Through its unanimous opinion to a Presidential reference, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court outlawed most formulations of a smaller two-judge bench that had prescribed fixed timelines for Governors and the President to dispose of proposed legislations. The government was crafty in taking the Presidential reference route instead of filing an appeal against the two-judge bench’s verdict, as in the latter case it might have gone to the same bench, which could have reiterated its judgment. Significantly, the Presidential reference did not mention the two-judge bench’s ruling.
The five-judge Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice of India B R Gavai and justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P S Narasimha, A S Chandurkar, however, held that Governors do not have unfettered powers to sit on Bills for perpetuity. It also said, "Governor is not bound by aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, while exercising his function under Article 200."
The bench held that indefinite delay by Governors in giving assent to Bills will be open to "limited judicial scrutiny", adding that deemed assent of Bills cannot be granted by court using its special powers under Article 142. Deemed assent would amount to a virtual takeover of "the role of a separate constitutional authority," it pointed out.
What the opinion of the Gavai-led bench actually does is it bars all states from exercising legislative options that are not aligned with the Union government’s thought process. Opposition-ruled states could read in it a slide back on federalism. For, the bench gives the Governor all the tools to block a Bill if he finds it problematic, even if the legislation is reiterated by the state assembly. And the decision of the Governor and President cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Likewise, the contents of a Bill, until it becomes law.
Why the reference
On May 13, the President referred 14 questions to the Supreme Court under its special advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) involving powers of Governors under Article 200 and the President under Article 201. These questions arose following a two-judge bench (Pardiwala judgment) decision in April last to impose strict timelines (one month or three months) for Governors and President to act on Bills. If the Pardiwala verdict sought to protect the exercise of democracy from mindless gubernatorial delay, the Gavai-led bench ring-fenced the Constitution from creative interpretation and improvisation, and restored the grandeur of those holding titular positions.
Pardiwala judgment
In April 2025, a bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan ruled in the Tamil Nadu versus Governor of TN case that under Article 200, a Governor cannot indefinitely withhold assent to a Bill. The court declared the TN Governor's action of withholding assent to 10 Bills "illegal" and deemed them assented to, making them law. The judgment claimed that there was no constitutional scope for inaction by the Governor when a Bill is presented for assent, rejecting the concept of "pocket veto" under Article 200.
The Pardiwala bench ruled that the TN Governor acted illegally and unconstitutionally by delaying assent to 10 Bills passed by the state legislature and by reserving them for the President after the Bills were passed for the second time. This "amounted to a violation of Article 200 of the Constitution and the Governor failed to act in accordance with constitutional norms and ministerial advice".
*The bench said that the Constitution does not recognise a "pocket veto" or "absolute veto" by the Governor under Article 200. The Governor is "constitutionally obligated to act on Bills presented for assent within a reasonable timeframe and cannot withhold assent indefinitely or simply withhold assent without returning the Bill for reconsideration" as required by the proviso in Article 200.
* The reservation of Bills for the President must happen at the first instance itself and cannot be done after a Bill is re-enacted, unless the Bill is in a different shape.
*It prescribed specific timelines (such as one month or three months) for the Governor to act on Bills, rejecting any "unchecked discretion".
President's 14 questions
These questions centred on: Governor’s powers under Article 200 (assent, withholding, returning or reserving Bills); President’s role under Article 201; whether timelines can be judicially prescribed; whether ‘deemed assent’ is possible; whether the Governor is bound by aid and advice of the cabinet; whether actions under Articles 200 and 201 are justiciable; and whether the Supreme Court’s earlier 2025 decision in State of Tamil Nadu versus Governor of Tamil Nadu had already answered these questions.
Maintainability of the reference
Political parties opposing the Presidential reference argued that the reference was mala fide, and that it was an indirect attempt to appeal the Pardiwala verdict against Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi, and that Article 143 cannot be used to revisit a judgment already delivered. Article 141 of the Constitution states that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within India.
The opposing parties, mainly states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, submitted that "the reference was not maintainable, and ought to be declined and returned unanswered in entirety." It was also argued that the reference seeks formulation of general standards for constitutional authorities to follow, and that the Supreme Court had held that a reference must be refused when it is vague, hypothetical, speculative, general and omnibus (Special Courts Bill 1978).
