In May 1999, even as the strategic focus of the government and the Army was on the Kashmir Valley and the expanding arc of terror south of the Pir Panjal, a situation developed along the 120-km-long segment of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kargil sector. Since the higher reaches of the LoC receive a huge quantum of snowfall, it was considered imprudent to keep it occupied by troops during winter.
Both the Indian and Pakistan Armies followed a system of vacation of some posts in winter which were held during the summer and reoccupying them in the spring, contingent on snow conditions. In May 1999, just as there was considerable euphoria in political and diplomatic circles due to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s successful Lahore Yatra to break the ice with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a few shepherds in Kargil reported the presence of some intruders at the vacated posts.
That triggered a series of events involving Pakistani denials, allegations that so-called ‘Kashmiri freedom fighters’ were in occupation of vacated posts and actions by the Indian Army and Air Force to recapture the heights. Often I am questioned on why India was so trusting with winter vacation. Let me answer it here with the experience of having visited Kargil in a professional capacity in 1996, three years before the intrusions.
I was doing an extensive reconnaissance for the drafting of the annual war game of the formation responsible for the security of Ladakh, including Kargil. I asked the commander of the brigade why there were such extensive gaps in the deployment on the LoC when LoC deployment in Jammu and Kashmir usually meant occupation or domination of all important ground. His answer appeared quite convincing. He informed me that the Kargil deployment had what were called ‘traditional gaps’ on which both sides exercised an unwritten agreement not to disturb the deployment pattern. Secondly, with the separatist proxy war in Kashmir, India did not expect Pakistan to attempt the same in Kargil which was decidedly pro-Indian.
In retrospect that does not justify the trust we seem to have then reposed in an army reputed for its rogue nature. The real problem was despite being eight years into the Pakistan-sponsored proxy hybrid war, the Indian Army continued to have a single Corps Headquarters at Srinagar responsible for the counter-terror grid of Kashmir, the counter-infiltration effort, the security of the LoC (including that in Kargil), the security of the special sector—Siachen and of Eastern Ladakh where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) exists.
Looking back, it is unimaginable how we persisted with such an arrangement. The lack of focus on winter vacation in a comparatively lower priority zone such as Kargil was obvious. There were more serious things going on. This was borne out by the fact that it was one of the first arrangements which changed, post Kargil. It is often debated whether Kargil witnessed a total failure of intelligence. My opinion is that intelligence is not only about inputs but also about assessment. Inputs were scanty but even at tactical level assessment should have been made of the potential threats. Sufficient surveillance over the area was mandatory. We failed in both.
Why did Pakistan, or specifically General Pervez Musharraf, attempt such a mission in which he did not take on board the Prime Minister or the heads of the Pakistan Air Force and Navy? Musharraf essentially aimed at two things. First the occupation of the Kargil heights which would give the Pakistan Army visual dominance over the Zojila-Kargil road so that observed artillery fire could prevent the Indian Army’s unhindered logistics maintenance of the Ladakh sector.
It was presumed that with limited maintenance capability the holding of Siachen Glacier too would be rendered near-impossible thus forcing its vacation. This was simply too unrealistic as another logistics artery existed via Manali, although less stable. The second reason was to force redeployment of the counter-terror grid in Kashmir in order to reinforce Kargil, and thus help revive the flagging separatist and proxy efforts in Kashmir.
Musharraf failed completely in the first aim but did succeed partially in the second. The vacation of the hinterland in the Kashmir Valley led to a vacuum which took a fair amount of time to fill. It led to a fillip to the terror elements resulting in the highest activity year in 2001 when 2,100 terrorists were killed. Compare that to the 253 terrorists killed in 2018 to obtain an idea of the magnitude.
What cannot be taken away from the Indian Army is the ability to bounce back. No doubt it cost us over 500 lives and many more serious injuries, but the manner in which the effort towards restoration of the LoC to original status was pursued was professional to the hilt. Credit should go to the astute leadership at all levels, especially the lower. The young officer component displayed valour and tactical competence of the highest order. The speed of redeployment and build-up of other resources was done in the quickest timeframe.
Politically, the crisis was handled with maturity and statesmanship by PM Vajpayee, although his orders
denying the Indian Army and Air Force the crossing of the LoC will remain a point of debate. I remain convinced that his orders were perfectly legitimate and they actually helped India retain the ascendancy in international circles. As India celebrates the 20th Kargil Vijay Diwas on July 26, one of the pledges the nation must take is never to allow its security be lackadaisical. Given the abysmal budget for defence one can never be certain of that. atahasnain@gmail.com