Without even a ripple, May 3, the date marking the completion of two years of ethnic strife in Manipur, has passed. For almost two years now, an Indian state has had an arbitrary border drawn through it, separating two warring communities, with an intervening ‘buffer zone’ or ‘no man’s land’ patrolled and monitored by the Army and the CRPF. Since Independence, nowhere in India has such a situation prevailed. More dangerously this is being allowed in a border state that abuts the violence-wracked and failing state of Myanmar, and is not far distant from another country on the edge of chaos—Bangladesh. And yet, the Centre’s silence on Manipur speaks volumes on its orientation towards this troubled Northeastern province. The strife in Manipur continues to be treated as a simple ‘law and order’ problem, with little attention to any constructive initiatives.
The reliance on blunt force is evident even in attempts at ‘normalisation’, such as the forcible restoration of ‘free movement’ between the divided Hill and Valley areas on March 8, under directives of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Despite continuing unrest, it had been decided that bus services covering four routes connecting Imphal, Senapati, Kangpokpi, Bishnupur and Churachandpur, would be restored. A single bus left Imphal, under armed escort, but was met with protests, road blocks, barricades and stone pelting, as it entered ‘Kuki areas’. Eventually, the bus was overturned and a security vehicle was set on fire a few kilometres beyond Gamgiphai in Kangpokpi District. One person was killed and over 20 injured in clashes, as security forces sought to restore order. The entire enterprise was then abandoned, and the move only cemented the orchestrated hatred between Kukis and Meiteis.
It is significant that, despite continuous troubles, a complete absence of any process of normalisation, the comprehensive failure to recover thousands of weapons and large quantities of ammunition looted from state armouries, and mounting evidence of bias and, indeed, political mischief by the powers that be, prominently including the state’s chief minister, Biren Singh, the government was allowed to continue for more than 21 months after the start of the troubles, and was pressured to resign only on February 9. Crucially, the troubles were created and persisted under a ‘double-engine government’, with a BJP regime both at the Centre and in the state.
It is useful to recall, moreover, that the enduring insurgencies in the state were all but over, when intentional mischief plunged it into renewed ethnic strife. The year 2022 saw just seven insurgency-linked fatalities. There was an abrupt escalation to 157 such fatalities in 2023, with just four of these occurring between January and May. Total fatalities in both insurgent and ethnic violence exceeded 200 in 2023, and there was a significant overlap between the two categories, making a clear separation difficult. Insurgency-linked fatalities fell to 87 in 2023, but the largest drop was in the ‘insurgent’ category, from 73 killed in 2023, to 30 in 2024. Several dormant Kuki and Meitei insurgent groups have revived their violent activities, and there has been a significant escalation in turf wars. Indeed, of the 28 killed in 2025 (South Asia Terrorism Portal data till May 3), 27 were insurgents, of who 24 were killed in a running battle between Manipur-based insurgent formations, including the People’s Liberation Army/ Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup/ United National Liberation Front-Koireng and the Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, on the one hand, and the Myanmar-based Kuki National Army-Burma on the other, in the Kamjong district of Manipur, near the Indo-Myanmar border, between January 27 and 30. Abductions, extortion and other crimes have also become frequent. Of over 6,000 weapons looted from various state armouries, just half have yet been recovered, most of them after President’s rule was imposed in February, further testimony to the prejudicial actions of the Biren Singh regime. There are, of course, voices of reason, both in the political leadership and in civil society, but these remain on the periphery of the dominant and polarised discourse in the state. Crucially, any significant step towards reconciliation would require powerful political initiatives from the Centre to act against the extremist elements in the present political spectrum, but there is little evidence of any such measures. Moreover, there is little trust among the larger population in the good faith of the Centre’s intentions and interlocutors.
Violence and political malfeasance have created an abyss of hatred and suspicion between the Kukis and Meities in Manipur, and this is unlikely to be filled in the foreseeable future. If political and administrative actions continue to compound the injuries on both sides, however, this will become an incurable wound that can only produce wider harm in India’s fragile Northeast.