KOCHI: In How Prime Ministers Decide, Neerja Chowdhury digs deep into her decades-long career as a political reporter to bring you a captivating glimpse into the inner workings of India’s highest political office.
The work featuring the legacies of six pivotal leaders — Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, V P Singh, Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh — is part biography and part political analysis, and a compelling study of leadership. It was awarded the 2024 Ramnath Goenka Sahithya Samman (Best Debut Non-fiction) by The New Indian Express Group.
Neerja tells TNIE that she was inspired to write the book upon realising that “the real story — of how decisions were made at the top — was very different” from public perception. While many believe that the prime minister is “the most powerful person and can do anything s/he wants”, she explains that this is not entirely the case.
“The PM has to contend with all kinds of pressures — lobbies at work, nationally and internationally, pulls of caste, community, religious pressures from within one’s own party….”
Also, no prime minister inherits a clean slate, she says. Each must navigate “the baggage of the past” while steering the nation forward.
Kitchen cabinets and close coteries play a key role. Sometimes, Neerja says, they include individuals from outside the official system. For instance, Kapil Mohan and Anil Bali of the Mohan Meakin family (famous for their Old Monk rum). “They were close confidants of Indira Gandhi,” she says.
RSS support to Indira
One of the book’s intriguing themes is how prime ministers handled crises. For instance, Indira Gandhi’s declaration of the Emergency in 1975 was driven by her “fear of losing power”, leading her to suspend democratic rights and consolidate authority.
Yet, she bounced back. Indira adopted “a four-pronged strategy”. This included winning over former adversaries like Raj Narain, marginalising potential threats, and most interestingly, “mobilising support through temple-going and her ‘pro-Hindu’ turn”.
“She told friends privately — she never admitted this publicly — that but for the RSS’s support for her in the 1980 general elections, she might not have come back to power with such a thumping majority. That was a time when Atal Bihari Vajpayee was secularising his politics and Indira Gandhi was Hinduising her political persona,” Neerja says.
Rao’s ultimate non-decision
According to the author, Rao inherited “a very difficult situation” when he took over as PM after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991. “The country was aflame with passions over ‘Mandal’ and ‘Mandir’. Jammu & Kashmir was burning, and so was Punjab,” she notes.
Moreover, the government was on the verge of an economic collapse. Within a year, Rao “stabilised the economy, and calmed the political temperatures”. He also put into place “new initiatives on foreign policy”.
However, Rao’s failure to handle “issues of caste and religion” was his undoing. “A year into his term, the Sangh-BJP combine upped the ante on building a Ram temple in Ayodhya. Rao tried to buy time through various means. But he shied away from dismissing the Kalyan Singh government in Uttar Pradesh, which was openly working for a Mandir in Ayodhya,” she notes.
Neerja believes this was because “Rao felt that imposing central rule in UP would enable the BJP to throw its net wider politically and give his opponents in the Congress the opportunity to dethrone him as prime minister”.
Vajpayee’s flip-flops and advice to Sonia
Vajpayee started off as a pacifist in the ’50s, having “penned a poem on the devastation that had taken place when the nuclear bombs were dropped in Japan”.
“In the ’60s, in line with his party’s policy, he was a nuclear hawk, after China exploded its nuclear device. In the ’70s, he became a nuclear dove again as a member of the government of Morarji Desai, who was opposed to India going nuclear. In 1998, as prime minister, Vajpayee went for a nuclear test, taking India to the global high table.”
Neerja says Vajpayee was “a master at doing flip flops”, and “yet managed to retain his image as a moderate”.
Another interesting revelation is Vajpayee’s unexpected advice to Sonia Gandhi “not to accept prime ministership in 2004”. This counsel, apparently, influenced her decision to appoint Manmohan Singh instead.
Manmohan’s ‘killer instinct’
The “quiet but firm resolve” of Manmohan Singh is another focal point. Manmohan’s push for the Indo-US nuclear deal faced significant resistance, including from the “all-powerful Sonia Gandhi who was half PM” and the Left. “Dr Manmohan Singh did not yield ground,” Neerja notes. He displayed “a killer instinct which few thought he possessed”. “But he did not display this determination or steeliness over any other decision,” says Neerja.
Centralisation of power
This is yet another significant theme in her book — centralisation of power with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). “Indira Gandhi was the first leader to make the PMO all-powerful,” Neerja notes. By the time of Narendra Modi, whose leadership is only briefly touched upon in her book, the PMO emerged as the epicentre of decision-making. “Modi’s centralisation of power,” Neerja says, “marked the zenith of this trend.”
“Add to this his emphasis on cultural nationalism, and we are looking at a distinct departure from the leadership styles of previous leaders. A new phase in Indian politics.”