
Recent senate hearings to confirm Donald Trump’s cabinet picks brought into sharp contrast the candidate for US secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth, and the secretary of state, Marco Rubio. Tammy Duckworth, a senator from Illinois, took apart Hegseth for not being able to identify any ASEAN member state, or the importance of even one of the members and the nature of ties they had with the US.
Hegseth’s response to the question focused on Japan, South Korea and Australia, which are traditional military allies of the US. Leaving out the ASEAN and the Pacific Island states reflected a minimalist understanding of what the region represents.
In what seemed to be a damage control exercise, secretary of state Marco Rubio, during his interaction with Duckworth, was able to reassert the diplomatic importance of the ASEAN and responded with clarity on how the bloc remains critical to any understanding of regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
From these two hearings, indications of a see-sawing effect seem visible. We will focus on three major areas. First, how the role of Indonesia in the wider context of the ASEAN and Indo-Pacific would be critical, especially as it tries to find a balance between the US-China rivalry in the region. Second, the role of Malaysia, which will be important as the current chair of ASEAN. Third, how different layers of multilateralism will have to coexist in the wider Indo-Pacific, with the Quad and ASEAN having to balance their individual roles.
First, let’s look at Indonesia, whose President Prabowo Subianto was the chief guest at last week’s Republic Day parade in New Delhi. Under his leadership, Indonesia will follow a more nationalistic foreign policy and will not hesitate to assert itself. Indonesia’s recent entry into the BRICS alters the older approach to foreign policy. Its role in the region will be important as it remains the primus inter pares in the region with unstinting support to ASEAN.
Following Trump 1.0’s unveiling of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in November 2017 and the Quad meeting later that year, Indonesia led ASEAN towards framing its own outlook on the Indo-Pacific. As a member of the G20, Indonesia will continue to play a role in addressing issues of green energy, technology and climate change globally, too.
Prabowo’s visit to New Delhi will deepen bilateral ties. For both nations, security of the Indo-Pacific is based on international law and rules, providing a stable architecture. Strengthening bilateral ties at this time will allow them to contribute to regional stability even as the Trump 2.0 era sees an exacerbation of tensions in the region.
Second, Malaysia will be the chair of ASEAN for 2025 and will be focusing on maintaining regional economic growth as a key priority. The region is continuing to recover from the impact of the pandemic. The ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework is focusing on areas like public health, deepening economic integration and strengthening intra-regional initiatives to address the recovery process.
For Malaysia, the challenge will be tackling tariff-related disruptions and imposition of punitive measures. Maintaining the centrality of ASEAN processes will be difficult, especially as the earlier Trump administration did not even appoint an ASEAN ambassador, undermining the importance of the grouping. ASEAN’s core multilateral processes will likely face pressure, for example, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus. Without the participation of major powers, these initiatives will remain inconsequential in their agendas.
While the Joe Biden administration gave equal importance to all these, the Trump administration may place a higher priority on the Quad mechanism. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) initiated under Biden had a flexible approach, letting countries opt for any of the four pillars—trade, supply chains, green energy and a fair economy. With the emphasis on multilateralism itself reducing under Trump, the IPEF may not evolve further.
For the Indo-Pacific, the issue of major power rivalry is almost a given. ASEAN’s concerns revolve around how implications of this will impact the region. How will states within ASEAN readjust to the shifting priorities? How will ASEAN manage great power tensions over the next four years?
There will undoubtedly be a layering of security options in the region. With bilateral tensions between the US and China once again dominating the scene, the focus on evolving multiple layers in the regional architecture will be the key to addressing issues of common concern. The capacity of ASEAN to exhibit dynamism in its centrality and evolve mechanisms such as a possible ASEAN Quad dialogue may address some core concerns, even as it copes with rising tension in its backyard.
(Views are personal)
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)
Shankari Sundararaman | Professor at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University