.
Pakistan’s greatest internal vulnerability may consequently be simultaneity. TTP terrorism, Baloch separatism, Pashtun grievances, PTI mobilisation and youth frustration do not have to merge into one movement. They possess different motivations and frequently contradictory objectives. Their cumulative effect nevertheless places extraordinary demands upon the State.
This is occurring at an interesting moment. Pakistan has recently enjoyed considerable diplomatic visibility. Munir has developed an unusually prominent international profile. Islamabad has strengthened relationships in Washington and the Gulf, retained its strategic partnership with China and projected itself as a useful intermediary in West Asia.
Pakistan has always possessed a remarkable capacity to convert geography into geopolitical relevance. Yet external relevance cannot indefinitely compensate for internal weakness.
For India, serious instability in Pakistan should never be viewed with satisfaction. A stable neighbour is preferable to an unpredictable one, particularly when it possesses nuclear weapons and a population exceeding a quarter billion.
Internal pressure could tempt Pakistan’s establishment towards external diversion, while weakening State authority could provide greater space to extremist organisations and introduce uncertainty into strategic decision-making. India, therefore, has an interest in watching Pakistan’s internal evolution and remaining militarily alert.
Mohsin Naqvi may prove important in that evolution, either as a future political alternative or the establishment’s effective civilian troubleshooter. It is too early to know.
Pakistan’s establishment has spent decades learning how to manage politicians, insurgents, separatists, terrorists and external adversaries. Its next challenge could be different; managing the aspirations of a generation increasingly impatient with the system it has inherited. Naqvi may become part of the answer. More significantly, his words suggest the establishment has recognised the question.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Governor of Bihar and former Commander of the Srinagar-based Chinar Corps
(Views are personal)
