Measuring diplomacy by outcomes rather than applause

India is looking for stability in global affairs, while the US is speaking a language of leverage. We are witnessing a correction of the Indo-Pacific idea, not its end
A country of India’s size, history and aspirations does not need constant affirmation
A country of India’s size, history and aspirations does not need constant affirmation(Express illustrations | Sourav Roy)
Updated on
4 min read

The most revealing moment of the Modi-Trump meeting at the G7 summit in Évian was not the absence of the famous embrace that has come to symbolise their relationship. Nor was it Donald Trump’s familiar shower of praise for Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

It was a single sentence spoken by Modi before the meeting.”The world does not suffer from a shortage of resources. It suffers from a shortage of trust.” At first hearing, it sounded like a general observation about international affairs. Yet in the context of recent events, it was difficult not to hear something deeper.

The meeting itself was never primarily about repairing India-US relations or engineering a dramatic reset. It was about managing a relationship that has become more complicated at a moment when the strategic landscape around India is being reshaped.

The international environment is changing rapidly. West Asia is in flux. The possibility of an end to the Iran conflict raises questions about the future balance of power in the region. Europe appears increasingly peripheral to the most consequential diplomatic conversations. China continues to expand its influence while remaining largely absent from the frontlines of crisis management. And the US under Donald Trump is speaking a language that many of its partners are finding increasingly unfamiliar.

It is the language of leverage. India, by contrast, continues to speak the language of stability. That difference may prove more consequential than any missing hug.

Much commentary following the meeting focused on optics. Trump dominated the encounter, speaking at length, wandering across subjects and dispensing his characteristic hyperbole. His references to Modi as a “great negotiator” and a “killer” were vintage Trump. He has always used exaggeration as a political instrument.

The more important question, however, is not what Trump said. It is what India gained. That answer remains uncertain. Trade negotiations continue. Questions surrounding visas remain unresolved. Differences regarding Pakistan persist. The larger uncertainties surrounding West Asia remain very much alive. Diplomacy ultimately has to be measured by outcomes rather than applause.

The contrast between the two leaders was visible not merely in style but in substance. Trump’s worldview is transactional. Relationships are evaluated through advantage, reciprocity and immediate returns.

Modi’s intervention at the G7 pointed towards something else. His emphasis on trust reflected a concern that many countries increasingly share. In a world where wars proliferate, trade is weaponised, sanctions become instruments of policy and alliances are repeatedly tested, predictability itself has become a strategic asset.

This concern was also visible in India’s handling of the deaths of Indian sailors in the Gulf. The official Indian readout noted that the Prime Minister had reiterated the importance of ensuring the safety and security of civilians, including seafarers. The formulation was careful. The concern was unmistakable. The attribution was absent. Some will view this as excessive restraint. Others will see it as mature diplomacy.

The broader issue is that recent events are forcing a reassessment of assumptions that have governed India-US relations for nearly two decades. Much has been made recently of the apparent weakening of the Indo-Pacific framework. The renaming of the US Indo-Pacific Command has triggered debate about whether the concept itself has run its course. That conclusion is perhaps premature.

The Indo-Pacific was never merely a slogan. It reflected genuine strategic realities: the integration of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, China’s expanding maritime reach, the importance of sea lanes and India’s growing role in the wider Asian balance of power. What recent events have exposed is not the failure of the Indo-Pacific idea, but the limits of relying upon it as the principal organising framework for India-US relations.

Perhaps the Indo-Pacific was not an oversold stock so much as an incomplete prospectus. The China factor undoubtedly brought India and the US closer together. But the assumption that shared concerns about China would automatically produce convergence across the board now appears overly optimistic. Differences over trade, technology, Pakistan, Iran, Russia and immigration never disappeared. They were merely overshadowed by the larger imperative of balancing China’s rise.

What we are witnessing today is therefore not the end of the Indo-Pacific idea. It is a correction. And corrections are not always unhealthy. They force a more realistic assessment of where interests genuinely converge.

This reassessment is visible also in a broader shift within sections of the American strategic establishment. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s remarks at the Raisina Dialogue and the scepticism expressed by influential figures such as Peter Thiel reflect an America increasingly focused on preserving technological and economic advantage. Countries are evaluated more through calculations of utility, capability and competitive relevance.

India is not exempt from this scrutiny. Washington’s questions are increasingly practical. Can India become a trusted manufacturing hub? Can it emerge as a significant technology partner? Can it contribute to supply-chain resilience? Can it generate capabilities rather than simply promise potential? These are legitimate questions. But they are also questions that India should be asking of itself.

One of the curiosities of contemporary Indian discourse is that while we increasingly speak of ourselves as a leading power, we remain remarkably sensitive to external approval. A mature strategic culture should know better.

A country of India’s size, history and aspirations does not need constant affirmation. It certainly does not need validation from Donald Trump. The real test of national stature lies in whether India’s interests are taken into account when important decisions are made. It lies in whether India possesses the capabilities to shape outcomes rather than merely react to them.

The Modi-Trump meeting was therefore less significant for what it achieved than for what it revealed. The relationship remains important. The strategic logic remains compelling. But the era of easy assumptions is ending. India and the US are entering a more mature, more transactional and perhaps more demanding phase of their partnership.

That need not be a cause for alarm. Indeed, it may ultimately produce a healthier relationship, one grounded less in sentiment and more in a clear-eyed understanding of where interests align and where they do not.

In such a world, trust remains important. But trust, as the Prime Minister’s remarks implied, cannot be sustained by rhetoric alone. It rests upon credibility. And credibility, in international politics, is another name for capability.

Nirupama Rao | Former Foreign Secretary and former Ambassador of India to the US 

(Views are personal)

(On X @NMenonRao)

X
The New Indian Express
www.newindianexpress.com