The Gavai-led bench rejected all objections, and said Article 143 invokes a “constitutional dialogue” between the Executive and the Judiciary, and that it is the court’s institutional responsibility to clarify constitutional roles where genuine doubts exist. It said that a "state of doubt, or confusion, has arisen in relation to the State of Tamil Nadu versus Governor (April 8, 2025)." The court held that in the 15 previous Presidential references, the SC had, barring two exceptions, always answered them under Article 143(1).
Constitutional principles
At the heart of the reference lies Article 200, which prescribes the powers and procedures available to a Governor when a Bill is passed by the State legislature and sent to him for assent. The bench cited historical constitutional debates and earlier Supreme Court precedents for its interpretation of Article 200. It was of the opinion that constitutionally, the Governor has only three options when a Bill is sent to him for assent:
1.Grant assent: Approve the Bill as passed, allowing it to become law
2. Withhold assent: Return the Bill to the legislature with comments
3. Reserve the Bill for President’s consideration: Request reconsideration by sending the Bill back, after communicating the Governor’s concerns. If the state legislature passes the Bill again, with or without amendments, the Governor can then either assent or reserve the Bill for the President, owing to an interpretative reading of Article 201.
However, it added that the Governor’s powers do not include "unfettered or indefinite withholding of assent" or indefinite inaction on Bills. Indefinite withholding without a reason violates the spirit of federalism, it emphasised.
Governor’s discretion
The bench opined that the Governor enjoys constitutional discretion in choosing an option and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising this discretion. Its reasoning on Article 200 rests on its reading of Article 163 and several Constitution bench judgments. Article 163 establishes the general rule that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in situations where the Constitution requires the exercise of independent judgment. The bench emphasised that such "discretion" may be either expressly stated or arise by necessary implication. This reasoning is important because the text of Article 200 does not explicitly use the word “discretion”, yet the bench inferred that discretion is embedded in it.
To support this, the bench drew from earlier Constitution Bench rulings. In 'Samsher Singh vs State of Punjab', the majority recognised that certain functions, such as reserving a Bill for the President, require the Governor to act irrespective of ministerial advice. The 'MP Special Police Establishment case' further clarified that ‘discretion’ is not confined only to situations where the Constitution explicitly employs that term; "otherwise, Article 163(2) would be rendered useless". Article 163(2) says that there can be matters where the Governor can act in his discretion even though the Constitution has not expressly so provided.
The MP Special Police ruling affirmed that constitutional duties demanding impartiality cannot be left to the advice of a "potentially biased" Council of Ministers. The Nabam Rebia case reinforced this view, explicitly noting that Article 200 is one of the functions where discretion exists, either expressly or impliedly. The Gavai-led bench endorsed this reasoning.
The court further rejected the contrary interpretation in the Pardiwala verdict and found that it relied on a partial reading of Shamsher Singh case, overlooking relevant Constitution bench rulings. The bench explained why discretion at the Article 200 stage is constitutionally necessary. Many provisions—such as Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2), 288(2) and 360—require a Bill to be reserved for the President before it becomes law. The President cannot act unless the Governor first exercises this function, and the state cabinet may have political reasons to avoid such scrutiny. Therefore, leaving this decision entirely to ministerial advice would disrupt the constitutional scheme and undermine federal checks and balances, it reasoned.
'Deemed assent' and timelines
A key controversy was the Pardiwala ruling’s formulation that assent to Bills would be ‘deemed’ granted if the Governor or President failed to act within fixed deadlines. The Justice Gavai-led bench rejected the concept. It held that Articles 200 and 201 do not prescribe any timelines for action by Governors or the President.
The bench reasoned, through its re-reading of Purushothaman Nambudiri versus State of Kerala, that the imposition of timelines by courts would infringe on the separation of powers and federal autonomy, violating a “basic feature” of the Constitution. It said that the absence of a timeline for assent in Articles 200 and 201 "was by way of deliberate constitutional design". It noted that the Constituent Assembly deliberately omitted time limits, entrusting Governors and the President with discretion. "Despite H.V. Kamath’s remarks (Constituent Assembly Debates on Article 111 in 1949) in support of a fixed timeline to encourage prompt action, there is conspicuous absence of any timeline in Article 111 of the Constitution, as adopted in 1950. A similar logic would apply to Article 200, in relation to the Governor’s function," it said.
On the concept of deemed assent, the bench termed it "antithetical not only to the spirit of the Constitution, but also specifically, the doctrine of separation of powers". The concept of deemed assent or deemed consent after expiry of a judicially set deadline, as declared by the Pardiwala bench under Article 142, was outlawed. The bench opined that such deemed assent would amount to "judicial overreach and usurpation of executive functions, violating the separation of powers doctrine fundamental to the Constitution".
