Samuel P Huntington’s 1993 thesis on the nature of emerging conflicts seems to have come true. He argued that the fundamental source of conflicts in the world will not primarily be based on ideological or economic grounds; rather, they will arise due to the great divisions across cultural backgrounds and power politics. The Hegelian dialectical perspective that the primary conflict is in the realm of ideas and not in terms of material progress also has been proved wrong of late.
This achievement was facilitated by strategic political initiatives to contain the threat (of ideology) by the promotion of capitalist systems and materialistic values. The approach of containment remained one of the main pillars of US foreign policy during the Cold War. This was meant to prevent the spread of communism and create a global economic paradigm based on materialistic value systems.
George F Kennen’s anonymous contribution to the journal Foreign Affairs in 1947 predicted that US policy would “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power”. Despite criticisms and objections to this strategy, the US foreign policy followed it in much of its Cold War political operations. Many of the subsequent policy documents (for instance, the Truman Doctrine in 1947, National Security Act of 1947, Marshall Plan in 1948, creation of NATO in 1949) reflected the acceptance of the Kennen doctrine as well as its high relevance in the pragmatic political strategy space. The strategic move of containment has yielded benefits for the US.
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 was significant followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the Tiananmen Square incident. Why did the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev repudiate the Brezhnev doctrine (to use force if necessary to ensure a socialist state remains socialist)? How did US President Reagan end the Cold War at the bargaining table instead of the battlefield? Questions remain. The post-Soviet disintegration experience suggests that ‘Shock Therapy’ in the economic front helped to establish the capitalist interest of accumulation by dispossession.
It was this phase of rapid economic reform that enabled a handful of oligarchs to gain much of Russia’s wealth. By 1992, half of Russia’s population lived below the poverty thresholds. Despite privatising enterprises catering to three-fourth of the Russian GDP, the growth dropped constantly and the economy shrunk by 40 per cent in the five-year period from 1991 to 1996. The country had to import one-third of its food by 1997. The weak banking system, unfavourable business environment and the loss of trust in institutions posed a threat to investments, and economic growth and recovery.
Despite the Soviet disintegration and the weakening of its economic base, there remained much inhibition for the US to get closer to Russia. And there were mixed views on any collaboration with the Cold War enemy. One of the reasons for this inhibition could be the inability of the containment strategy to weaken the state militarily, despite attempts to bring down the size of its nuclear arsenal. US President-elect Donald Trump appears to be friendlier with his Russian counterpart than earlier leaders. He can break the prevailing inhibition and get close to Russia. Well, of course, it makes the incumbent administration and media furious. There are observations on Russian involvement in the November 2016 presidential elections.
This has already created cripples in the US political and administrative apparatus. The recent eviction of 35 Russian diplomatic staff in response to the election hacking allegations is indicative of the failure of the intelligence system. The incoming president has recognised it by putting more faith in Wikileaks than intelligence agencies.
The US is still confused as to how to treat Russia—as an enemy or a friend. Actually, successive Republican administrations have administered the containment strategy and succeeded in their mission. The Democrats, on the other hand, kept a conservative stand in bilateral and foreign policies in an ambiguous and opportunistic framework. Once containment is over, there hardly exists a reason for not being close. One missing element for US in this containment framework has been China. But it is worthwhile to recall Dr Henry Kissinger’s argument (Washington Post, June 13, 2005) that containment won’t work with China.
This perhaps must have prompted President Obama to consider strategic ties with China. It is perhaps true that the centre of gravity of world affairs has shifted from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for three centuries, to the Pacific. This makes it prudent for the new US administration to think of close relations with Russia. There, however, remain roadblocks on account of and power politics. Russian territorial interests are potentially blocking the US initiative of establishing a unipolar word order in politics. Currently America sees a ‘parallel world’ of Putin, which hates the ‘evil empire’ of US, imposing its corrupt political and civilisational values.
A recent memo submitted to the incoming president (by a high profile think tank) warns of the power politics of why Russia cannot be an ally of the US. A Swedish report on the Russian military establishment concludes that the authoritarian direction of Russian politics with the strong use of enemy images to legitimise policies will be difficult to reverse without undermining its power positioning. Hence the scope of a more Westernfriendly attitude from the Russian end is less and therefore, there will be limited room for Trump to move close to Putin.
C S Sundaresan
President of Alliance for Advanced Research and Development Initiatives, an independent think tank
Email: cs.sundaresan@hotmail.com