In The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (2020), External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar says: “My generation ... carried into our profession the heavy baggage of difficult experiences with the US, China and Pakistan.” The heavy baggage has only gotten heavier. But has the time finally come for a substantial shift in our Pakistan policy?
We might ask, vis-à-vis the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Foreign Ministers Meeting in Goa, if the gloves are finally off when it comes to Pakistan. In response to his Pakistani counterpart Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s tired and predictable raking up of the Kashmir issue in multilateral meetings, EAM Jaishankar retorted, “Pakistan has nothing to do with Kashmir, only issue is when will they vacate PoK.”
Apart from trying to equalise with India on Kashmir, Pakistan has long enjoyed the advantage of doublespeak when it comes to terrorism. Calling itself the victim of terrorism on the one hand and using so-called non-state actors and army-supported terror outfits to do its dirty work against India on the other. Most Indian governments prior to Modi 2.0 have been obliged, by our own geo-strategic and political necessities, to play along, not calling out Pakistan’s carapace of lies loudly enough.
The contradiction, however, is obvious for everyone to see. If the Pakistani State has no control over the terror groups operating from its soil and cannot be held responsible for them or their actions, what is the point of talking to it or its representatives? Else, even as victims of terror, we end up participating and countenancing the convenient fictions of Pakistan—in fact propping up its falsehoods and fake narratives on the international scene—instead of avenging the deaths of our soldiers killed by Pakistani terror strikes. To put it starkly and simply, with every terrorist strike against us, the message that goes out is that the Indian State not only fails to protect its soldiers and civilians from enemy attacks but keeps talking peace with the Pakistani State which foments and funds these very terrorists.
This contradiction might best be summed up in Jaishankar’s own words: “That India could offer a hand of friendship, but nevertheless respond strongly to acts of terror, is hardly a contradiction, except for those determined to see one.” Unfortunately, no special determination is now needed to see this contradiction. The weakness of our previous governments and their moral posturing to cover up strategic failures is all too evident. Has the time come, therefore, to change both our postures and policies towards Pakistan? Again, if we are to go by Jaishankar’s own admissions, the answer is yes: “The value of the Uri and Balakot responses was that, finally, Indian policy could think for itself rather than let Pakistan condition its answers. And that, in many ways, was the role of Sri Krishna as well on the Pandava side.”
Explaining India’s position while talking to the press, Jaishankar said on Friday, May 5, “As a Foreign Minister of an SCO member state, Mr Bhutto Zardari was treated accordingly. As a promoter, justifier and a spokesperson of a terrorism industry which is the mainstay of Pakistan, his positions were called out and they were countered including at the SCO meeting itself.” Quite right. For even as our EAM was making this statement, a gunfight between the Indian army and Pakistan-sponsored terrorists was going on in the forests of Rajouri in Jammu and Kashmir. Five of our “White Knight” Bravehearts of 16 Corps were martyred—or as some prefer to call it—killed in action. You don’t have to be a strategic genius to know that these attacks are meant to scuttle the forthcoming G20 meeting in Srinagar.
No wonder, Jaishankar did not mince his words: “You know, victims of terrorism do not sit together with perpetrators of terrorism to discuss terrorism. The victims of terrorism defend themselves, counter acts of terrorism, they call it out, they delegitimise it and that is exactly what is happening.” Hindu strategic traditions, codified and encapsulated by Kautilya some two millennia ago, recognised “Sama, Dana, Bheda, Danda”—appeasement, bribery, sowing division, and finally, aggression—as valid. Texts as varied as the Mahabharata and the Srimad Bhagavad Purana justify, even extol, these methods.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, we have excelled, to our own detriment, in the first approach—sama, i.e., appeasement, mollification, conciliation. But have we tried the other three?
For instance, I suggested long ago—but once again after the 26/11 attacks against India—that since most Pakistani terrorists are essentially mercenaries, wouldn’t it be easier to bribe them at source rather than pay heavy damages later? And to update this strategy, should we not use Taliban groups against Pakistan in a similar manner?
To take the argument forward, we might ask if we have gone far enough in our punitive measures—danda—against Pakistan. If we take out twice the number of their assets for each one of ours that they kill, the message might strike home in Islamabad more effectively.
When it comes to bheda, too, what Pakistan has been doing in Kashmir and Punjab we might do equally effectively in Sindh and Balochistan. Dismemberment, both threatened and actual, even in little bits, is bound to have its effects on the Pakistani deep state and establishment.
No more sweet-talking Pakistan, as our EAM said: “So, to come here and preach these hypocritical words, as though we are on the same boat, I mean, they are committing acts of terrorism. And you know, I don’t want to jump the gun on what happened today [Rajouri attack mentioned above] but I think we are all feeling equally outraged. Let’s be very, very clear on this terrorism matter. I will say Pakistan’s credibility is depleting even faster than its forex reserves.”
These strong words from Jaishankar, we might be assured, signal a welcome shift in our diplomatic offensive against our enemy from birth. The “unsentimental audit of Indian foreign policy” that Jaishankar spoke of in his book has finally resulted in balancing our strategic accounts with Pakistan. Coupled with action on the ground, even in the enemy’s territory, such a shift in our diplomatic posture is more likely to yield results.
(Views are personal)
Makarand R Paranjape
Professor of English at JNU
(Tweets @MakrandParanspe)