Central to the idea of “good governance” is the role of the state in providing it. The state is made up of a set of institutions and organisations, which are given specific powers and responsibilities over a country and its people. At one extreme, it is entirely autonomous of society or at the other, totally dependent on it. Most states are between these extremes, depending on historical factors and the social, political and economic development of the people.
Whether the state provides “good” or “bad” governance depends entirely on how those managing the state see their roles and interests. The modern state is not the personal office of a single ruler or dynasty claiming divine sanction. The movement from personal rule to democracy has transferred the legitimacy of the state from “divine right” to “the will of the people” expressed through a written constitution. But no constitution is sacrosanct. It has legitimacy as long as it performs the basic functions set for it and continues to suit the people.
Our present Constitution largely incorporates the British Government of India Act of 1935. But where the British act allowed for a limited electoral franchise, the Constitution permitted unlimited adult franchise. Popular democracy was a way to preserve the unity of the country in the face of “fissiparous tendencies”. The aim was to establish that Indians could be more democratic and better governed in the new Republic than under the British. It could have worked in the long run if the entire electorate was literate, educated and economically secure—the characteristic of an able, strong and independent citizenry. We performed the act of grace without providing the wherewithal of a life of grace. The result was that the elected political elite gained unlimited power.
The Congress and the civil service, with the police and Army to back them up, were to ensure the continuation of the strong state inherited from the British. The state had to arbitrate the inevitable pressures of a democratic polity. Soon “leaders” of every religious, linguistic, caste, sub-caste and ethnic group jockeyed for a share of political power that could be used and misused to give them access to the state and to convert that access into money, jobs and status for themselves and their groups. Such pressures invaded not only the political parties but also the civil service, police and finally, the Armed Forces. The Constitution became a battlefield.
The current Indian state does much damage. Its structures are corrupt, exploitative and dysfunctional. They seem to do exactly the opposite of what was required by the Constitution and the law. The police don’t maintain law and order; the courts don’t provide justice; schools don’t teach, and politicians and bureaucrats serve themselves. As for rural development and agricultural progress and the rest of the development activities—they are intended to develop the political and bureaucratic class and their hangers-on, who tend to be criminals or dalals. The activist state has become a sad joke. Its writ does not run too far, and its servants break its laws and rules with impunity.
Given the ineffectiveness of the state’s many functions, what should it do in the future? The remedy lies in concentrating on the sovereign functions of the state—national defence, law and order, civil and criminal justice, public health, literacy and education of the poor. These functions define the state, which if not performed or performed badly, mean it is a failing or failed state. The economy is important only in as much as it enables the state to perform these sovereign functions well.
Already the state is exiting many functions, largely due to its approaching bankruptcy. But as the space for the private sector expands and markets dominate, the state also needs to be strengthened and made efficient in regulating these forces to ensure fair competition and protection to citizens, consumers and investors. It is also necessary to reduce the interference of politicians in the routine functions of the state. The true role for the state is that of a protector, regulator and umpire, but it cannot do this if it becomes a player along with the rest of us.
Government structures and institutions are in a state of collapse. Almost all government functionaries are taking care of themselves. The Constitution as it stands seems unworkable; the balance of power between three organs of the state—the legislature, executive and judiciary—is out of order. The allocation of responsibilities between the Union and states needs to be defined clearly. The Constitution’s “basic structure”, even at the beginning, was indefinable with almost all individual fundamental rights subject to severe constraints of “public order” or “public interest”. Most of these limitations on individual freedoms are part also of the general law devised by the British.
The electoral success of the BJP in the last two general elections shows there is no credible opposition. If the trend continues, and there is no reason to think otherwise, the BJP would have occupied all key elements of the state and economy by 2024 in the same way that the Congress had done over the last 70 years.
The BJP’s agenda and vision for the country are radically different from that of regimes in the past. The contemplated electoral, structural, institutional and personnel changes might not be possible within the framework of the Constitution and its judicial “guardians”. Tinkering with the Constitution as in the past and more recently, in the matter of the dilution of Article 370, will not be sufficient. To effectively achieve its new vision for the country and its people, a new constitution would be needed. This time, however, a much more alert, confident and articulate electorate will need to be consulted, and its approval sought in a referendum to ensure the legitimacy of the new constitutional order.
Gautam Pingle
Dean of Studies and Head, Centre for Telangana
Studies, MCR-HRD Institute of Telangana
Email: gautam.pingle@gmail.com