It is beyond dispute that the Prime Minister’s decision to trim the size of his convoy of vehicles—as a followup to his austerity call to the nation—is politically astute in following the philosophy of setting personal examples in public life. But the big question is, can we ignore the implications of such a security compromise?
We need to remember the carnage that followed the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984. Thousands of innocent Indians were killed and incalculable damage was caused to properties across the country. Our robust democracy could survive one of its hardest tests, but anything could have happened had the downward spiral continued, including a collapse of our democratic institutions.
Can we take such a risk anymore? Are not the geopolitical challenges more pernicious and unpredictable than ever before? Can we under-estimate the nefarious designs of international players in destabilising a nation seen as steadily rising as a formidable economic and military power?
The Indian PM is one of the most highly-threatened dignitaries in the world. And dignitary with such a high threat perception is more vulnerable during movements by road. Route deployment, crowd control en route and anti-sabotage checks can, to a great extent, obviate the risks. But the planning must include contingencies needing offensive and defensive driving. The security in-charge at the ground level may have to manoeuvre the convoy to deal with a variety of operational and medical contingencies, cover the flanks of the main car and employ deception including the use of decoy cars. A lean motorcade severely restrains such tactical options.
Elaborate security measures and pompous cavalcades are rarely sought by democratic leaders, as such arrangements keep the public figure away from the public. They are aware that there is a political cost to such exclusions. It is here that the profundity of the security agencies’ professionalism is put to test. While granting the legitimate rights of the PM in deciding the nature and extent of his own security—as, ultimately, his choice prevails—these agencies should be able to prevail upon their principal with professional firmness.
An unwieldy motorcade is equally fraught with danger. Evacuation, sudden and tactically-required diversion, or a getaway becomes more cumbersome with a long convoy. One of the golden principles of dignitary protection is to engage with assailants for the minimum duration of time, evacuate or get away with the protectee, and leave the advance covering party to deal with the contingency. An unwieldy convoy makes this process more complicated apart from making it vulnerable to compromise.
Therefore, it is very difficult to suggest an ideal number of vehicles. But the number can be considerably reduced by following measures. Trim the size of the entourage accompanying the PM.
Include only those functionally and operationally required. Reduce the presence of other dignitaries if certain protocols are revised. Ensure strict access control, anti-sabotage checks and effective traffic management—which can help reduce some of the security vehicles like the pilot and advance warning cars.
During routine movements in the capital, once the routes are thoroughly sanitised and secured, a reasonable pruning of cars can be done as no unchecked gathering is expected. Such reduction can also be considered while on unscheduled surprise travels, unless it doesn’t follow a predictable pattern. The element of surprise should be to the advantage of security agencies.
A proposal for introducing electric vehicles is being mooted. The efficacy of such vehicles after bullet-proofing and other technical modifications is in doubt, apart from their inability to attain speed thresholds. Such a changeover could be considered several governmental fleets, but not the PM’s convoy.
The PM’s security is a priority in national interest irrespective of the person in power. Nefarious elements are always watching for vulnerabilities in our security protocols and planning to strike when the drills are weak. A loophole in any aspect enhances the vulnerability, as the dictum that the chain is as strong as its weakest cog is truly applicable in dignitary protection. Hence, the security umbrella of personal protection around the PM, especially when moving out, can’t be allowed to be compromised, however ethically sound the austerity measures may sound.
Multiple measures of dignitary security such as advance deployment, anti-sabotage checks, route securing, flank cover of the main car and body cover to the principal are equally important and non-negotiable. It would not be advisable to reveal the entire gamut of VVIP security to the public—its nuances are best understood by professionals. Each security drill, however mundane it may appear, is significant and has a purpose.
A strict enforcement of the regulations at the alighting point in Sriperumbudur on May 21, 1991 could have saved the life of Rajiv Gandhi. This incident is worth mentioning because, even to this day, the security man is rebuked when trying to keep a reception line-up lean and manageable.
No price is too high for protection of the PM considering the catastrophic consequences and collateral losses impacting the whole country if something untoward happens. If foreign hands are perceived to be involved, as per our latest retaliatory doctrine, the sources of terror would not be spared. And this might trigger a conflict that the whole world comes to rue.
K V Madhusudhanan | Former Inspector General, CRPF; founder DIG, CoBRA special operations unit; in charge of close-proximity security of four Prime Ministers
(Views are personal)
