The narrow Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck,” is once again at the centre of regional strategic attention — this time triggered by remarks from Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus during his recent China visit. Yunus referred to India’s Northeast as “landlocked,” implying its dependence on transit routes through Bangladesh. The comments have sparked swift diplomatic and economic responses from New Delhi, revealing the corridor’s deep-rooted strategic importance.
The Siliguri Corridor is a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states — Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya, collectively known as the Seven Sisters. This land bridge, just about 22 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, lies between Nepal to the north and Bangladesh to the south.
Its geographical fragility and criticality have earned it the nickname “Chicken’s Neck” in strategic and military circles. Any disruption in this corridor — be it from military conflict, natural disaster, or internal unrest — would sever India’s northeastern states from the rest of the country.
The recent tension emerged after Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s interim chief advisor, made pointed references to India’s “landlocked” Northeast in Beijing. Though subtle, the comment implied India’s dependence on Bangladeshi territory for transit to its own territory — a point India is deeply sensitive about.
In response, New Delhi promptly restricted certain Bangladeshi exports through its entry points, exempting the land-locked Nepal and Bhutan and accelerated work on alternative connectivity projects that bypass Bangladesh. Mainly among these is the long-talked about Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, which aims to connect Kolkata to Mizoram via Myanmar, reducing dependence on Bangladeshi transit routes.
This reaction is not just about infrastructure. It’s geopolitical signaling — a warning to Dhaka that undermining India’s strategic autonomy in the region comes with consequences, economic and political.
India’s concerns have intensified since the departure of Sheikh Hasina from power in August 2024. The Hasina regime maintained friendly, understanding and warm ties with New Delhi, but the interim administration led by Yunus has taken a markedly different tone. Anti-India rhetoric has gained mainstream space in Bangladesh’s political discourse, along with the politically-motivated attacks against Hindu minorities, that Dhaka denies. Dhaka’s growing closeness with Beijing is viewed with alarm in Indian policy circles. Two recent developments have particularly heightened Indian anxieties: Dhaka’s plans to move the $1 billion Teesta River project from India to China; and reviving the Lalmonirhat airbase in northern Bangladesh with Chinese assistance.
Both projects lie close to India’s border and have major implications for Indian security — especially regarding surveillance and the possibility of foreign military use.
The Lalmonirhat airfield, originally built in 1931 by the British and used in World War II, has been largely dormant since Bangladesh’s independence. The current revival plan, reportedly supported by China, could turn it into a logistics or surveillance hub. While it presently hosts a Bangladesh Air Force maintenance unit, Indian agencies are concerned that it could be upgraded for full-scale military operations or dual-use missions that will be against New Delhi’s strategic interests.
A functional Lalmonirhat airbase would lie perilously close to the Siliguri Corridor. India will need to see if Bangladesh will allow other countries like China and Pakistan to use it. Bangladesh has the right to develop airfields for their security reasons, but that should not be used against India is India’s position.
The strategic relevance of the Siliguri Corridor is not new. Its current geography is a result of complex historical shifts — from the Anglo-Gorkha war, the Duar war, and treaties such as Sugauli and Punakha, to the creation of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) and the redrawing of borders by colonial powers. These artificial boundaries cut through long-standing social, cultural and economic ties in the region.
Today, the corridor serves as the only land route connecting the Indian mainland to its northeastern states. It is also a transit point to Nepal, Bhutan and even Bangladesh, making it an artery not just for national integration, but for regional diplomacy.
The town of Siliguri, at the heart of the corridor, is a crucial transport hub, handling road, rail, and air traffic. This logistical importance has made it a magnet for both legal and illegal cross-border activity — from trade and migration to drug trafficking and human smuggling.
The corridor’s narrow geography makes it exceptionally vulnerable. At its narrowest between Phansidewa (near the Bangladesh border) and Panitanki (on the Indo-Nepal border), it is susceptible to both military incursions and internal disturbances. The proximity to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction — where India, Bhutan, and China meet — adds another layer of complexity.
Chinese infrastructure build-up in the Chumbi Valley has triggered border standoffs, including the 2017 Doklam crisis. Analysts warn that any hostile movement from the north — combined with instability or pressure from the south (Bangladesh) — could potentially choke the corridor, cutting off northeast India.
The corridor is also seen as a choke point in any future military conflict involving China. If China were to ally more directly with Bangladesh or secure access to bases like Lalmonirhat, it would give Beijing new leverage in a region.
Under Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s military and economic ties with China have deepened further. Beijing remains Dhaka’s largest arms supplier — delivering fighter jets, artillery and naval vessels. It is also a major infrastructure partner, involved in building roads, railways, bridges and airports across Bangladesh. The two countries frequently conduct joint military exercises, and Chinese companies have gained influence over strategic infrastructure, raising alarms in Indian strategic circles. China’s growing role in Bangladesh has transformed the Siliguri Corridor from a logistical asset into a geostrategic vulnerability.
Faced with this encirclement risk, India is fast-tracking alternate connectivity projects. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project will connect Mizoram to Kolkata via Sittwe Port and Paletwa in Myanmar. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway aims to link Manipur with Southeast Asia, reducing India’s dependence on Bangladesh for regional connectivity. Domestically, India is investing in robust rail and highway infrastructure through the corridor, ensuring redundant and rapid deployment of military and civilian assets. By expanding its network of access points, New Delhi hopes to mitigate the strategic risks posed by both geography and geopolitics.
The Chicken’s Neck is not just a cartographic curiosity; it is a strategic fulcrum for India’s northeastern policy, its neighbourhood diplomacy, and its military doctrine. What makes it so vital is not just its role as a connector — but its potential as a vulnerability. Any disruption here — intentional or accidental — could have outsized consequences for India’s unity and security.
With rising regional tensions, Dhaka’s growing tilt towards Beijing, and heightened Chinese military activity near the border, the Siliguri Corridor’s strategic significance is once again at the forefront of Indian policymaking. What happens in this narrow strip of land will continue to influence the future of India’s engagement with both its Northeast and its neighbours.