Donald J Trump’s diary is its own theatre of war. Last week, the US President called Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The “frank” exchange, held soon after American envoys had flown back from Moscow with a truce plan, lasted about an hour. The truce lasted only the weekend; fighting resumed on Monday. Trump has priorities—discussions on his ‘big ballroom’, banning media, demolishing the Kennedy Center, Taiwan, oil in Venezuela and shutting down the AI scare. There is also the task of managing the narrative at rallies for the midterms.
His diary says September 24 is set for a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington. He has not called Modi recently. Perception has it that at the Oval Office, India is more talked about than talked to. In this curious triangle of three men on three continents, Trump is apparently trying to end wars—one that he promised to end in a day and a new one he promised he wouldn’t start.
By Friday, one more entry closed on his diary: HR 5334, the Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The Act, named for a senator who died before he could sign his idea, passed the US House on September 16 by 262-159 votes. The law, which the President signed on Friday evening, has 200-plus sections providing for punitive action and some delectable exceptions. Section 114 curiously says it shall not apply on import of low-enriched uranium into the US.
The Graham law sanctions Russia. It extends the Iran Sanctions Act by five years. It authorises tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five countries buying the most Russian oil, India one of them. China, on the same shipping data, is the other—usually the bigger one. The crowning assumption is that barrels need no passport, whereas tariffs can be targeted. Read as a Russia law, it is a blunt instrument. Read as three-way triangulation, it becomes a possible weapon of peace.
On the face of it, the US Congress has armed the President with an economic weapon designed for extraction. The question is: can the threat of tariffs bend Russia’s will or China’s? The record thus far is far from inspiring. The week Trump spoke with Putin, China and Russia vetoed the US at the UN Security Council on a move that would have authorised UN experts to keep monitoring sanctions on Iran.
There is much discussion about the impact of the Graham law on India’s imports from Russia. Thus far, India maintained its strategic autonomy navigating past sanctions, exploring the geographies of hydrocarbons—from Venezuela to Iran and Russia to Venezuela—all in the interest of an economy hosting over 1.4 billion people. Can the US force China, the largest customer of Russia and Iran, to stop buying oil or gas from either? Beijing clearly qualifies ahead of Delhi for action under the Graham law.
Context is critical for the design of objectives and divining outcomes. The law stipulates that the President impose the levies within 30 days of enactment. In theory, much is possible. In reality, the spectrum of possibilities is vividly vast. You could argue China holds over $600 billion of American debt, that China can choke production lines across sectors—from rare earths to medicine inputs. It is true that China has the cards. It is equally clear that China will not have to play them.
Threats and decisions are defined by circumstance and availability of choices. There is the economic context—and then there is the geopolitical framework. The data points on the economic landscape are flashing red and amber. The biggest economic indicator is also political. Consider prices at gas stations across the US—gasoline is averaging above $4.2 a gallon and diesel over $6.2. The rising tag is showing up in opinion polls in the run to midterms—in one, 84 percent of Democrats, 73 percent independents and 66 percent of Republicans concurred Trump’s tariffs have raised prices. A Cato Fall 2026 survey finds 75 percent say tariffs will matter.
Prices are determined by supply and demand. This week, Brent nudged towards $110 a barrel as attacks on pipelines by the Houthis forced Saudi Arabia to cut production and cancel shipments to Europe. Shrinking supply has consequences. India has explained that if it had ceased to buy from Russia, global crude prices would have shot up to $200. India is one of the largest refiners and suppliers of diesel to Europe—any coercive threat will cut output and drive global prices higher.
The geopolitical context, particularly after the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, suggests the US will walk the pebbles gingerly. The published agenda for the Xi-Trump meeting is about extension of the Busan and Beijing détente—trade truce, rare earths, Taiwan and AI. What isn’t on the agenda matters more than what is. The US would like an off-ramp to end the war with Iran and also the war in Ukraine. The pathway to any breakthrough will be paved with the presidential authority for waivers under the Graham law. And China has the heft—material and political—to influence Iran and Russia.
None of this lands in a vacuum. This week, the US Fed—under new Chair Kevin Warsh—hiked interest rates to 3.75-4 percent the day the House voted. The national debt passed $40 trillion in August, growing near $7.35 billion a day. A government fighting political risks of inflation does not get to squeeze the global oil trade for free. It is choosing to pay for this law twice—once at the pump, once at the ballot.
Read all columns by Shankkar Aiyar
Shankkar aiyar
Author of The Gated Republic, Aadhaar: A Biometric History of India’s 12 Digit Revolution, and Accidental India
(shankkar.aiyar@gmail.com)
