Trade diplomacy can't replace industrial might

Lower tariffs have often widened India’s trade deficits rather than narrowing them. The new free-trade deals are welcome. But to make them work commercially, our capabilities need an upgrade
The conventional wisdom that FTAs act as reliable engines of global value-chain integration is widely contradicted in available data
The conventional wisdom that FTAs act as reliable engines of global value-chain integration is widely contradicted in available data(Express illustrations | Kapil Gaikwad)
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4 min read

In recent years, New Delhi has fallen in love with trade diplomacy. Spurred by foreign tariff shocks and the aggressive weaponisation of global trade dependencies by the US and China, New Delhi has executed a dramatic embrace of bilateral free trade agreements. The nation’s strategic arc, stretching from completed pacts with the UAE, Australia, Oman, the UK, the European Union and New Zealand, added to the ongoing and “almost complete” negotiations with the US, Canada and Gulf economies, seems to signal a conviction at the highest levels of government that preferential market access is the ultimate key to economic statecraft, global value chain integration and regional dynamism.

Yet, this newfound geoeconomic catechism rests on a seductive but fragile assumption: that opening foreign doors through tariff elimination or reduction automatically translates into robust export growth, industrial integration and better economic numbers for India. A sober look at the empirical record reveals a starkly different reality. Far from catalysing an export revolution, the record shows that India’s trade agreements have, in fact, widened trade deficits more often than narrowed them, eroded export competitiveness and coincided with a weakening of its participation in global value chains.

The disconnect between diplomatic ambition and commercial outcome is nowhere clearer than in India’s long-standing FTAs with its major Asian partners, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Korea, Japan and Singapore. Across our FTAs with these partners, trade flows have become overwhelmingly import-driven. Between 2012 and 2025, India’s trade deficit with ASEAN exploded from $10.4 billion to $51.2 billion, driven by a surge of incoming goods that vastly outpaced Indian shipments to these countries. A similar imbalance characterises trade with Japan and South Korea, while India’s former trade surplus with Singapore turned into a persistent deficit following the signing of our bilateral agreement with the city-State.

More troubling than the raw deficit numbers is the steady erosion of India’s market presence in these FTA-partner economies. Between 2012 and 2025, India’s share in the total import baskets of its major FTA partners stagnated or systematically declined. In ASEAN, India’s share of the import market plummeted from 3.42 percent to 1.71 percent. In Singapore, it shrank from 2.27 percent to 1.71 percent, while in South Korea, it dipped from 1.33 percent to 1.02 percent.

These figures puncture the dominant narrative that tariff preferences alone guarantee trade success. Rather than leveraging FTAs to insert Indian enterprise into regional production networks, Indian industry remains largely stuck on the margins of manufacturing-led integration. The hard truth is that zero-tariff market access for India still means that our exports have to compete with exports from other countries that may have similarly low levels of tariffs for their products. 

To compete effectively, Indian exports have to be attractive, easily available and price-competitive. Reducing trade barriers alone cannot compensate for our structural domestic limitations and widely-prevalent bottlenecks at home, ranging from weak industrial capabilities and high logistics costs to infrastructural deficits and operational inefficiencies that make our goods less competitive abroad.

The conventional wisdom that FTAs act as reliable engines of global value-chain integration is similarly contradicted by the data. Between 2012 and 2025, India’s trade-related value-chain integration as a percentage of gross trade actually contracted, falling from 37.13 percent to 34.38 percent. During this period, India’s ties weakened across key production hubs including South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia, registering gains only in isolated instances such as Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. This decline underscores a vital lesson: deeper regulatory harmonisation and duty-free access are insufficient drivers of value-chain participation if domestic firms lack the scale, technology and specialisation required to plug into the manufacturing processes of multiple countries.

I want to stress that I am not advocating that India should retreat into autarky or abandon trade diplomacy. On the contrary, I have long argued against our protectionist instincts and welcome their abandonment in recent years. FTAs remain indispensable tools for securing critical raw materials, expanding service exports and building strategic alignments in an increasingly fragmented world. 

However, treating trade agreements as a substitute for domestic industrial capability is a fundamental miscalculation. Without a strong domestic manufacturing base, just signing FTA pacts risks them creating asymmetric highways that accelerate foreign import penetration far faster than they build Indian export competitiveness.

If India is to turn its diplomatic ambitions into tangible economic strength, our FTA strategy must be tightly tied to a targeted, modern industrial policy. Tariff negotiations must go hand in hand with aggressive technological upgrading, supply chain realignment, infrastructure modernisation and domestic reforms that eliminate the regulatory sclerosis choking our system. We need to facilitate approvals, end tax terrorism and lower the cost of doing business, not as a slogan but as a reality. 

And we must end the appalling situation that leads every businessman I have met in the last few months to lament that corruption has never been worse. After several such conversations, I have found myself saying, “When Modiji said ‘na khaunga, na khane doonga’, I didn’t realise he only meant beef.”

Diplomacy can open doors, but only domestic capability determines who walks through them. That is the same principle that applies to FTAs. Until India fixes its internal manufacturing and structural weaknesses, and transforms its domestic policies and business culture, its expanding network of trade agreements will continue to yield asymmetric market access, opening Indian markets to the world while leaving its own producers waiting on the threshold.

Even as I applaud the new pacts we are so enthusiastically signing, I would like to offer a friendly word to Piyush Goyal: you have a double-barrelled responsibility; you are minister of both commerce and industry. Are you being consumed by the first half of your portfolio while neglecting the second?

Shashi Tharoor | Lok Sabha MP, Chair of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Sahitya Akademi-winning author

(Views are personal)

(office@tharoor.in)