US President Donald Trump’s strong words against Pakistan while announcing his new Afghanistan policy late last month have drawn varied reactions. In Afghanistan, there was relief as no immediate US disengagement was contemplated. They also felt vindicated as the source of their problems had been so bluntly identified.
Predictably, in Pakistan, the response was denial and a sense of being victimised. It was matched by deep dismay at the tone and content of Trump’s message. As Trump put it, “We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organisations.” The earlier decisions of the US designating the Hizbul Mujahideen as a terror group and its head Syed Salahuddin as a terrorist are seen as a trend showing the US is now firmly aligned to India. And just a few days later, the statement released by BRICS referred to terror groups in Pakistan. This perhaps added to Islamabad’s concerns. In both cases, the content of the statements was not so new, but the level at which it came from was.
With regard to China, Pakistan has been at pains to emphasise that the BRICS statement used language which had earlier been employed and that since the groups mentioned were in fact banned by Islamabad, it also meant that the statement was not directed at Pakistan. A visit by the new Pakistan foreign minister to Beijing soon thereafter and supportive statements from his Chinese counterpart have provided additional reassurance.
That Chinese stakes in Pakistan are too deep to be really affected by the odd multilateral communique strengthens the assessment that the China axis remains strong. Unrelated developments such as a slight diminution in Pakistan’s cricket isolation—an international cricket team has visited Pakistan this month and might be followed by the Sri Lankan team—also help in shielding its domestic public opinion from the image Pakistan suffers globally.
Certainly, only the most committed Chinese supporter in Pakistan believes the Chinese government has total equanimity with regard to extremist groups in Pakistan—the BRICS statement suggests a greater convergence of China with US and other assessments. The difference however is that China for the time being is concentrating on other aspects of its relations with Pakistan. In particular, China will also try to see if it can reduce the huge friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a task which the US has failed to do.
With respect to the US, there is less joy as far as Pakistan is concerned. A visit by the Pakistan foreign minister to Washington and other trips by US officials to Pakistan were postponed after Trump’s speech. It would be a fair assessment that the US postures have added to the sense of isolation many Pakistanis feel about their country’s image. This state of siege, especially among Pakistan’s elite, was further enhanced by measures announced by the New York State Department of Financial Services against the Habib Bank—Pakistan’s largest bank—for its failure to comply with regulatory regimes directed against money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit financial transactions.
The bank later announced that it was closing down its New York branch. It also reached an out of court settlement to pay a fine of $225 million. This is the largest fine ever imposed on a Pakistani bank. In financial and banking circles in Pakistan, the impression certainly is that the action against the bank was not unrelated to Trump’s new policy approach. Many felt this was the clearest possible sign that the lessons gained by the US in the past decade from the financial squeeze on Iran would now be applied to Pakistan.
Pakistan’s economy is already facing challenges, so the country might be forced to turn to the IMF for assistance after a four-year gap. And with elections coming next year, hefty doses of fiscal populism can be expected. At this juncture, tough US postures add to the sense of pressure in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s anxieties are fuelled further by speculation over the US moving beyond measures similar to those taken in the past—withholding payments of either aid or repayments for facilities provided by Pakistan for access to its troops and bases in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the US is also contemplating sanctions against Pakistani intelligence officers or withdrawal of the major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status which Pakistan has had since 2004. Measures like the withdrawal of MNNA will also enhance Pakistan’s all-pervasive mood of defensiveness. If this happens, Pakistan would respond in two key areas: sharing of intelligence about extremist groups active in Europe and the US, and minimum logistics support with regard to Afghanistan.
The Trump broadside and related developments have left many in Pakistan shaken but such pressures are not new. It is evident that after some initially strong statements from the National Assembly and the National Security Council, Pakistan has chosen to try and deal with the US rather than only condemn it. An effort seems to have been made to contain domestic rhetoric. The public is being reassured that a regional consensus on terrorism and Afghanistan is being evolved with the foreign minister’s visits to Turkey and Iran apart from China.
The China visit is to be followed later by a Trilateral Foreign Ministers meet with China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These efforts will enable Pakistan’s foreign minister to finally visit the US and help him explain Pakistan’s challenges, both domestic and with Afghanistan and India, and reiterate his country’s commitment to fighting terror. The kind of response he gets from the US remains to be seen.
(Syndicate: The Billion Press)
T C A Raghavan
Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
email:editor@thebillionpress.org