Indian optimism awaiting a Trumpian order

We are dealing with a superpower seeking to reconcile multiple interests in a challenging global environment. Convergence of interests does not translate to a congruence of actions
India is the country that loves Trump the most: 85 per cent of respondents feel that Trump will be good for America, and 84 per cent that he would be good for India.
India is the country that loves Trump the most: 85 per cent of respondents feel that Trump will be good for America, and 84 per cent that he would be good for India.Photo | Express Illustration: Mandar Pardikar
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4 min read

Donald Trump will be inaugurated today as the 47th President of the United States, but he has already dominated the information space for over two months with media conferences, foreign and domestic policy prescriptions and Cabinet appointments. To cap it all, he claims a major credit for Wednesday's Hamas-Israel hostage release deal.  

The world now awaits the new President with anticipation, anxiety and trepidation. A poll conducted for a Brussels-based think tank (ECFR) and an Oxford University Project showed major European nervousness: merely 34 percent of respondents from 11 European Union countries felt that Trump was good for America; even fewer (22 per cent) felt he would be good for the EU.

These sentiments are obviously in response to Trump's harsh public pronouncements about EU freeloading on the US on trade and NATO's total dependence on the US for security.

Trump wants Europeans to pay for their own defence and to withdraw subsidies to ensure "fair" trade. It upends the post-War understanding between Europe/NATO and the US: partnering the US in upholding the liberal global order abroad, in return for US largesse for a security umbrella and lenient economic terms. For Europe, this volte face comes at a time of political disarray and economic malaise.

The first order of business is to disengage from the conflict in Ukraine so that the US can focus more on the strategic challenge from China. Since his boast that he would stop the war in 24 hours, Trump has come to realise that many conflicting interests in the US, Europe and Russia need to be reconciled, if the outcome is not to be even messier than the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Trump's presumed policy guide, Project 2025, suggests that a Eurasian security architecture should effectively consist of Europe developing a conventional deterrent against Russia, with the US providing a nuclear umbrella. With Europe's limited indigenous military-industrial capacity and economic situation, it is difficult to see this happening in the near term. If Europe also has to find the resources for the multi-billion-dollar reconstruction of Ukraine and rehabilitation of its displaced population, this would be a double whammy. The reasons for disaffection with Trump are obvious. 

The war in Ukraine brought into sharper relief the post-Cold War transformation in the international geopolitical landscape. Pressed by Western countries to take positions that undermined their national interests, the so-called middle powers rediscovered their autonomy of action and asserted their economic and political interests. The recklessly expanding sanctions regime affected many outside Russia, making a mockery of a "rules-based order". Trump has acknowledged this during his campaign, particularly noting that financial sanctions undermined the dollar's dominance, which is a US geopolitical priority.

And what of India?

The EPRS/Oxford study has another interesting revelation: it shows that India is the country that loves Trump the most: 85 per cent of respondents feel that Trump will be good for America, and 84 per cent that he would be good for India. This is way ahead of countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Brazil, which show varying degrees of support.

This optimism is based on the much-advertised personal chemistry between Trump and Narendra Modi. Modi's declaration, Ab ki baar Trump Sarkar, in late 2019 is coming true after skipping an election cycle. Trump made complimentary remarks about Modi during his election campaign.

Bilateral relations flourished during Trump 1.0, notwithstanding publicly aired differences over tariffs and ease of doing business for American firms in India. These arguments will continue, but if they can nudge India to implement much-needed economic reforms, they would benefit India and India-US relations. India is in a better place on trade deficits than in 2016-20: its trade surplus with the US is well behind China, the EU and countries like Vietnam and Thailand.

Illegal immigration is at the centre of the US political discourse. More than visas for skilled personnel, India should be engaged on potential problems from the US precipitating the deportation of hundreds of thousands of illegal Indian immigrants with consultations to regulate this process to minimise the pain. In the long run, if this can result in more stringent measures to curb rampant people smuggling, it would serve a larger cause.

Trump’s major contribution to the relationship was a re-emphasis on the convergence of interests in China. The Quad grouping of the US, India, Japan and Australia was elevated to a summit-level dialogue. Other bilateral material and intelligence support reinforced the message.

This thrust is likely to continue, though there may be changes in nuance. Trump continues to emphasise the rivalry with China publicly, but frames it in economic and technological terms, more than in military terms. Project 2025 defines the US objective as making the subordination of Taiwan prohibitively difficult–-but at a cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear. The course of the US-China rivalry is important for India's security calculations and bilateral posture towards China.  

In his first term, Trump was locked into a strongly anti-Russia position. This included the CAATSA legislation, which envisaged US sanctions for buying major weapons systems from Russia. However, when India went ahead with purchasing the air defence system S-400, the US Administration did not impose sanctions. A shift of US geopolitical focus away from Russia toward the Indo-Pacific would provide India welcome space for its Eurasian strategy (including Russia), which is not incompatible with US strategic interests.

Trump 1.0 showed an understanding of India's perspectives on South Asia. This may continue. Project 2025 calls for strengthening the US-India partnership in the region and for a "clear-eyed" US policy toward the "perfidiousness" of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military-political rule in Pakistan. It criticises US foreign aid for Pakistan as against US national interests.

There are, therefore, objective reasons for optimism in India about the incoming Trump Administration. There will be challenges that would flow from the asymmetry in the relationship. We are dealing with a superpower seeking to reconcile multiple interests in a challenging global environment. This means that a convergence of interest does not translate to a congruence of interests. We have to take some bad along with the good in the relationship while seeking to protect our core interests. The key is to ensure that neither the US nor Indian expectations of the engagement exceed what can be reasonably delivered.   

P S Raghavan

Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, is a former diplomat

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