WASHINGTON: David Coleman Headley was not just an operative of terror outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba, but a person handpicked by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to spy on India and specially trained to map out the Mumbai terror attacks, says a new report from ProPublica, the US investigative journal.
Now, for the first time, there is a detailed inside account of how the ISI has been playing a “double game” of acting as a front-line US ally in the fight against terror while supporting selected terror groups to serve Pakistani interests, the journal says.
It says Headley began “a direct relationship with ISI officers in January 2006” and became close to an officer simply identified as Major Iqbal, who became his main handler in Lahore. Major Iqbal gave Headley secret documents on India and assigned a non-commissioned officer to give the “American standard intelligence training”.
“In essence, US and Indian officials say, Headley was more than a terrorist: He served as a Pakistani spy,” Pro- Publica says in its report, based on discussions with Indian and US investigators. It also quotes from a 119-page tome prepared by Indian investigators after their interrogation of Headley.
The report says that India and the US have drawn their conclusions on the ISI-LeT nexus in the Mumbai plot not only from Headley’s confessions, but also from documents, phone records and electronic eavesdropping.
“Officials from both countries say they are persuaded that ISI officers recruited and trained Headley in spying techniques and gave him money and instructions to scout targets in Mumbai and elsewhere,” it says.
Significantly, the report points to Headley’s disclosure that ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha visited Lashkar’s military commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi upon his arrest three months after the Mumbai attacks.
While Headley reportedly suggested that Pasha visited Lakhvi to “understand the Mumbai attack conspiracy”, Indian counter-terrorism officials believed the visit was to “ensure his (Lakhvi’s) silence and obedience”, ProPublica said. It quoted one Indian official as commenting: “I think Pasha was aware of the plot beforehand, or he is not chief of the ISI.” Dealing with the role of Major Iqbal, described as fat, deep-voiced and in his mid-thirties, the report says he introduced Headley to a man identified as Lieutenant Colonel Shah, who promised Headley financial support for terrorist operations against India.
“Headley learned techniques for detecting surveillance, developing sources and other skills, then practiced with the lower-ranking officer on the streets of Lahore. The specialised training lasted several months and continued intermittently afterward as Major Iqbal taught Headley how to use cameras and other devices for missions,” the report says.
“Most of the Headley statement is consistent with what we know about the ISI and its operations.
And it’s consistent with what he told the FBI and what they told us.
A lot has been cross-referenced to travel, communications, other evidence,” an Indian counter-terrorism official was quoted as saying.
US counter-terrorism officials, however, do not see evidence that ISI chiefs made an “institutional, top-down decision” to attack Mumbai, ProPublica notes, adding: “Indian investigators say Headley’s confession portrays Iqbal as a mastermind of the attacks. U.S. investigators analyze his account differently, attributing a more limited support role to the ISI officer.”