

In 1776, the year in which Britain’s American colonies declared independence, Adam Smith paused in ‘Book V’ of The Wealth of Nations to admire the way English judges touted custom. Smith had noticed something about the three great courts that sat in Westminster Hall, each of which had begun for a different purpose. The King’s Bench existed to try matters relating to the Crown, the Court of Common Pleas heard ordinary suits, and the Exchequer collected revenue. But the judges of all three, Smith explained, had long been supported by the fees of those who came before them, and each court tried to draw to itself as much business as it could.
They found ways around the limits to their jurisdictions. The King’s Bench took up civil claims on the fiction that the defendant had committed a trespass. The Exchequer’s device was more elaborate. A person seeking to recover a private debt could plead that the defendant’s failure to pay had left him unable to pay the king. What began as a dispute between two private persons could thus be brought before a court concerned with royal revenue. So litigants acquired a choice of where to sue.
Smith did not disapprove. Each court, he wrote, endeavoured “by superior dispatch and impartiality” to attract as many causes as it could.
The arrangement would later change. Legislations in 1799 and 1825 restricted judges to fixed salaries. The legal historian Daniel Klerman has stated that the common law’s reputation for favouring defendants belongs to a period when judges had lost their financial incentive to attract claims.
It has always been the practice of advocates to approach for their clients the courts that may have otherwise possessed the necessary jurisdiction and that were seen as most favourable for a claim. Without it being any assessment on objectivity or impartiality, on a scale of functional efficiency, some courts were perceived as being favourable to the plight of workmen and others as establishment-oriented. Some were more open to technology and capital while others were seen as not.
The choice of court was—as it still is—also predicated on speed, specialisation and inventiveness. This practice, the more contentious version of which is ‘forum shopping’, is a natural consequence of the desire of parties to achieve results, even as the law constantly evolves to deal with the widespread use of technologies in our daily lives.
But the phrase ‘forum shopping’ came much later than the practice. One scholar dates its first appearance in a judgement to 1952 and another suggests that ‘forum shopping’ was discussed in detail in 1937 by the US Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co.
While rightly looked down upon, it is prevalent across common law nations. In ‘forum selling’, Klerman points to the example of a federal district court in east Texas. In 2003, it was not among the 10 busiest courts in the US for patent cases. In the first half of 2015, it was receiving nearly half of all patent cases in the country.
To prevent misuse, countries have sought to establish practices to regulate the choice of forums. In India, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not treat the choice of a court as a vice. It starts from the opposite premise and allows a suit to be filed where the defendant resides or does business, or where the cause of action arises “wholly or in part”. A cause of action can arise in many places, so the code often gives the plaintiff a choice of several courts. What the code polices is not the choice, but its abuse.
It is against this background that the Supreme Court’s recent order in Sai Maghalakshmi Traders should be read. A food business from near Bengaluru had sued a trader from Chennai in the Delhi High Court. Justices B V Nagarathna and R Mahadevan transferred the suit to Madras while observing that though several high courts may have jurisdiction, it cannot become a justification for forum shopping, nor perpetuate “notions of a hierarchy among the high courts”. Any perception that one high court is better suited than another to a type of dispute was “entirely misguided and erroneous”.
A few days later, the Delhi High Court, in the landmark ABD Maestro batch matter, returned the plaints in 17 intellectual property suits. In more than half of them, neither side was in Delhi at all. India’s intellectual property law, the court noted, has largely grown under the banyan tree that is the Delhi High Court, and a banyan “also stunts the growth of other trees below it”.
All high courts are equal in rank under the Constitution, as the Supreme Court has reminded us. What differs from one court to another is a court’s functional efficiency, which is usually reflected in the working of its registry and in the experience it has built up in a particular subject.
Until other high courts develop comparable speed and specialised capacity in a subject, the pressure to file in a particular high court would persist. Hopefully, the nudge from the Supreme Court in Sai Maghalakshmi Traders would encourage high courts in the country to achieve higher standards of functional efficiency, thereby reducing the need for a litigant to look for a better forum to sue at.
Saai Sudharsan Sathiyamoorthy | Advocate, Madras High Court
(Views are personal)