"We have no hesitation in concluding that the concept of deemed assent of pending Bills by the Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, is virtually a takeover of the role, and function, of a separate constitutional authority. The reliance on Article 142, cannot lead to supplanting constitutional provisions itself," the bench said.
Did the reference try to overturn the Pardiwala verdict? Opponents argued that the reference was a "disguised appeal". The court disagreed. It held that "The President may refer a question even if the court has decided a similar question earlier, so long as the new question “has arisen or is likely to arise” and is not merely an appeal. Article 143 cannot be used to overturn earlier judgments, but here the court was not revisiting facts or parties, rather it was clarifying general constitutional ambiguities, the bench said.
Judicial review and immunity
Article 361 provides personal immunity to the President and Governors, holding that they cannot be made answerable to any court for their official acts. The bench clarified that this provision does not extend to remove all judicial scrutiny of their actions. Instead, it bars proceedings against the President or Governor, but does not foreclose any review regarding legality or mala fides of official action (eg, in context of proclamation of President’s Rule). The power of limited judicial review for "unreasonable inaction" is thus maintained.
Justiciability before Bills become law
The bench held that judicial review over a Bill that has not received assent is constitutionally barred, and that review and further challenges are permissible only after the law is enacted. Underlining the principle of separation of powers, the bench said only upon a Bill becoming law can its validity be challenged through judicial review; not before.
Seeking SC opinion
On whether the President must seek the Supreme Court's opinion every time a Bill is reserved for her consideration under Article 200, as prescribed by the Pardiwala bench, the court clarified that such a reference is not required. The President's satisfaction under Article 201 is sufficient, but a reference under Article 143 remains a discretionary tool should more guidance be needed.
Indian federalism
All states are entitled to determine their legislative policy subject to the constitutional provisions and framework, the bench notes. No one description - federal, quasi federal, federalism with unitary bias, pragmatic federalism, cooperative federalism or asymmetrical federalism, captures the nature of Indian federalism in its entirety, but each contributes to a unique perspective of understanding the nature of Indian federalism, it adds. However, it would be against the principle of federalism and a derogation of the powers of the state legislatures to permit the Governor to withhold a Bill without following the dialogic process in the first proviso to Article 200. The first proviso initiates a constitutional conversation between the institution of the Governor and the House. The option to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, too, shows the cooperative spirit of federalism, and the checks-and-balances model the Constitution has envisaged, the bench suggests.
15 Presidential references since 1951: SC declined just two
There have been 15 Presidential references under Article 143(1) so far. Except two, all were answered (fully or partly) by SC. The only ones returned unanswered were: Special Reference number 1 of 1993 (Ayodhya case) and Jammu & Kashmir Resettlement Bill (1980). Here is a shortlist of all 15 references and what they were about:
*Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1951) – Can Parliament delegate its law-making power?
*Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (1958) – Validity of a Bill under Articles 29 and 30
*Berubari Union case, 1960 – Was a simple law enough to give away territory to Pakistan?
*Sea Customs Act, 1963 – Validity of a tax proposal and exemption under Article 289
*Keshav Singh case, 1964 – Clash between UP Assembly and Allahabad High Court over privileges and contempt
*Presidential Poll, 1974 – Meaning of Articles 56, 62, 70, and 71 for President’s election
*Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) – Setting up special courts for political leaders’ crimes during Emergency
*Cauvery Water Disputes, 1991 – Can a state ignore a Tribunal’s interim order by passing an ordinance?
*Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 (Ayodhya) – Returned unanswered.
*Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 – Appointment of judges and whether the Chief Justice’s recommendation is binding
*J&K Resettlement Bill, 1980 (decided later) – Returned unanswered due to delay
*Special Reference No. 1 of 2001 – Can a state regulate natural gas when it is a Union subject?
*Gujarat Assembly Election, 2002 – Duty of Election Commission to hold elections when assembly is dissolved suddenly
*Natural Resources Allocation, 2012 – Questions arising from the 2G spectrum judgment
*Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 – Validity of Punjab’s law to cancel water-sharing agreements
Article 200
Assent to Bills
When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:
Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom:
Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.
Article 201
Bills reserved for consideration
When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill, the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the House or, as the case may be, the Houses of the Legislature of the State together with such a message as it mentioned in the first proviso to Article 200 and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and, if it is again passed by the House or Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to the President for his consideration.