Scholar and warrior, Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam (Retd) has done a deep scan of all the wars India has fought since Independence; unearthing many undocumented war facts in the process.
In this freewheeling interview about his new book, Full Spectrum: India’s Wars 1972-2020, he highlights the issues that are keeping India away from achieving its true potential as a military power.
Subramaniam also makes no bones in saying India has to develop more intellectual capital within the armed forces if it wants to punch above its weight globally on the security front.
What have been the striking commonalities between the wars India fought and the most important lessons for Indian decision makers?
Since Independence, Indian strategic decision makers have adopted both proactive and reactive strategies when faced with national security crises. There have been times when they have demonstrated a flexible response strategy to recover from a disadvantageous situation. Examples of clear proactive responses were seen in the 1947-48 conflict with Pakistan and the Liberation of Bangladesh. The 1962 conflict was a result of India constantly playing catch-up to Chinese moves and ending up being surprised on multiple fronts. Kargil and the Eastern Ladakh face-off are examples of India being surprised initially and having to respond reactively, but thereafter demonstrating resilience and restoring complete status quo in Kargil and partial in Eastern Ladakh with the crisis not having completely played out as yet.
What does your analysis conclude about the current standoff at the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh?
I have answered that partly in the previous question, and I would be cautious about predicting an outcome as yet because there are three more hot spots that need to be resolved. While India may be able to persuade the PLA to vacate Hot Springs and Gogra with continued firmness and no let up in deployments in depth, resolution of the transgressions in Depsang will be the trickiest.
Do you think it is the external pressures like wars that have been triggering transformations in the weapon profiles and in the organisational structures?
All over the world, it is crises, failure and post-mortems that have triggered reforms in forces structures and organisations. Unfortunately in India, despite advisories from high-profile committees like the K Subrahmanyam Committee after Kargil or the Naresh Chandra Committee, reform within national security structures was lethargic because of a lack of a top down political push. This time around, I think PM Modi is quite clear about three issues with respect to the national security reform: First is to restructure and integrate. Second is to ‘do more with less’, and third is to indigenise and innovate. It will not be easy.
The way war is changing right from Nuclear, Conventional and sub-conventional level to the hybrid spectrum, do you think India is prepared for it?
While there is much room for improvement, I think India’s armed forces have done pretty well when it comes to coping with a wide range of wars, conflicts, internal fissures and cracks, less-than-war situations and much more. That is the reason I chose the title ‘Full Spectrum...’ for my latest book.
Are you also releasing an international version of ‘Full Spectrum...’?
Yes, the book is being published by the University Press of Kansas in April or May as part of their Modern War Series with a different title, and a slightly different flavour to cater to an international readership.
What is the extent of the technological gap that the military industrial complex, on the Indian side, faces? And what factors can make this gap commutable in real war situations?
I like the term you have used. Military Industrial complex. Unfortunately, the term attached itself more easily to the United States during WW-II and ever since. Our Indian defence manufacturing ecosystem can hardly be called a military- industrial complex. The absence of defence innovation, excessive reliance on imports and extremely diverse inventory of platforms and systems, and a lack of reverse engineering capability, has resulted in large asymmetries emerging vis-a-vis our principal adversary – China. But, the government’s indigenisation and collaborative drive through the Atmanirbhar initiative is a step in the right direction. However, the reality is that as long as there is stress with our principal adversaries, we have to continue to plug gaps selectively with high-end imported platforms and weapons, while devoting more resources to innovation and indigenisation.
What projects are you working on?
My current assignment as the Presidential Chair of Excellence at The National Defence College allows me to do that. A small project I am excited about at NDC is an edited volume that I am putting together with some of the most accomplished practitioner-scholars.