The Myanmar civil war, triggered by the February 2021 military coup, has crossed the four-year mark. There is, however, still no sign of a respite from the anarchy the country is in. Adding to the country’s misery now is the devastating earthquake last week, the death toll from which has already exceeded 2,000 and is expected to climb much higher.
The devastation from the quake will understandably divert international attention from the civil war for now. But in the days ahead, the tragedy will probably accentuate the acute divisions this country of multiple ethnicities is cursed with, when it becomes evident that the government does not have the means to mitigate public misery from the calamity.
The country’s economy is already stressed to breaking point by the civil war, and therefore it will have to depend on the generosity of the international community to overcome the new challenge. It remains to be seen if politics colours the response and how many countries get to set aside their disapproval of the junta to extend humanitarian aid.
One scenario is almost predictable. China will be among the most indiscriminate in offering help to the junta, not for any particular liking of the latter, as often alleged, but to ensure its deep interest and matching investments in the country are not upset. It is for this that China has always made it very clear that it will ally with anybody in power in Myanmar. Indeed, when Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy or NLD was in power after the 2015 election, China had also rolled out the red carpet for Suu Kyi.
China has also not abandoned other backup plans in case its Plan A of winning the confidence of whichever party is in power runs into rough weather. This is clear from the influence it cultivates and maintains on several powerful ethnic armed organisations or EAOs, especially in the Shan and Kachin states bordering China. This fine strategic balance was seen at play in the manner China brokered a ceasefire between the junta and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three EAOs in Shan which had inflicted some serious reverses on the junta.
These three EAOs are the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army of the Kokang people, Ta’ang National Liberation Army of the Ta’ang people, and the Arakan Army of the Rakhine people. The picture is clear. China’s influence over Myanmar’s many EAOs has been an effective bargaining chip in its quest to partner with the party in power.
It may be recalled that China was also one of the prime movers behind the nationwide ceasefire agreement in the country on October 15, 2015—a month before the general election which saw the return of Suu Kyi’s NLD to power. Of the 15 EAOs invited, only eight ultimately agreed to sign the pact; two more joined next February, again under China’s influence.
But aligning with the party in power, especially during a civil war, must have to be a delicate balancing act, for it can generate negative sentiments among those opposed to the regime, directed at whoever makes such a move. China is already sensing this to a considerable extent.
Reports indicate that China’s pressure was again a factor in coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing, the current chairman of the junta’s state administrative council, deciding to fix Myanmar’s next election this December. The hope is it will bring back a certain degree of legitimacy to the country’s government, and therefore a return to peace and political stability.
It is quite obvious: a Myanmar in anarchy hurts China’s interest. But a splintered Myanmar where it would then have to deal with several statelets to protect its interest cannot but come across as a diplomatic and strategic nightmare. This is especially so considering the possibility that some or several of the new states may not be favourably disposed to it and may become the entry points for rival powers opposed to it.
China’s interest goes much beyond the resources Myanmar offers directly—copper, jade, rare earths and hydroelectric power, to name just a few. It already has an oil and gas pipeline from Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Rakhine state to Yunan province, directly transporting crude oil and natural gas. The interest is also about land access to the Indian Ocean, and from there to Africa, where its investment is expanding, and the oil-rich Arabian peninsula. This anxiety is often described as China’s Malacca Strait dilemma, which currently is its only and winding sea route to the Indian Ocean. Not all the countries around this strait come under China’s sphere of control.
With its rivalry with India unlikely to de-escalate in the near future, Pakistan and Myanmar remain China’s most viable land routes to the Indian Ocean. While both these countries have friendly ties with China, Myanmar is the preferred route. First, the Karakoram passes are far more rugged. Second, before the February coup, the territories in Myanmar the route passes through were much more stable than the Pashtun and Baloch frontiers in Pakistan.
China’s growing influence in Indian Ocean littoral nations is leading to the emergence of a new geopolitical theatre in the region. India is legitimately concerned by the development. In a 2004 paper, American geostrategic researcher Virginia Marantidou claimed this was China’s ‘string of pearl’ strategy to encircle India and undermine it.
Such a posture also predictably drew in other China-wary powers into this theatre. The revitalisation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad—the strategic forum comprising the US, India, Australia and Japan—is one evidence. At the same time, no less a person than the ousted prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, had charged that certain Western powers had a hand in the trouble in her country and neighbouring Myanmar.
These are interesting times. The return of Donald Trump as US president is causing unexpected changes in the geopolitical order. This strategic theatre may yet see a complete makeover—for the good or bad.
Pradip Phanjoubam | Editor, Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
(Views are personal)
(phanjoubam@gmail.com)